Dmitry Gorenburg (@russmil) and I wrote an article for WaPo outlining what we think we know about the Russian military buildup. I'm going to summarize the content here. Long thread. /1
Forces near Ukraine (250-300km) can be estimated at 60 battalion tactical groups (BTGs). These are task organized combined arms formations, averaging 800 personnel in size, but structure varies. Can be 600-1000. However, BTGs are a rough way to measure. 2/
Permanently based ground forces around Ukraine constitute 55-60k. Roughly half of these 60 BTGs are therefore being counted from units garrisoned in the area, the other half represents the buildup. We are using BTGs that could be generated as an imperfect unit of measurement. 3/
When we total the number of Russian forces from perm based and those of recently added formations it is likely to be 85,000+. This does not include Russian led separatist forces in the Donbas (going to ballpark that at about another 15k but much lower combat effectiveness). /4
We're not counting aerospace or naval forces in this equation, just ground troops. The 60 BTGs therefore represent about 35% of Russia's total available BTG formations. More are on the way from Eastern Military District and will increase that number next week. /5
The addition of 30 BTGs technically more than doubles Russian ground force offensive potential. But the units sent thus far are equipment without personnel. They are prepositioning equipment, not sending manned formations. Deploying this way is less expensive and disruptive. 6/
Troops back at their garrisons still need equipment to train and maintain skills, participate in exercises, etc. so it is not cost free, but much less so than if they were away from their bases. When the Russian military sends personnel it will be an important indicator. 7/
While some training can be conducted in forward-deployed locations, it is constrained by available facilities, so if you send personnel it ends up draining combat readiness and morale, which will affect actual performance in a conflict. /8
Prepositioning equipment makes this deployment more sustainable, less expensive, and gives Moscow greater freedom to select the timing of an operation while retaining the element of surprise. But the more they mass, the more disruptive it is to the military's overall readiness.
I just want to reinforce that these are estimates. The presence of numbers in any conversation can convey false certainty, but we have to appreciate that there is a fair bit we don't know.
The reason I made this thread is because someone couldn't read the WaPo article and wrote 'democracy is behind a paywall' in their twitter comment. And I thought, that's kind of funny, but this person has a point, its hard to get information to people through a paywall.

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More from @KofmanMichael

8 Dec 21
Feel its important to dispel a few myths about the military aspects of the situation. First, that a real military buildup would have the element of surprise and this is so visible that it can't possibly reflect worst intentions. That's just not correct. 1/
Russia can deploy a large force, with prepositioned equipment, for months. Then add logistics and conduct an operation on short notice. The posture retains the element of surprise. Ukraine cannot know the timing of the operation and can't afford to mobilize too early either. 2/
Current unit positions do not necessarily reflect final unit positions. They are being moved about. Russia can move these units back and forth for months. And yes this does appear to be a much more covert deployment, contrary to what some political analysts think. 3/
Read 6 tweets
9 Nov 21
Brief thoughts on Russian military activity and deployments. The deployment does constitute a buildup, and not just north, or east of Ukraine. Elements of 41st CAA, 1st GTA, & 58th CAA reinforcing permanently based units of the 20th and 8th CAA & 22nd Army Corps in Crimea. 1/
The military activity is out of cycle. These are not routine drills, certification checks, and one would struggle to come up with innocuous explanations for what is being observed. It is not just about 41st CAA units moving up to Yelnya, or 1st GTA movements. 2/
This activity is not particularly public, or paired with coercive statements, compared to what took place in February-April earlier this year. It does appear that the Russian military has been ordered to position itself for a possible operation in the coming months. 3/
Read 7 tweets
31 Oct 21
Commercial sat imagery suggests that units parked at Pogonovo began leaving over a week ago. A new concentration has appeared near Yelnya in recent days. The 144th is an unfilled, understrength division. It appears that elements of the 41st have shifted position to Yelnya. 1/
Elements of the 41st CAA were parked in Pogonovo after March-April, supposedly to participate in Zapad-2021 exercises. They never left after the exercise which concluded mid-September. Then began loading and moving out over the past week. janes.com/defence-news/n…
Here The Lookout's post is quite helpful, discussing the appearance of a new concentration of forces in Yelnya that emerged in recent days, and unlikely to belong to the 144th MRD.
Read 4 tweets
25 Jul 21
Fascinating podcast on tripwire forces & deterrence, but in listening to this, and reading the article I have questions. If just having sufficient forces to blunt was a solution, then we wouldn’t have weaker states attacking stronger ones. How much does the mil balance matter? 1/
The authors seem to stray a bit into the best deterrence is defense. That’s not true, defense is not deterrence. However, the belief that having deployed forces to blunt an attack & thereby achieve deterrence by denial is the prevailing conventional wisdom in DC. 2/
The problem is that military establishments come to different impressions of the military balance, expectations for how a war might go, and political leaders are not impressed by capability/operational concepts anyway. Having more stuff is only part of the equation. 3/
Read 8 tweets
22 Apr 21
Some thoughts on Shoigu's recent announcement declaring an end to this buildup of Russian forces near Ukraine's borders. Well, most of them. The statement is a positive evolution of this situation, but I would not count the matter resolved. Thread 1/ tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…
Shoigu suggested that the deployed elements of 41st army are actually staying in Pogonovo outside Voronezh until Zapad-2021. This means through September. 56th VDV BDE is not on his list, so we can assume they will stay in Crimea and convert into a regiment there as planned 2/
We still have to see this withdrawal happen over the coming weeks, even as there are indicators that some units are on the move from Eastern Military District in Russia to this region, i.e. the final force posture that they intend to maintain after April is unclear. 3/
Read 4 tweets
14 Apr 21
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. Russian troop deployments continue. The situation looks set to endure through April into May. Russian rationales (plural) offered remain unconvincing. I would look closely at mil posture and statements over next two weeks. 1/
Russian forces are deploying in staging areas, not moving to forward assembly points, or dispersing. This may change. The distance between Voronezh and Ukraine for example offers some time for indications and warnings, and modest opportunity to detect change in posture. 2/
There are indeed field hospitals, signals units, electronic warfare, air defense, MTO combat service support units involved. Mostly seeing elements of 4 armies, 3-4 VDV units, and supporting assets that belong to higher echelon commands in MDs. 3/
Read 5 tweets

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