Cyberattacks against Estonia 2007, interventions in Georgia 2008 & Ukraine in 2014, recognition of Abkhazia & S. Ossetia as countries, annexation of Crimea, war in Donbas, hit squads in London, Salisbury, Berlin & Tomsk killed Europeans & undermined European security.1/
Compared to this list, please explain to me how NATO expansion -- the last major wave which took place 20 years ago-- "threatens" Russian/European security? (& yes, I take note that NATO did attack a Serbian dictator conducting ethnic cleansing.) 2/
And now today, Putin has deployed 130,000 heavily-armed soldiers to invade Ukraine. Isn't that a threat to European security too? Before this crisis, what had Ukraine, Biden, or Brussels done to threaten Russia? Nothing. (The false equivalency in policy debate needs to end.) 3/
Equivalency arguments would be more valid if the US had invaded Belarus, recognized Chechnya as an independent country, supported separatists in Dagestan, sent hit squads into Russia for Snowden & Germany had annexed Kaliningrad. But of course, we havent done any of this.
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On the U.S. preemptive war in 2003 vs Putin's planning for preemptive war 2022, I don't see logically or morally how you could be against the former but acquiescent to the latter. I'd have thought there'd be more outrage at the UN or campuses about this new impending war.1/
The decision to invade Iraq when we did was a mistake. In the fall of 2001, I had a different view. By the spring of 2002, I changed my view. By me aside, even if you were against the war from the beginning, there is no moral equivalency between Iraq then & Ukraine now. 2/
Ukraine has not invaded or tried to annex a neighbor. Or used chemical weapons. Or violated countless UNSC resolutions. Or repressed or terrorized Ukrainian citizens. Or done anything threatening to Russian security. Rather than seeking WMDs, Ukraine gave up nukes. 2/
You can argue that Bush's preemptive war in 2003 and Putin's preemptive planned war in 2022 were/are both immoral. 1/ THREAD
You can argue that 2003 and 2022 were/are strategically imprudent and geopolitical blunders. 2/
You also can explain both 2003 and 2022 as the "world as it is" -- great powers doing what they do. We may not like it, but that's the nasty Hobbesian world we live in. Classic realism. 3/
"MAPs do not provide security guarantees, and the hard reality is that Ukraine today is not qualified to join NATO. Zelensky should focus instead on implementing necessary domestic reforms to prepare Ukraine for NATO membership without formally signing a MAP." 2/
Since 1945 until today, U.S. soldiers have been stationed in Germany to deter a Soviet threat and now a Russian threat. I don't recall German leaders describing these deployments as "too provocative" to Moscow. But I'm not an expert on German history. I'm probably wrong. 1/
Imagine, if during the Berlin blockade in 1948, Truman had said, 'better not send any planes; Moscow might think it too provocative?' (Remember, in 1948, West Germany was not a formal ally.) 2/
The Berlin blockade analogy is an instructive one. Think of the counterfactual. Had we not responded and let the Soviets take the city, would Moscow have then stopped threatening West Germany or other parts of Europe? Of course not. 3/
"But what if Putin really wants to talk about European security? If so, U.S., Canadian and European leaders should embrace the opportunity." 1/ THREAD
Some of the great pillars of European security of the past — the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Vienna Document, the Paris Charter, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine and 2/
"the Helsinki Final Act — are either now defunct or no longer serving their originally intended purposes.
Many of the demands in the draft treaties now floated by Putin, however are nonstarters and violate agreements Moscow signed before." 3/
My colleagues were not short of words to describe this summit today & this is probably no bad thing. I too used the term ‘historic’ to describe it, referring to the long way we have come...& entering the period of productive construction that the start of this decade ushered in."
"Now we are starting to build up our cooperation, and so I would agree overall that this is indeed an important stage in building a full and productive partnership between Russia and NATO." 2/
"Incidentally, even the declaration approved at the end of our talks states that we seek to develop a strategic partnership. This is not a chance choice of words, but signals that we have succeeded in putting the difficult period in our relations behind us now." 3/