Specifically, doesn’t an ‘end of war’ declaration imply that N Korea will stop its border provocations?
This is both an obvious and persuasive argument for the EoW.
So why aren’t proponents making it?
I’d bet many skeptics would oppose it much less if this were part of it.
1
This is both an obvious and persuasive argument for the EoW.
So why aren’t proponents making it?
I’d bet many skeptics would oppose it much less if this were part of it.
1
https://twitter.com/19_forty_five/status/1480965610918105099
The reason they’re not making this obvious argument is also obvious, and illustrates why the whole EoW debate is pointless:
N Korea will not stop provoking SK or even consider surrendering that card - even though it’s the very logic of the declaration!
And even if NK said it
2
N Korea will not stop provoking SK or even consider surrendering that card - even though it’s the very logic of the declaration!
And even if NK said it
2
would, no one serious would believe them.
NK can’t make credible commitments on any major issues anymore. Their long history of mendacity and provocation undercuts the whole point of something as grandiose as this EoW.
This is why I always argue to start small with NK. Go
3
NK can’t make credible commitments on any major issues anymore. Their long history of mendacity and provocation undercuts the whole point of something as grandiose as this EoW.
This is why I always argue to start small with NK. Go
3
for limited, contained deals with clear benchmarks and sequencing (Keohane’s specific reciprocity) and then build out in future deals as previous ones are successfully completed (functionalism).
Stop shooting for these big-bang, Nixon-goes-to-China moments. They’re too hard
4
Stop shooting for these big-bang, Nixon-goes-to-China moments. They’re too hard
4
to work out, all the moving parts create too much implementation complexity, and strategic trust to take big chances is too low.
If you keep insisting on a deck-clearing resolution to Korea on the order of the Camp David Accords, what you get in practice is big talk but no
5
If you keep insisting on a deck-clearing resolution to Korea on the order of the Camp David Accords, what you get in practice is big talk but no
5
actual change. This is what happened to both Trump & Moon Jae-In.
They wildly over-promised, didn’t want to do the grunt work, & thought charisma & presidential will were enough to cut the gordian knot. It’s not, so after 5 years of outreach, they have nothing to show for it.
6
They wildly over-promised, didn’t want to do the grunt work, & thought charisma & presidential will were enough to cut the gordian knot. It’s not, so after 5 years of outreach, they have nothing to show for it.
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