Before anyone labels the confirmed BrahMos sale to the Philippines as a breakthrough move, do note that Indonesia has operated the ship-based Russian-origin Yakhont and Vietnam the land-based variant Bastion-P for some time. India is certainly a new entrant to the game.
Indonesian Navy official release on the Yakhont test-launch in April 2011, from the frigate KRI Oswald Siahaan. tni.mil.id/view-26141-rud…
A 2015 special feature story by Vietnamese newspaper Tuoi Tre, on the Vietnam People's Navy 681 Coastal Defense Missile Brigade that operates the Bastion-P. tuoitrenews.vn/news/features/…
PH is tipped to be the third SE Asian military with this capability. India is not only a second new entrant into the SE Asia supersonic anti-ship missile game after Russia, but the sale to PH heralds the eventual hurdling of initial policy difficulties in exporting the BrahMos.
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Besides the genius of “Tiger of Malaya”, what’s most interesting in the course of my research that prepared my lecture on Malayan Campaign to the officer cadets back then, was the handy tactical pamphlet issued to each soldier, Read This Alone - And The War Can be Won.
What’s so interesting about this pamphlet is to start with the background in the run-up to December 1941. War in China back then bogged down; it’s akin to a python attempting to swallow an elephant instead of a deer. Imperial Japan needed resources to fuel this war effort. 1/
The imperial GHQ was generally split into two camps: go north vs go south. Go north camp advocated exploiting the sizeable IJA presence on Korean Peninsula and Manchuria to stage a knock out blow at Stalin’s USSR in the Far East to reach Siberia’s resource riches. 2/
MINI-THREAD: Yesterday (15/5) at Zhoushan, the PLA Eastern Theater Command Navy dispatched the 38th Escort Task Force for counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Notably, destroyer Nanjing debuts for such mission. My updated table below. xinhuanet.com/english/2021-0…
My first observation is that from 2019, the composition of a typical ETF has stabilized to 1 destroyer, 1 frigate and 1 replenishment oiler. Prior to that, shortfalls in destroyers would mean either 2 frigates were deployed, or that there'll be LPDs filling the slot sometimes. 1/
Second observation is the PLA Navy's increased fleet capacity accords the luxury of dispatching different ships each time, unlike in the past (up until the end of 2017) when the same ship would be deployed again. 2/
THREAD: following reports of PLA Navy Type-022 Houbei catamaran missile fast attack craft harassing a motorboat chartered by ABS-CBN journalists in the Spratlys, Beijing's pretense about just using "white hulls" to promote SCS peace and stability is well over. Context is impt.
In recent years, especially after the disparate PRC maritime law enforcement agencies were unified under a single China Coast Guard, there has been internal debate within the agency about the challenges they face when carrying out maritime sovereignty and rights protection. 1/
One of the complaints within CCG is that, while PRC has been trying to "foster stability" by using "white hulls" to spearhead maritime sovereignty and rights protection duties, they often encounter navies of the SCS rivals, putting them at disadvantage, or so they claimed. 2/
That's a load of crap, if you bother to dig out the list of transgressions which took place since late 2016. Crying victim and blame-push in order to justify asking Americans to pay to keep VFA? Want to have your cake and eat it, I suppose. cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/2/16…
Exhibit 1: “It is not enough that China now gives the impression that it is giving ‘permission’ to our fisherfolk to fish in the waters around the shoal… giving permission is an act of ownership, it should not stop our claim of ownership over the shoal.” philstar.com/headlines/2016…
Exhibit 2: "He told us we should not be overly celebrating, because we might offend China," Lorenzana. gmanetwork.com/news/news/nati…
@fravel Thank you Professor Taylor. Under Ch3, clause 20, the CCG is authorized to order foreign organizations or individuals to cease such unlawful activities or to dismantle/remove the structures, floating or fixed, within waters and on islands and reefs under national jurisdiction...
@fravel And the subsequent mention is that if the foreign organizations or individuals fail to heed those orders, CCG is authorized to stop those activities (i.e. construction of those structures) or forcibly dismantle/remove them...
@fravel This clause gives "stability-inducing cover" to CCG, because it first mandates CCG to order the other party to desist from constructing/emplacing those structures, and failing which, escalate the action to stop such activities or forcibly dismantling/removing those structures...
THREAD: The 25th Standing Committee session of PRC's 13th National People's Congress passed the Coast Guard Law, which has been under deliberation and opened to "public consultation" for the past few months since last year. Some key takes below. reuters.com/article/us-chi…
1. There has been much reported in the press focusing on the authorization of CCG to open fire at foreign vessels. The first that came to my mind is that beyond how it could impact regional maritime flashpoints e.g. SCS disputes, it's a common practice worldwide anyway. 1/
2. Authorizing MLE agencies to open fire in the course of their law enforcement and sovereignty assertion duties is nothing new, since coastal states have had domestic laws governing such provisions. In 2018, Vietnam passed its new coast guard law that outlines the same. 2/