As it‘s getting a bit convoluted: the Protocol as the approach of the two parties to find a special solution for NI provides for two provisions that people are currently referring to quite a bit (short thread)
First of all Art. 16. Art. 16 provides for safeguards under certain conditions, requiring a specific procedure (Annex 7). Art. 16 has not been invoked here (and of course the procedures for invocation have not been followed). Also: Mr. Poots would not be the right person to do so
The WA is a treaty between the UK and the EU, the invocation of Art. 16 is a matter for the UK.
Secondly, Art. 18. This is the provision for democratic consent the parties provided for. Democratic consent in NI is provided shall be reached in accordance with a procedure the UK has determined in a unilateral declaration.
That‘s not what happened here.
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HMG‘s view on the powers of NI is truly interesting. The lesson for foreign partners: you have to negotiate with devolved executives, not Westminster, if you want your agreement to be complied with.
Not sure that‘s the message HMG wants to send.
Foreign affairs powers of constituent states are not entirely unknown. US state - though they largely lack them in theory - negotiate forms of agreements all the time. So do German Länder.
It‘s incredibly ironic that the logical consequence of a step taken to bring NI closer to GB would be to start treating NI as entirely separate from Westminster.
And I would add another component here: while I do not think the US was treated unfairly, that also does not quite matter. The thing is that the US thought of trade remedies as their weapon of choice. And the need for that weapon has grown rather than declined.
So while it encountered legal limits for its tool of choice it at the same time regarded it as ever more necessary, requiring an ever larger (and problematic) scale.
The current Russian stance is not cost-free. Russia is pushing Sweden and Finland ever closer to NATO and risks causing rather than preventing NATO enlargement (Ukraine and Georgia have not been likely to join anyways) /1
Which opens a road to a strategy involving those countries with 3 pillars: announce that Sweden and Finland will join should an attack happen. /2
The second pillar is the hardest: Eastern Europe, Germany and Italy need to find (and get help finding) alternatives to Russian gas (NS2 is more of an indicator of that problem than the problem itself - with or without NS2 Russia will have them on the hook) /3
German trade data from November 2021: exports up 1.7% compared to the month before, imports up 3.3%, exports are now 5.7%, imports 17.5% higher than Feb 2020, i.e. pre-covid. Let's look at German-UK trade /1
Comparator: Nov 21 compared to Nov 20. Exports to UK are down 4.9%. Imports from UK are down 7.9%. For the same comparator overall German exports are up 12.1%, imports are up 19.3%.
In short: decoupling continues. German trade grew with the EU as well as with the rest of the world. It shrank with the UK.
I quite agree with Sam: there was the belief that Brexit would magically deliver a low-regulation paradise. But there is not only no democratic consensus for that, there is also the looming question whether that paradise actually exists /1
Quite a few of those proposals (see the TIGRR Report) are written at a rather high level of abstraction, conveying vision rather than how to get there. There is a lack of thought-through detail. /2
As you can see from the merry bundling together of the idea of not regulating and having the common law deal with stuff, while simultaneously being a world-admired standard-setting regulator whose regulations are not exported (we don‘t do that), but copied everywhere.
As I proposed a metric for evaluating booster campaigns to @spignal and didn‘t want to be the lazy guy not actually doing the analysis, I did a very preliminary one. And there‘s a story - just not the one people seem to want to find (short thread)
@spignal Booster campaigns are time dependent on full vaccination. Accordingly, to see whether boosters are on track, it would seem appropriate to look at the time lag between full vaccination and booster.
I looked at when different countries reached the percentage of full vaccination they now have boostered. The later they did, the better the booster campaign.