While I am tempted to agree with @McFaul on emotional grounds, I would take an exception on academic grounds, for two reasons. First, Western colonial enterprise in Africa and Asia was based on economic exploitation underpinned by a racist ideology.
Russia, as a colonial power, partook of this enterprise insofar as it was directed towards non-European peoples (Central Asia, Caucasus). Ukraine does not fit this pattern. The pattern of domination is much more in line with, say, English-Irish or English-Welsh relations.
If you don't agree, you might ask yourself if you know of any cases where, say, an ethnic Vietnamese would hold a position of power in Paris, or an Angolan in Lisbon. Also, compare economic relationship between Ukraine and Russia in the Soviet context with, say, Italy-Somalia.
The second reason that I am not too keen on the colonial framework in relation to Russia and its immediate neighbourhood is that it adopts a somewhat arbitrary division of the colonised and the colonisers.
My favourite example is Abkhazia. The Abkhazians would see Georgians as a "colonising" power whereas the Georgians would see the Russians as a "colonising" power. The reality is that they both have the potential to be colonising powers.
The same btw applies to Russia/Ukraine in relation to ethnic Russians in Ukraine. This is not to deny the fact that Russia has amassed a huge force on Ukraine's borders, has annexed a piece of a neighbouring country's territory, and quite possibly wants to annex more.
This is merely to stress that the "colonial" analytical framework does not begin to capture the complexity of this situation.
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An interesting development in Ukraine today that will go under the radar for most country watchers but which is badly-timed from the point of few of diffusing Russian-Ukrainian tensions: provisions of Art. 25 of the Ukrainian Language Law go into effect.
These require that the minority language print media furnish Ukrainian versions of their publications. Here's the relevant provision. This does not apply to publications in English and "EU languages" and mainly affects Russian publications.
I re-read the Venice Commission verdict on this law, which is (predictably) highly critical of provisions that discriminate against Russian, including Art. 25.
A mistaken view imho. Rhetoric in CEE, including in the Baltics, was very much that Russia's weakness represented a unique opportunity to escape Moscow's grip. The (not unreasonable) fear in the early-mid 1990s was that Russia would eventually succumb to its imperial fantasies.
After Zhirinovskii showed stunning results in the 1993 Duma elections, Lech Walesa memorably told Clinton that "every second Russian thought like Zhirinovskii." There followed a prolonged, brutal war in Chechnya that cast further shadow on Moscow's post-imperial credentials.
Walesa basically represented the mood across the region. And when I read this today - as someone who despised Zhirinovskii back then - I know that Walesa exaggerated. But the burden was on *us* to prove him wrong. And did we? What imperial fantasies do we still nurture?
"Asked about Ryabkov keeping the door open to basing troops and equipment in Latin America, Sullivan responded: “I’m not going to respond to bluster in the public commentary.”... “If Russia were to move in that direction, we would deal with it decisively.” apnews.com/article/europe…
So, he says he won't respond to bluster and then... does it anyway. This comment is of course all over the Russian media, presented for maximum effect as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and so on and so forth.
By the way, in exploring the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I came to the conclusion that Khrushchev's decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was mainly the result of his concern that Moscow was not allowed to do what the US allowed itself to do in Europe.
An interesting historical document. Soviet Ambassador in Iran proposes to build up Soviet forces at the Iranian-Soviet border "to raise alarm among Iranian reactionaries." Molotov suggests to Stalin that they could just carry out military exercises in the border area.
The history of the question is as follows: in 1945 the Soviets (who at the time occupied northern Iran) helped foment an ethnic Azeri insurgency. The insurgents were de facto in control of northern Iran by late 1945. But they depended on Soviet protection.
Facing pressure from the US, Stalin was forced to withdraw troops from Iran but he did so after he achieved an agreement with Tehran that 1) they'd respect ethnic rights of the Azeris and 2) they would grant the Soviets an oil concession. Prime Minister Qavam promised to deliver.
This op-ed by @EvelynNFarkas is making rounds: defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/…. In a nutshell, she argues that the US must go to the United Nations to build a "coalition of the willing" and then demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine and Georgia or face war.
This op-ed has justly been criticised as out of touch with reality. E.g. in passages like this.
The op-ed has a lot of history. Problem is, the "beginning of the end of the international order" refers to international order created in 1945, which entailed "acceptance of Russian gains," including significant territorial changes. Awful? Yes.But let's not kid ourselves.
A rather uninspiring op-ed by Bret Stephens: nytimes.com/2022/01/11/opi…. Makes some far-fetched claims about Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which inter alia show that he has no idea what he is talking about, which is a familiar feature to those of us who follow Bret Stephens).
But this here is a real jewel of historical comparisons. Ok. The US airlift in 1973 *postdated* Egypt's and Syria's attack. In fact, even after the Yom Kippur war started, Nixon/HAK were reluctant to authorise an airlift to Israel. They only did it after the Soviet began theirs.
By launching an airlift to Ukraine, the US will (most certainly) provoke a war that it is ostensibly trying to avoid. OK what happens then. Oh, I see.