Thread by @DAlperovitch

I’ve been convinced since mid December that the RU invasion of UKR is very likely. But I recognize that a lot of people disagree (not least of all, many in UKR government — at least publicly)

It is always good to reevaluate your assumptions so let’s red team the alternatives 🧵

I have heard 2 predominant theories of why Putin might not invade:

1. He will recognize the significant risks and costs of an operation and pull back at the last minute

2. This was a bluff from day one and he was never planning to invade

Let’s evaluate both systematically

First, the pullback theory

Essentially, some people seem to believe that Putin—who, whatever else you want to say about him, is no dummy—launched a massive troops buildup (and not recently, but back last spring) and only just now realized that it is not going to work

In fact, given that the force buildup is still taking place at the moment, he apparently has not yet come to this realization but will definitely do so sometime soon

And no one in the quite capable Russian General Staff was smart enough to realize this either or at least convince him of the futility of the invasion. But they will soon!

And once he realizes this, he will jump at the (quite flimsy) diplomatic straws that are being thrown at him by Biden, Macron, Scholz, etc and negotiate an honorable pullback in exchange for some unspecified token win (one that he has already publicly described as insufficient)

Ok. I won’t put an explicit probability on this theory but let’s just say that I don’t think it is very plausible

Now on to the bluff theory

It essentially goes like this—Putin was never planning to invade and the many monthlong military build-up, exercises in Belarus and diplomatic ultimatums were all designed to get concessions from US, NATO, Ukraine, etc

On the face of it, this seems much more plausible. So let’s start with the assumption that this is what Putin was indeed planning all along

Putin so far has had about 2 months of diplomatic discussions with the West to extract major concessions while he was building up leverage with the military moves.

But now that the buildup is days away from completion, his leverage is going to start to drain rapidly

Morale on the frontlines is going to decline rapidly in these pitiful conditions 👇. And he won’t be able to keep the troops at high degree of readiness outside of their bases for extended period of time

https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1489971014633246728?s=20&t=sfCgNOjxV49QZc4RtmB5xQ

With over 50% of BTGs already deployed near Ukraine—and, most importantly, a lot of equipment (much of it moved out of the Eastern District in the far east)—Russia is not well prepared for other potential security eventualities that might arise up elsewhere

The world is a dangerous place. You just do not want to remain in this precarious security situation for long

Plus, while most of the troops deployed near Ukraine are professional contractors, a not insignificant portion of the military is made up of 1-year conscripts. And their term starts to run out in April

New conscripts would be coming in at that time but they need to be put through training before they can do anything useful. While perhaps the conscription term would get extended on national security grounds, that would be very unpopular and would further impact morale

Over time equipment—some of which has been deployed for months—will start to experience issues and will need to be repaired/replaced. That will be hard to do in field conditions. So the force readiness will decline in the coming weeks and it will not be possible to sustain it

NATO countries, which have been flying constant recon flights over Ukraine, will quickly observe this and come to the conclusion that the whole thing has been a bluff and Putin had no intention to invade

And their willingness to offer serious concessions will decline accordingly

So perhaps he gets to extend his negotiation window for another 30-45 days—but really not much longer. And with each day that he doesn’t take action once the buildup is finished, his leverage will likely decline

And what concessions has Putin gotten from the West so far?

This is a great thread on the specifics of the written US proposal to Moscow👇

Basically some concessions on offensive missiles, no *permanent* troop build up in Ukraine, willingness to discuss strategic bomber flights and intermediate range missiles

https://twitter.com/baklitskiy/status/1488910193727524873?s=20&t=sfCgNOjxV49QZc4RtmB5xQ

It is hard to sell this as a big win—and, in fact, Russia is not trying to. Lavrov has explicitly said that there is some good things in the proposal but it does not address Russia’s fundamental concerns

As to Russia's core concerns about NATO expansion and NATO infrastructure in Ukraine, they do not seem to have gotten anything substantive

Quite the opposite
- NATO has supplied more weapons and ammo to Ukraine since the buildup began
- More trainers
- More western intelligence collection on Russia’s borders
- Turkey has signed an agreement to build TB2 drones in Ukraine
- US has deployed more troops to Europe

NATO is also more unified than it has been since the end of the Cold War—unified in confronting Russia that is.

So in every possible way with regards to Russia’s concerns re: NATO, they are worse off now than 2 months ago

And even though Washington believes that invasion could be days away, they have not offered Russia any more substantive concessions.

So why would they do so in the future when Putin’s leverage is declining?

So if he WAS bluffing, Putin has now lost and his only alternative to invasion is to ratchet down his demands and settle for a humiliating public defeat of a troops pullback and the start of long-lasting talks on (self-described) issues of secondary priority

Meanwhile, Ukraine wins by not blinking in the face of an existential threat and, as a result, getting closer to NATO in every practical way

Any further discussion of freezing NATO expansion will be in the rearview mirror. NATO weapons and a lot of other infrastructure will likely remain in Ukraine permanently

So is the bluff scenario possible?

Perhaps—one can hope—this is indeed how this troublesome episode ends but I find it hard to believe that Putin—or the siloviki security elites around him—would ever accept such a humiliating outcome

Thus, I remain convinced that invasion is highly likely to occur in the next 10-12 days. I hope I am wrong

END