TL;DR: This can be real and mod quite what it seems at the same time. gov.uk/government/new…
First, I’m always skeptical of anything that comes from intelligence services, not because I think intelligence services are evil or prone to lie, but because such stories are inherently unverifiable. I don’t like data I can’t verify.
However, skepticism ≠ rejection, and unverifiable ≠ unreliable. It just means we need to ask questions.
One of the questions we need to ask is how we — and how the UK gov’t in this case — understand “Russia”, “Russian intelligence svcs” and “the Russian government”.
While most analysts I know here in London are well aware of the complexities of all of the above, Liz Truss’s statement simplifies things to a monolithic entity. That’s potentially problematic.
We know that there are competing interests within the Russian system. We also know that there are competing networks vying to wag the dog, and that has particularly been the case in Russia’s intervention in Ukraine since 2014.
Developments in Donbas since 2014 are rife with Russian intel actors and their local “friends” devising plans and trying to sell them to the Kremlin. Sometimes the Kremlin buys, sometimes it doesn’t. That’s a big part of how the system works.
That system, though, generates an awful lot of chatter — most of which is genuine, but much of which never grows legs.
In this case, it’s entirely plausible that Russian intel actors did indeed decide the plan that Truss has revealed. And yes, it would be bad if Russia tried to put that plan into action. And it’s bad that the Russian gov’t is paying people who come up with plans like this.
But we don’t know — and we can’t independently verify — whether there was ever any top-level buy-in for this plan. Without that, it may not mean very much.
If the FCDO has evidence that the communications they presumably intercepted were robust and included clear instructions from Moscow to the field, that would be meaningful in the extreme. If that’s the case, they ought to say so.
Absent that, though, I’m just not sure the evidence we have justifies the headlines we’re seeing. “Russian agents plan Kyiv coup” ≠ “Kremlin plots Ukraine putsch”.
Before I go, a disclaimer: I’m not here to say we should be ignoring what the Kremlin is doing. Even without a coup plot, Putin’s stance is threatening in the extreme and demands a response.
But just because Putin threatens a war doesn’t mean we need to deliver the fog.
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And there we have it: Russia apparently resolves to undertake a formal intervention to prop up an incumbent government in the FSU. If this goes ahead, it will be a first.
Yes, Russia intervened to prop up Lukashenka, but not formally — and not this overtly. Russia also intervened in Georgia, Moldova, Karabakh and Tajikistan in the early 1990s, but under very diffident circumstances.
If this does run through the CSTO, it will be interesting to see how many of Russia’s CSTO allies contribute troops — Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
(2) People who are experts on other countries -- say, Russia, Ukraine or Belarus -- may have smart and thoughtful things to say, but that doesn't make them experts on Kazakhstan.
(3) Comparisons to other countries -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, etc -- can be instructive and enlightening, but they need to be structured in order to be useful. We need to know what we're comparing and why, if we want to use the comparison wisely.
And before anyone starts with the “Putin isn’t a socialist” argument, you’re right — he isn’t.
But neither were the Soviet leaders Putin knew best. By the time Brezhnev came to power, it was about power, not socialism.
Brezhnev presided over the creation of essentially oligarchic control of the economy (a term scholars were using in the early 80s, _not_ a retcon). See Robert Tucker, Val Bunce and others writing in the 1980s.
This is a bad headline — but it’s even worse policy. TL;DR on a quick thread: The US (and Europe) should open doors to Russian citizens vaccinated with Sputnik-V. washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/…
First, on the headline: the US isn’t actually closing the door on Russians or anyone else. It’s opening the door to people vaccinated with WHO-approved vaccines (more or less) — a list that doesn’t include any of the vaccines available in Russia.
But while not opening the door isn’t the same as closing it, Russians could be forgiven for seeing the difference as somewhat trifling.
Now, I can already hear the howls from some on here: “Who cares!” We should all care.
A friend recently dropped off an old @CarnegieRussia brochure, and while it’s from well before my time at the CMC, I couldn’t help but share the nostalgia! (Russia hands may find this amusing. Or not. Caveat emptor.)
First things first: Alexei Arbatov never changes. Ever.
So, just over 24-hours into Russia's three-day electoral bonanza, and it's going more or less as you might have expected. TL;DR: The Kremlin's not taking its chances.
A few observations follow, with the caveat that info is thus far limited, and there are still 2 days to go.
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First: There are widespread reports of what can best be described as shenanigans. These don't have the feel of a massive, centrally coordinated falsification campaign, but they do feel like a massive uncoordinated falsification wave. Pick your poison.
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In this context - and before proceeding - it's worth re-re-upping a point re-upped by @Ben_H_Noble in @MoscowTimes: Russian authoritarianism often operates through decentralized proactive compliance, rather than centralized control and coercion.
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