When people talk about the economic, social and human costs to Russia arising from an expansion of its war against Ukraine, they forget: Moscow will have factored in the gains from 'acquiring' an occupied labour force and industry. A crucial oversight in some expert calculi. 
E.g., if Russia loses RUB 1,800 billion (€21 billion) per annum from sanctions impact (based on loss of gas revenue to Europe), how much does it gain from subsuming, say, one-third of Ukraine's economy? €45 bn pa is too high, due to sanctions. Maybe €15-25 bn pa? Breakeven.
What would be the social cost to Russia? This would be linked to the economic 'hiccup' as Russia adapted its economy (toward the East) and the human cost in terms of lives and permanent disability. Angry mothers of dead soldiers: did that tip Putin off his chair after Chechnya?
Putin can withstand many thousands of casualties from among army ranks. After all, 700,000 to 900,000 Covid deaths have not shaken his power. It will only be a problem if Russian cities and their populations are attacked directly. Then, maybe, people will react to the 'cost'.
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