Thread by @MMazarr

I so respect and agree w/most of what @KoriSchake writes, but am surprised by the implicit message of this new piece--specifically that a major part of "the Biden problem" is that the president isn't willing to threaten military force to defend Ukraine
nytimes.com/2022/02/11/opi…

2/ *No one* wants Russia to invade or considers the threat to Ukraine a minor issue. It would be a human catastrophe and a major assault on shared norms. But the security of Ukraine is simply not a vital US interest; there's no way to escape that brutal fact

3/ Kori writes, "Biden is sending the message that the US is afraid of confronting Russia militarily," and even if we don't plan to attack, "it’s a big bargaining advantage for Russia if ... we’re ultimately reassuring it that it doesn’t need to worry about us"

4/ But why telegraph a willingness to fight a nuclear-armed power over a non-vital interest? Maybe there's some bluffing/Schelling-esque "promise you would rather not fulfill" elements here. But it would be a profoundly irresponsible act for a US president to bluff over this

5/ She adds, "Most egregiously, Mr. Biden let Russia know it need not fear the prospect of US troops fighting to defend the sovereignty of Ukraine and postwar order, saying publicly that 'there is not going to be any American forces moving into Ukraine'"

6/ But that's exactly what he should have said. Why should the American people be willing to risk major war over a country that is not vital to them? Those who advocate fighting also need to indicate how to solve the operational problem--deploy US armored BCTs to Ukraine?

7/ The US cares deeply about many things it will not--and *should* not--fight for. In the Cold War these included the French position in Indochina to Laos to Hungary and Czechoslovakia to Afghanistan. Commitment to a norm doesn't equate to an imperative to fight for it

8/ She continues: "Russia knows it won’t confront US forces," so "we have effectively conceded to Russia a sphere of influence to prey on countries beyond NATO’s boundary." That presumes military punishment is the only way to deny the claim to a sphere of influence; not true

9/ Overreach is strategically perilous. Russia's projection of power in Ukraine would impose a long-term strategic penalty. We could have used the same "we must fight to avoid influence" language over Afghanistan in 1979; instead we met our goals by imposing costs over time

10/ She then seems to back off her advice and doesn't advise large-scale US force deployments. The advice seems to be, Indicate that you might go to war w/o taking the steps necessary to do so. But that would be the most incredible posture of all

11/ This crisis reflects a rising pattern: Motivated rivals challenging norms on the fringes of vital US interests. We better get our head around the fact that we will not and should not use military force in these cases--and get busy developing alternative responses

12/ The critical distinction to me is thinking long-term rather than short-term. RU and CH may get away with some adventurism. But w/the right economic, political, and other responses, we can assure that every such step makes them strategically weaker vs stronger

13/ The days of sufficient US power to deter + defeat any assault on global norms are past. As in the Cold War, there will be times when we have to live with horrible actions directed at distant peoples. Success will come in the long-term strategic balance