All year we’ve been tracking what Chinese influence campaigns look like on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. A new remarkable document gives us an inside look at how it works: local governments buy global internet manipulation as a subscription service. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
The bidding document from Shanghai police lays out with remarkable clarity what they want. The first order of business is fake accounts. They need a company that that can provide 100’s of accounts on Twitter, Facebook and other platforms. Sometimes they need it quick.
Then they want a special set of accounts that are camouflaged as real people and have their own following. Aware of the bot purges on sites like Twitter, they demand the contractor be able to keep the account up for long periods of time.
This speaks to a new level of sophistication. China’s bot nets fail in part because they are hordes of unfollowed accounts that repost official state media. Now that is changing. The goal is to create credible, well-followed accounts to astroturf. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
They then get into some specifics about platform manipulation. They spell out how they need the fake accounts to juice the likes and retweets of specific posts, with the goal of tricking recommendation algorithms to make government posts appear “at the top of the forum.”
Not content to deceptively propagandize, China police also go on the offensive, identifying critics living overseas and tracking their connections in China. In a growing number of cases, family members are held to intimidate Chinese living abroad into deleting accounts.
When it comes to China content, it’s increasingly difficult to discern real accounts from paid boosters. This shows why. A price list for internet manipulation as a service. A constellation of contractors now provide this for local governments across China.
And we’re likely just getting started. On China’s internet government-sponsored trolling and astroturfing has gone on for years. The tools will get better. The efforts bigger. The results more sophisticated and deceptive. We’ll see if it will be effective: nytimes.com/interactive/20…
On a personal note, this was a struggle to Tweet. It was my final piece working with @CRTejada For a decade he patiently fixed my copy, offered guidance and wry jokes, and, for me, made journalism the greatest job in the world. He was the absolute best. Miss you Carlos.
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In the Cold War there were useful idiots. In the internet era, we now have useful influencers. Check out our deep dive into a new crop of social media personalities that get major support from China to boost its image overseas. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
The rise of the influencers dates back to the protests in Hong Kong, when China first began to more aggressively push its narratives on global social media. It has returned to them again and again, to defuse criticism over Xinjiang and the early spread of the coronavirus.
So what did we find? State media and local governments pay influencers to take trips around China. They also offer payment for content sharing. The influencers say they are creatively independent.
As Chinese state media worked to shift the narrative around Peng Shuai, they got help from a familiar resource: a big old bot network. We turned up 97 fake accounts amplifying and claiming to believe the creepy proof-of-life posts from state media: nytimes.com/interactive/20…
Twitter took down the ones @nytimes and @propublica identified and likely 100s more. It says it's investigating. The accounts mostly pretended to believe Peng was safe and free. Some echoed state-media attacks against foreign media and governments that had expressed concern.
They were part of a broader network of 1,700 accounts we found that pushed other propaganda points, linking #StopAsianHate to articles critical of China and hitting out at usual targets like Guo Wengui and Steve Bannon. They posted mostly during China work hours:
China's Gilded Age is over: riding high off Covid-19 success, Xi Jinping is upending China's private sector. It's about control, to varying ends: guiding innovation, reducing the wealth gap, managing debt, sculpting culture, building self reliance: nytimes.com/2021/10/05/bus…
All of this has been long in coming, but the policies/casualties keep piling up. It's a huge story and there's been tons of great coverage, but the world seems just to be waking up to it, so here are some thoughts with links to good stories.
Why now? A Chinese professor said it's about Xi's popularity: "At this point, the public would support whatever the government does. So in terms of the reforms, it’s a very important window." The hit to capital markets shows the potential dissatisfaction:
To recap the past year: Beijing cut IPO of Ant Financial, suspended apps of Didi, fined Alibaba. Created new data and algo rules, but exempted gov't. Shut down tutoring sector. Banned foreign textbooks. Declared war on celebrity fandom. Cut kids to 3 hours of games per week.
Also...likely some ban of foreign IPOs. There are some interesting ideas in Beijing's regulations. Some sectors badly needed controls. But what is happening should unnerve all. Silly parts of private tech fund serious innovative parts. Foreign investment has been critical.
Not to mention this is happening as large state-backed monopolies go untouched. I do wonder if 2021 won't go down as the year everyone realized China's era of reform and opening up (and likely the economic successes that came with its embrace of private business) truly ended.
How do you deny genocide accusations today? An online influence campaign of course.
Our breakdown of the anatomy Chinese propaganda campaigns, which now flow fast and at large scale from China to the global internet. This is likely just the beginning. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
In recent months thousands of testimonials from inside Xinjiang purporting to show Uyghurs living happily were blasted across the global internet.
The videos look spontaneous. They are anything but. Each step of the way was the hand of China’s government.
Our analysis found major linguistic correlations between the testimonials, suggesting they were half-scripted. At times they are disturbingly like hostage videos. People saying they’re free in the same way over and over obviously points to the opposite likelihood.
The world's best system of disinformation sits not in Moscow, but Beijing. A new leak shows how Beijing pulled on specialized software, censors, trolls, snitches, and police to exert precise control over the early narrative of the coronavirus pandemic. nytimes.com/2020/12/19/tec…
Videos that showed hospitals overrun, corpses in the streets, angry residents in lockdown were purged. Media was ordered not to call the virus fatal. Terms like lockdown were downplayed. The heroism of party officials was emphasized.
While controls were aimed primarily at a Chinese audience, officials were aware sought to use the censorship to impact opinions abroad. One directive instructed officials to “actively influence international opinion.”