Keep in mind that Moscow is 270 miles from the closest part of the border with Ukraine but it is also 350 miles from the border with Latvia (let's not even mention Narva to St. Petersburg). NATO hasn't deployed those kind of weapons to the Baltics for a reason.
That's because such a move would be considered escalatory and destabilizing in Moscow. So how serious is the threat of the US deploying such systems to Ukraine? IMO, not likely, but I think this might be more about the systems in Poland and Romania. 2/
That's why I think one of the best deterrence measures is to open the door (or possibly even make a public commitment) to deploying land-based long-range missiles and missile defenses in the Baltics (with their agreement) in the event of a Russian escalation in Ukraine. 3/
The problem with sending more arms (e.g. Javelins) to Ukraine as a deterrence measure is 1) they won't significantly alter the outcome 2) they may make a Russian invasion more likely. Sanctions can be useful, but we rely on them too heavily. 4/
A Russian escalation in Ukraine would be an attempt to solve a security issue for Russia (i.e. a hostile neighbor becoming more powerful), so effective deterrence measures should worsen Russia's security situation if they take that COA to alter their cost-benefit analysis. 5/
We should also realize that Javelins and Stingers aren't the best weapons for nations to fight against a capable peer-adversary. We should look at developing better options for proxies, such as loitering munitions, long-range ATGM (SPIKE NLOS), and better air defense systems. 6/
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Thread on yesterday's Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board.
Putin: "work continued on the modernization of the Army and Navy on a grand scale. Consequently, the share of modern weapons exceeded 71 percent in the troops and 89 percent in the strategic nuclear forces."
Thread from last year's Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Board. 2/
Putin: We continued to actively develop cutting-edge weapons systems. Some of them,...Avangard and Kinzhal, have been put on combat duty. The Navy accomplished a wide range of tasks. Russian ships and submarines constantly patrolled all important sectors of the world’s oceans. 3/
Good thread by Mike, but I respectfully disagree. Below is my explanation of the spring buildup. When we consider what happened over the summer, it is clear that the spring demonstration didn't achieve Russia's objectives, and the current activity is likely a final warning.
Events after the Putin-Biden summit:
-HMS Defender incident
-UK-UKR £1.7 B naval agreement
-Continued US arms deliveries (additional $60 M announced in Aug-Sep)
-US-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework
-Continued Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation
-TB2 strike in the Donbas
2/
The totality of these events (the TB2 strike was a surprise), as well as continued NATO naval/aviation presence in the Black Sea, was too much for Moscow, and they wanted to stop further "creeping" NATO defense support for Ukraine before Kyiv received long-range weapons. 3/
Putin and Shoigu inspecting new rifles, including an SVCh Chuvakin, AK-12, possibly an ORSIS AR-15J, and what looks like an HK416 (probably local model). t.me/dimsmirnov175/…
Another video of Putin handling one of the AR-type rifles. 2/ t.me/RIAKremlinpool…
Screenshots of the SVCh Chuvakin, AK-12, HK416 clone, and other scoped AR-type rifle. 3/
Russia stopped short of Tbilisi because they had already achieved their goals, a siege would have been costly, and logistics was becoming a problem, not because of the US' response. Instead, Putin learned that Russia could invade non-NATO neighbors and the US wouldn't intervene.
If anything, the US' response to the 2008 War set the stage for 2014 and the current predicament by showing Russia a US military response would not happen. What you think was a sign of strength was interpreted in Moscow as weakness.
If you try to assess Russian foreign policy primarily through the lens of US domestic politics, you will get it wrong. There is also a 90% chance that any op-ed about Russia that mentions Putin's comment about the collapse of the USSR or Lenin's quote about bayonets will be bad.
Thread: Some interesting nuggets in this interview with Andrey Yelchaninov, Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission. He says state trials of the Armata will be completed in 2022 and the military will receive >40 Armata tanks after 2023. interfax.ru/interview/8071…
I think he probably meant the Russian military will receive >40 Armata in 2023. He also said new Armata ammunition is going through trials right now. 2/
Yelchaninov said tests of the Su-57's 2nd-stage engine will continue until 2026 with the first Su-57 with the 2nd-stage engine to be delivered in 2027. Of the 76 Su-57 ordered as part of GPV-2027, only 25 are expected to have the 2nd-stage engine. 3/
Not sure what "major change" means, but there is evidence Russia is continuing to send units and equipment near Ukraine, which I assume will continue. The "red line" from the US is a Russian invasion, but not a Russian enhanced military posture with more reinforcements.
Unless Biden announced major concessions during his conversation (which was never likely), the Russian buildup was always going to continue. Putin said he thinks there is value in keeping up tensions. We should expect to see an enhanced Russian mil force near Ukraine for months.
Russia has deployed much if not most of a Central Military District combined arms army near Ukraine. Until it leaves, Russia will have an enlarged military presence, and it would be costly to move it back and return it to Ukraine if the situation worsens. Easier to leave it.