Thread by @RALee85

A better explanation is that Russia realizes that Ukraine will be a long-term hostile neighbor, is determined to retake the Donbas, is arming itself for that purpose, and it is better to act now before Kyiv has greater conventional deterrence (can target Russian cities/bases)

https://twitter.com/JeffreyGoldberg/status/1476226171889233920

Ukraine is a national security threat that pins down much of the Russian Ground Forces needed to defend the Donbas. Either Russia will try to force changes to Ukraine's constitution/political orientation or force NATO to stop strengthening its military to "solve" that threat. 2/

A Russian military operation would be much more costly if Ukraine has cruise and ballistic missiles that could target important Russian bases and cities, and future Russian coercion efforts would be weaker if Ukraine had those kind of capabilities. 3/

I think Moscow believes that Kyiv won't make any concessions unless they are forced to by Washington or by Russian military force. Putin is currently trying with the former (and not attempting negotiations with Kyiv) and will likely attempt the latter if it fails. 4/

Russia has broader security concerns with NATO and is using this as an opportunity to try to solve some of those with the threat of force against Ukraine. But the events in Ukraine are the more pressing concern for Moscow (and NATO membership isn't the proximate cause). 5/

Russia's current actions are not routine. They have given:
1) specific demands
2) tied to a short timeline
3) promising a "military and military-technical" response
4) with substantial military capabilities capable of an escalation including an invasion on short notice. 6/

They are deliberately backing themselves into a corner where their credibility will be questioned if they don't achieve concessions or use military force. These are classic elements of a compellence strategy, which usually requires force if the target doesn't change its behavior.

There are different tiers of force that can be used as part of compellence, so a large-scale invasion isn't the only possible option. Russia could shoot down TB2, target Ukrainian artillery/MLRS used in the Donbas, or unleash its long-range fires on the Ukrainian military. 8/

The key questions:
-how ambitious are Russia's objectives?
-how much force does Moscow believe it has to use to force Kyiv to make those concessions?
I'm not sure, but Russia is making it clear it considers the current events unacceptable and worthy of using force to stop them.

The spring buildup failed to achieves Russia's aims at deterring these steps, and the HMS Defender incident, Ukrainian TB2 strike in the Donbas (the footage was released publicly), and NATO bomber flights over Ukraine/Black Sea, etc. are public embarrassments for Moscow. 10/

I think there are restraints for Moscow about what kind of military force is possible (i.e. I think killing civilians or damaging Ukrainian cities would be very unpopular among Russians), but Russia can inflict serious pain on the Ukrainian military without a larger invasion. 11/

So when we try to assess Moscow's cost-benefit analysis of using force against Ukraine we need to not just assess the costs of an escalation for Russia, but also their perceived costs of *not* "solving" this issue now, which they likely think is greater.

https://twitter.com/peterbakernyt/status/1476305096937984000

We shouldn't forget about the Karabakh example for Moscow and Kyiv. Azerbaijan was determined to retake those regions, spent decades of heavy defense spending and arms imports to prepare, and then attacked when the balance of power shifted with the support of a NATO member. 12/

I don't know what Putin is thinking, but Russia's rhetoric and actions are in line with an attempt at compellence and there will be a credibility cost if they don't act or achieve concessions. Since the latter is unlikely, I think a military escalation is more likely than not.13/