The attitude towards "immigration" seems to be worse than the attitude towards "allowing schoolkids to come" "allowing Romanian fruit-pickers to work" "allowing foreign butchers to work" "allowing truck drivers from abroad to work" /2
The problem thus is an image problem. The imaginary average immigrant is quite different from the real average immigrant.
Hence the experience of so many immigrants in so many countries that observe discussions that „we have a problem with immigrants“ but are then told „not with people like you, of course“
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What astonishes me is that those who felt the need to leave the EU because it was not pragmatic enough have abandoned all pragmatism in favour of 100% ideology. /1
Rejecting all simplifications because they require some form of regulatory alignment - even in areas where it is unlikely the population actually wants to change the rules. /2
And so we will have beef hormone debates, chlorine chicken debates, workers‘ rights debates, environmental standards debate, animal rights debates etc etc etc /3
As it‘s getting a bit convoluted: the Protocol as the approach of the two parties to find a special solution for NI provides for two provisions that people are currently referring to quite a bit (short thread)
First of all Art. 16. Art. 16 provides for safeguards under certain conditions, requiring a specific procedure (Annex 7). Art. 16 has not been invoked here (and of course the procedures for invocation have not been followed). Also: Mr. Poots would not be the right person to do so
The WA is a treaty between the UK and the EU, the invocation of Art. 16 is a matter for the UK.
HMG‘s view on the powers of NI is truly interesting. The lesson for foreign partners: you have to negotiate with devolved executives, not Westminster, if you want your agreement to be complied with.
Not sure that‘s the message HMG wants to send.
Foreign affairs powers of constituent states are not entirely unknown. US state - though they largely lack them in theory - negotiate forms of agreements all the time. So do German Länder.
It‘s incredibly ironic that the logical consequence of a step taken to bring NI closer to GB would be to start treating NI as entirely separate from Westminster.
And I would add another component here: while I do not think the US was treated unfairly, that also does not quite matter. The thing is that the US thought of trade remedies as their weapon of choice. And the need for that weapon has grown rather than declined.
So while it encountered legal limits for its tool of choice it at the same time regarded it as ever more necessary, requiring an ever larger (and problematic) scale.
The current Russian stance is not cost-free. Russia is pushing Sweden and Finland ever closer to NATO and risks causing rather than preventing NATO enlargement (Ukraine and Georgia have not been likely to join anyways) /1
Which opens a road to a strategy involving those countries with 3 pillars: announce that Sweden and Finland will join should an attack happen. /2
The second pillar is the hardest: Eastern Europe, Germany and Italy need to find (and get help finding) alternatives to Russian gas (NS2 is more of an indicator of that problem than the problem itself - with or without NS2 Russia will have them on the hook) /3
German trade data from November 2021: exports up 1.7% compared to the month before, imports up 3.3%, exports are now 5.7%, imports 17.5% higher than Feb 2020, i.e. pre-covid. Let's look at German-UK trade /1
Comparator: Nov 21 compared to Nov 20. Exports to UK are down 4.9%. Imports from UK are down 7.9%. For the same comparator overall German exports are up 12.1%, imports are up 19.3%.
In short: decoupling continues. German trade grew with the EU as well as with the rest of the world. It shrank with the UK.