It is certainly possible that Putin will backdown, but then the buildup will have been a strategic failure for Moscow. NATO countries will consider future buildups as bluffs and will draw the lesson that increased arms exports to Ukraine were decisive and will send more arms.
There will be a credibility cost for Russia and Kyiv will only be more emboldened to purse policies that will upset Moscow and to seek longer-range weapon systems. It would be a remarkable strategic blunder for Putin, which is why I think an escalation is more likely.
Plus, they are deploying a lot of equipment and units from the Eastern Military District. It is highly unlikely Russia would keep this force in Belarus until next fall. They'll be in a strong position to escalate once the exercise is over but readiness costs will soon increase.
And remember that Russia conducted a buildup in the spring that was designed to force NATO and the US to listen to its concerns. That buildup failed to achieve Russia's goals, which leads me to believe Moscow is more likely to use force this time if it doesn't get what it wants.
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Some people misinterpreted this tweet. Russia doesn't have all the pieces in place yet but is moving them right now (e.g. helicopters, VDV, air defenses, pipeline troops, logistics, etc.). They'll likely all be in place by February 9th. That's when an escalation is more likely.
Many of the units deployed near Ukraine aren't fully manned. I suspect we'll soon start seeing troops airlifted to Ukraine's border to man this equipment likely during the exercise in Belarus. If Russia wants to conduct a large-scale escalation, it will then have the capability.
Also worth keeping in mind when looking at negotiations with Russian officials that they are continuing to deploy forces, including from the Northern Fleet, near Ukraine. They may get close to 100 BTGs + 5 Iskander-M brigades and other important capabilities in two weeks.
A nice rundown of perspectives. I want to emphasize that Russia's current behavior—the demands, rhetoric, and buildup—are unprecedented. It is entirely possible that Russia's next steps will not be similar to previous uses of military force but could also be unprecedented.
So we are all debating how much a Russian escalation would look like 2008, 2014, and 2015. All of those events had an external catalyst that led to Russia's response. If Russia escalates now without such a clear event, it would be a significant departure from previous behavior.2/
There is a lot of uncertainty about which COA Russia may choose, and they could of course change their ultimate goal after deciding to escalate depending on how the conflict is going. We should also keep in mind that the Russian military is much more capable than 2008-2015. 3/
I would argue Russia has deployed the necessary equipment but just needs to send troops to man that equipment at this point. They will also move in another 10+ VDV BTGs if they decide to escalate. The slow preparation steps have already been taken, the next steps would be quicker
Let's not forget how many troops Russia's Military Transport Aviation can move on short notice. They moved quite a bit of equipment to Kazakhstan over the span of a week. Flying troops is much easier.
Russia has ~70 BTGs near Ukraine with important additional army and district-level assets (e.g. S-300V, Redut-2US, Iskander-M). If they continue moving units at this rate and deploy the VDV, they'll have half of the Russian military's BTGs near Ukraine in ~2 weeks.
A potentially pretty significant development. These are S-300V-series air defense/ballistic missile defense systems reportedly in Bryansk near the border with Ukraine. These would be used to defend against Ukrainian Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles. t.me/milinfolive/75…
I haven't seen the video yet, but that is a credible Telegram channel. Russia likely wouldn't conduct an escalation without more of them near the border. There are still some pieces we'd expect to see moved before a ground invasion, but this was one I was looking for.
I think Mike and I agree on most aspects of the situation other than the military option. I still think a more aggressive version of the 2008 conflict possibly ending with Russian forces outside Kyiv is the most likely option. But what if Kyiv doesn’t concede at that point?
I don’t know. A further escalation possibly requiring an occupation could be necessary, but I don’t think that is Russia’s ideal end state. Russian goals could also change once a conflict begins. They could become more or less ambitious depending on how events turn out. 2/
The demands, military buildup, and other aspects of Russia’s behavior are unprecedented, which means it is difficult to apply previous Russian uses of force to inform our view of what they will do now. Maybe it looks like 2008 or maybe Moscow decides that it need to go farther.3/
Wishful thinking. Putin has overseen:
-2nd Chechen War
-2008 Russo-Georgian War
-Invasion of Ukraine 2014-
-Intervention in Syria 2015-
Russia sustained thousands of KIAs in those conflicts. If Putin decides to escalate, he'll be prepared to sustain hundreds of casualties or more
Putin's record isn't perfect, but he has more experience using military force than any other leader in the world. Is there much evidence that Russian casualties sustained in these conflicts significantly hurt his domestic approval? We shouldn't underestimate him.
Again, if your only conception of how Russia will use force is a large-scale occupation, you're likely exaggerating how many casualties Russia will face.