Multiple Russian Navy officials, Captains, and officials from Electropribor have been accused of embezzling 692.7 million rubles ($9.35 million) from the state defense order from 2013-2016 from funds for upgrading the weapons of Northern Fleet ships. kommersant.ru/doc/5153456
They are also accused of destroying evidence and pressuring witnesses. 2 of the defendants, a retired Navy Captain and advisor to Rosoboronexport, and the head of the Navy's Missile and Artillery Armament Development and Operation Service, are under house arrest. 2/
Investigators from the FSB's Military Counterintelligence Department said the accused communicated on their phones with a foreign app that allowed them to delete their conversations, which sounds like Signal. 3/
The investigation also reportedly included unidentified members of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Command of the Navy. The embezzlement was from funds for new navigation equipment and the repair of anti-aircraft missile systems on missile cruisers (Marshal Ustinov?) 4/
The method of embezzlement is fairly common, they inflated the prices of the equipment, with the help of officials from the defense factories, and lied about the work they were actually doing. 5/
An MoD report from 2017 with then Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov visiting Elektropribor, which produces navigation systems for the Russian Navy. 6/ eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/c…
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A better explanation is that Russia realizes that Ukraine will be a long-term hostile neighbor, is determined to retake the Donbas, is arming itself for that purpose, and it is better to act now before Kyiv has greater conventional deterrence (can target Russian cities/bases)
Ukraine is a national security threat that pins down much of the Russian Ground Forces needed to defend the Donbas. Either Russia will try to force changes to Ukraine's constitution/political orientation or force NATO to stop strengthening its military to "solve" that threat. 2/
A Russian military operation would be much more costly if Ukraine has cruise and ballistic missiles that could target important Russian bases and cities, and future Russian coercion efforts would be weaker if Ukraine had those kind of capabilities. 3/
Thread on yesterday's Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board.
Putin: "work continued on the modernization of the Army and Navy on a grand scale. Consequently, the share of modern weapons exceeded 71 percent in the troops and 89 percent in the strategic nuclear forces."
Thread from last year's Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Board. 2/
Putin: We continued to actively develop cutting-edge weapons systems. Some of them,...Avangard and Kinzhal, have been put on combat duty. The Navy accomplished a wide range of tasks. Russian ships and submarines constantly patrolled all important sectors of the world’s oceans. 3/
Good thread by Mike, but I respectfully disagree. Below is my explanation of the spring buildup. When we consider what happened over the summer, it is clear that the spring demonstration didn't achieve Russia's objectives, and the current activity is likely a final warning.
Events after the Putin-Biden summit:
-HMS Defender incident
-UK-UKR £1.7 B naval agreement
-Continued US arms deliveries (additional $60 M announced in Aug-Sep)
-US-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework
-Continued Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation
-TB2 strike in the Donbas
2/
The totality of these events (the TB2 strike was a surprise), as well as continued NATO naval/aviation presence in the Black Sea, was too much for Moscow, and they wanted to stop further "creeping" NATO defense support for Ukraine before Kyiv received long-range weapons. 3/
Keep in mind that Moscow is 270 miles from the closest part of the border with Ukraine but it is also 350 miles from the border with Latvia (let's not even mention Narva to St. Petersburg). NATO hasn't deployed those kind of weapons to the Baltics for a reason.
That's because such a move would be considered escalatory and destabilizing in Moscow. So how serious is the threat of the US deploying such systems to Ukraine? IMO, not likely, but I think this might be more about the systems in Poland and Romania. 2/
That's why I think one of the best deterrence measures is to open the door (or possibly even make a public commitment) to deploying land-based long-range missiles and missile defenses in the Baltics (with their agreement) in the event of a Russian escalation in Ukraine. 3/
Putin and Shoigu inspecting new rifles, including an SVCh Chuvakin, AK-12, possibly an ORSIS AR-15J, and what looks like an HK416 (probably local model). t.me/dimsmirnov175/…
Another video of Putin handling one of the AR-type rifles. 2/ t.me/RIAKremlinpool…
Screenshots of the SVCh Chuvakin, AK-12, HK416 clone, and other scoped AR-type rifle. 3/
Russia stopped short of Tbilisi because they had already achieved their goals, a siege would have been costly, and logistics was becoming a problem, not because of the US' response. Instead, Putin learned that Russia could invade non-NATO neighbors and the US wouldn't intervene.
If anything, the US' response to the 2008 War set the stage for 2014 and the current predicament by showing Russia a US military response would not happen. What you think was a sign of strength was interpreted in Moscow as weakness.
If you try to assess Russian foreign policy primarily through the lens of US domestic politics, you will get it wrong. There is also a 90% chance that any op-ed about Russia that mentions Putin's comment about the collapse of the USSR or Lenin's quote about bayonets will be bad.