Exactly: "the case against realist accommodation is not only ethical but practical: In the 21st century, spheres of influence neither satisfy large aggressors nor can easily be imposed on small victims."
Declaring that Ukraine won't join Nato wouldn't stop Russian aggression against Ukraine and the west, and it wouldn't stop Ukraine's resistance.
It would rather re-introduce a dangerous precedent in European politics: that bigger powers can limit the sovereignty of smaller powers by using force (or the threat of it). The rules of the game of Europe's peace order would be fundamentally changed.
There is a big difference between acknowledging that smaller countries have less room for maneuver than bigger powers, and by turning this reality into a formal principle that is putting relations between states into a logic of domination and subordination.
And this would certainly not satisfy the Kremlin's appetite. Once the principles of the European peace order would be overthrown, Russia would double down elsewhere.
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Besides everything else, the current debate about Russian demands and actions is also a battle of world views.
Those who think that Russia is a great power, or should be a great power, tend to think that Russia has been mistreated by the West since 1991.
Those who think that great powers deserve or naturally have a sphere of influence / domination in their neighborhood tend to argue that the US should seek a compromise with Russia; de facto a delineation of mutual spheres.
Für Moskau sind Gespräche Mittel zum Zweck, und zwar nur eines der Mittel. Ein anderes ist die Drohung mit dem Einsatz von Militär.
Für Berlin dagegen scheinen Gespräche oft schon der Zweck an sich zu sein. Die Annahme scheint zu sein, dass die Gegenseite durch Gespräche gewissermaßen sozialisiert werden kann, dass sich damit Konflikte überwinden lassen.
What is the German government's position on the inclusion of Nord Stream 2 into the sanctions package in case Russia further invades Ukraine?
My reading is that it's "strategic ambiguity": on the one hand, Berlin doesn't want to officially include NS2 into the list of potential sanctions, on the other hand, the message is that "all options are on the table", as @NilsSchmid (SPD) said yesterday.
@NilsSchmid This position is a compromise between a) those who want to keep Nord Stream out of the conflict with Russia -- as many in SPD do -- and those who think it can't be isolated from broader geopolitics -- as the Greens and probably FDP thinks.
"... should not distract from the fact that Nato is not prepared to offer Ukraine membership. If doing so could avert a war, why not find some way to say out loud what any Nato official would say behind closed doors: that Ukraine’s membership in Nato is not being considered?"
@scharap assumes that all Moscow wants is a declaration that Ukraine is not becoming a Nato member anytime soon -- and that it would go back to the status quo ante, before the current crisis, if it gets this assurance.
@scharap He also assumes that otherwise Moscow would wage open war on Ukraine.
Steht alles hier: Helmut Schmidt, Strategie des Gleichgewichts. Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte. Stuttgart 1969
Seite 19: "Weil eine Strategie der Kriegsvermeidung zu der Gefahr einer Prämie für denjenigen führt, der sich an ihre Prinzipien nicht hält und seine Macht zu Lasten der anderen zu erweitern trachtet, ist die Kriegsvermeidungsstrategie angewiesen auf eine Kontinuität des ...
"CSTO support allowed Tokayev and his allies to hold on to power for the time being, yet it linked, perhaps inextricably, Kazakhstan’s political future to Russian President Vladimir Putin"
"In this new chapter of its political history, Kazakhstan’s relationship with the Russian Federation will undoubtedly be filtered through the lens of the authoritarian solidarity extended by Putin through CSTO intervention."
"Kazakhstani multivectorism—the foreign policy mantra of the Nazarbayev era—is now a thing of the past: as a consequence, we may reasonably expect the regime in Nur-Sultan to drop its typical reticence toward integration into the Eurasian Economic Union."