The Sino-Russian joint statement, signed in Beijing, is an extremely interesting programmatic document. I am sure we'll soon have the English translation but here's the link to the Russian version: kremlin.ru/supplement/5770. Some observations. 👇🏿
1) This is a major effort to construct a globally-relevant ideological narrative to legitimise Beijing's and Moscow's bid to rework the international order. This is done by semantically challenging widely accepted terms like "international community" and "democracy."
We see this in the preamble, where they talk about Western / US interference in other countries' internal affairs, which is "rejected by the international community."
In section 1, we have a full-fledged discourse on democracy, more or less in the spirit of the recent joint Sino-Russian oped in the National Interest. The central argument: a) democracy is whatever we say it is. b) If it's not what we see it is, then see a).
The same section also talks about "democratisation of international relations," which is a long-running theme of Putin, and which contradicts another one of his long-running themes - strengthening the role of the UN Security Council, where Russia enjoys the right of veto.
This latter theme also appears in the text. My guess is that the "democratic" section was based on a Chinese draft.
2) Section 3 is pretty interesting. Here we have Russia's wording about "indivisible security," which also underpins Moscow's security guarantees ultimatum. Beijing and Moscow promise support in defending each other's "core interests."
The next paragraph shows what this means as far as China is concerned - Taiwan is specifically listed. But we don't have any mention of Ukraine (as Russia's "core interest"). Instead, the following paragraphs talks about "neighbouring areas".
This is interesting because, as @Igor_Denisov has shown, the Chinese seem keen to underplay Ukraine. The fact that it featured nearly at the bottom of Wang Yi's discussion with Lavrov (according to the Chinese readout) and did not even appear in the Russian readout is telling.
3) Other interesting bits in the section: China & Russia jointly oppose NATO enlargement. Criticise "Cold War" ideology. BTW Cold War comes up three times in the documents, which, as a Cold War historian, I find pretty interesting.
4) Lots of criticism of the US in the document. INF & AUKUS in particular. CSTO / Kazakhstan is not broached but it's telling that the statement has five paragraphs on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which the Chinese clearly prefer to the CSTO in matters of Central Asia.
5) The general tenor of the document is China's support for Russia's actions. But the fact that Ukraine is not mentioned *anywhere* in the text would suggest to me that the Chinese are putting some distance between themselves and the Russians on this elephant in the room.

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More from @DrRadchenko

Feb 2
If you asked, what is the most important document from the early Cold War that helps understand Soviet approach to the West, I would say it's this telegram from Stalin to Molotov, dated September 27, 1945.
This was where he famously coached Molotov (who was then at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers): "The Allies are pressing on you to break your will and force you to make concessions. It is clear that you must display complete obduracy."
The reason for Stalin's obduracy was that he realised that he held a bad hand of cards. The US possessed atomic monopoly. The USSR was in ruins and could not possibly support another war. So he bluffed by refusing to yield - on virtually anything. It was a psychological game.
Read 5 tweets
Jan 23
While I am tempted to agree with @McFaul on emotional grounds, I would take an exception on academic grounds, for two reasons. First, Western colonial enterprise in Africa and Asia was based on economic exploitation underpinned by a racist ideology.
Russia, as a colonial power, partook of this enterprise insofar as it was directed towards non-European peoples (Central Asia, Caucasus). Ukraine does not fit this pattern. The pattern of domination is much more in line with, say, English-Irish or English-Welsh relations.
If you don't agree, you might ask yourself if you know of any cases where, say, an ethnic Vietnamese would hold a position of power in Paris, or an Angolan in Lisbon. Also, compare economic relationship between Ukraine and Russia in the Soviet context with, say, Italy-Somalia.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 16
An interesting development in Ukraine today that will go under the radar for most country watchers but which is badly-timed from the point of few of diffusing Russian-Ukrainian tensions: provisions of Art. 25 of the Ukrainian Language Law go into effect.
These require that the minority language print media furnish Ukrainian versions of their publications. Here's the relevant provision. This does not apply to publications in English and "EU languages" and mainly affects Russian publications.
I re-read the Venice Commission verdict on this law, which is (predictably) highly critical of provisions that discriminate against Russian, including Art. 25.
Read 8 tweets
Jan 14
A mistaken view imho. Rhetoric in CEE, including in the Baltics, was very much that Russia's weakness represented a unique opportunity to escape Moscow's grip. The (not unreasonable) fear in the early-mid 1990s was that Russia would eventually succumb to its imperial fantasies.
After Zhirinovskii showed stunning results in the 1993 Duma elections, Lech Walesa memorably told Clinton that "every second Russian thought like Zhirinovskii." There followed a prolonged, brutal war in Chechnya that cast further shadow on Moscow's post-imperial credentials.
Walesa basically represented the mood across the region. And when I read this today - as someone who despised Zhirinovskii back then - I know that Walesa exaggerated. But the burden was on *us* to prove him wrong. And did we? What imperial fantasies do we still nurture?
Read 4 tweets
Jan 14
"Asked about Ryabkov keeping the door open to basing troops and equipment in Latin America, Sullivan responded: “I’m not going to respond to bluster in the public commentary.”... “If Russia were to move in that direction, we would deal with it decisively.” apnews.com/article/europe…
So, he says he won't respond to bluster and then... does it anyway. This comment is of course all over the Russian media, presented for maximum effect as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and so on and so forth.
By the way, in exploring the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I came to the conclusion that Khrushchev's decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was mainly the result of his concern that Moscow was not allowed to do what the US allowed itself to do in Europe.
Read 5 tweets
Jan 13
An interesting historical document. Soviet Ambassador in Iran proposes to build up Soviet forces at the Iranian-Soviet border "to raise alarm among Iranian reactionaries." Molotov suggests to Stalin that they could just carry out military exercises in the border area.
The history of the question is as follows: in 1945 the Soviets (who at the time occupied northern Iran) helped foment an ethnic Azeri insurgency. The insurgents were de facto in control of northern Iran by late 1945. But they depended on Soviet protection.
Facing pressure from the US, Stalin was forced to withdraw troops from Iran but he did so after he achieved an agreement with Tehran that 1) they'd respect ethnic rights of the Azeris and 2) they would grant the Soviets an oil concession. Prime Minister Qavam promised to deliver.
Read 5 tweets

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