Thread by @jasonkstearns

(BOOK THREAD#2)
My book provides some general lessons for conflicts. I argue that Congolese war is carried forward by its own momentum, it has become an end in itself. Violence has become systemic, exceeding the intentions of any one actor.

However, at the heart of this is the Congolese state, the most important of the 120+ belligerents present today. What are the interests of this state? I argue that these interests need to be studied, not assumed or ignored. (2/14)

Elites attitudes have been marked by involution: reproducing and intensifying violence, despite the cost of the population and even though other approaches could have been more beneficial to those same elites. (3/14)

In part, this is due to naked economic interests. But normalization of violence––in particular through cultivation of apathy in the Congo and abroad––and the essentialization of identity ("that's just how those Swahili/easterners/Congolese are") have contributed a lot. (4/14)

Across the border in Rwanda, different factors led to a similar outcome: an investment in violence even when it did not necessarily benefit those in power. The RPF's institutional culture, internal conflicts and the concentration of power played key roles. (5/14)

The RPF's main perceived threat comes from its own army and Uganda, whereas legitimacy comes partly from security and legacy of genocide. Waging a war against "genocidaires" in Congo focused attention of RDF and highlighted ongoing threat of genocide. (6/14)

In sum, I highlight the "symbiosis" of the Congolese conflict––the extent to which it has become a vested interest of Congolese (and until 2013 Rwandan) elites. This is not maintained by grand conspiracy but by apathy and an amalgamation of individual interests––a system. (7/14)

This is not too far from what @KaldorM has termed "mutual enterprise." (8/14)

Congolese know this. "Oyo eza système ya lifelo," @KoffiOlomide_MM sang, "No Nkunda no job," "Ebola business"––all of these are expressions of this involution of interests, this perverse symbiosis. (9/14)

As @luchaRDC said: "The sick Congolese state and the confused international community are strategic partners. They manage Congo's problems together." (10/14)

And the situation is not too dissimilar elsewhere on the continent. In large parts of Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and the CAR violence has become integrated into system of governance. (11/14)

The (neo-)liberalization of economies and politics has accommodated and reinforced armed conflict in some places. Bakassi Boys, Arrow Boys: rebellion involves insurgents on periphery interacting with political elites at the center of the state in violent equilibrium. (12/14)

It is no surprise that counterinsurgency in many African states often looks more like patronage, aiming at co-opting regime strategies for exercising authority outside of warfare. (13/14)

In Chad, @m_debos has described how war has become a "métier." In Guinea-Bissau @henrik_vigh has described belligerents oscillating between friendship and enmity. @AchilleMbembe1 spoke of "intimacy of tyranny" on the continent. (14/14)