Folks are right to be skeptical about regime change, but if you consider the logic, a compellance operation or a punitive raid doesn't make good sense in this case. Moscow has no way to enforce implementation of any agreement it imposes without regime change and/or occupation. 1/
The problem with the various lower-end scenarios is they don't offer much in the way of gains. Prior offensives yielded Minsk I, and again Minsk II. This strategy is seen as having failed. Why would Moscow repeat the same failed strategy of compelling with a limited operation? 2/
Moscow loses bargaining power as soon as an offensive ends, which means it has no way to secure preferences in UKR no matter what deal is signed at gunpoint. UKR only gains in Western support, Russian influence declines in the country, sanctions increase. 3/
The deployment of Russian forces in Belarus suggests they intend a pincer movement to encircle Kyiv. If they intend to besiege the capital then very likely the Russian plan is to impose regime change. What would Moscow want to install if not a pro-Russian regime? 4/
Installing a pro-Russian regime may be a more likely Russian plan than hoping airstrikes & offensives result in something. The anticipated scale of the operation suggests to me that Russian pol goals are very ambitious - far beyond another Minsk agreement. 5/
If they are going to use force, and the evidence points to this prospect, then its probably going to be on a large-scale & with maximalist aims. The lesser alternatives lose Moscow more than they gain, and hard to see how Russia secures political aims with a punitive campaign.
I wouldn't exclude the prospect of partition either, which is both a contingency, and the threat Moscow will likely make if it is holding a substantial percentage of UKR territory. That may be the leverage they intend to use to attain desired political ends.
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