But even conditional on my inflation views, I'm even more uncertain about what exactly monetary policy should do. Nervous about overreacting but also nervous about being so far from a reasonable place now.
So just, well, nervous.
There are good reasons to think inflation will go down (shift to services, massive stimulus behind us, workers returning, global supply chains unsnarl, normalized endemic COVID). A number of these arguments are overstated, often in the same way, but collectively plausible.
There are also good reasons to think inflation will go up (tighter labor markets, higher inflation expectations, wage-price spiral, continued excess demand with accelerations Phillips curve, normalized endemic COVID). (Yes, normalized endemic COVID is on both lists.)
All in all, I give a bit more weight to the down arguments than the up ones but with trepidation. I've said inflation in the 3-4 percent range, more data and reflection would leave me. I'm tempted to raise that to 3.5-4.5 percent given more data and reflection.
What should the Fed do? I wish interest rates were much closer to neutral right now, like 2-3% on the FFR (depending on your view of neutral real & expected inflation). I can even see the argument for being at a very dovish Taylor rule of ~6%.
BUT, the idea of rapidly raising rates is scary. In November I called for three hikes in 2022. I held back in part because of fear of too abrupt a shift being destabilizing. I'm surprised about how much the Fed has shifted with financial markets by and large taking it in stride.
At this point raising rates by 150 bp or 175 bp (once per meeting possibly with a 50bp hike at the first one) is well within the bounds of reasonable IF I'm right about inflation and employment continues to improve.
But how about more?
I worry a lot that more would do precisely what the hikes are intended to avoid--which is to push the economy into recession. Raising rates by 2-3pp in a single year in a world of uncertain financial market reactions and monetary lags is terrifying.
But having monetary policy at an expansionary setting for the entire year--which is what the 6 or 7 hike scenario would mean--is also terrifying, especially with the lags in monetary policy.
Where does this leave me? Mostly I would love the Fed to have a better forecast for inflation that is not the product of wishful thinking about overstating all the reasons it will come down & ignoring the reasons it will go up. This has gotten much better but could still improve.
I have less strong feelings about what policies exactly they would do conditional on that forecast.
And note, they don't and won't decide/lock forecast now, some of this will get clearer as the year evolves.
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1. Gas prices not very high in historical context.
2. Federal gas tax last raised in 1993, has been cut in half by inflation since.
3. Gas tax lower than the climate/road damage/congestion costs imposed by gasoline.
4. A gas tax holiday would raise profits for oil companies.
Expanding on the last point, the "incidence" of any tax cut gets shared between the two sides of the market (whichever side is less responsive to price will get more of the tax cut). In the case of a gas tax holiday that would mean billions for oil companies.
It is depressing that the decades long link between highway financing and highway use was broken in the 1990s. If anything the gas tax should go up not down. I realize that is impossible to ask now. But at least hold on to what we have.
Over the next yr the labor force participation rate could rise by an astounding ~0.9 percentage point if all of the people who have left the labor force return.
The last time we've seen anything like this was 1976, 1977 & 1978.
Maybe not so comforting for inflation.
A short 🧵
The labor force participation fell sharply when COVID hit & is still far from recovered. Now 1pp below where it would have been if all the age-sex participation rates had stayed the same. This is due to a combo of ages and genders. (Discontinuity is the population controls.)
It's plausible that many of these people will come back over something like the next year if COVID becomes more manageably endemic or more ignored.
If these workers come back that will be great for incomes, employment, GDP, and much more.
If you think profit maximization (aka corporate greed) was responsible for the 7.5% inflation over the last twelve months, what would you say was responsible for the 6.3 million private sector jobs added over the last twelve months?
In some sense both of these are trivially the result of corporate greed in that most of what we see in our economy is an equilibrium that reflects profit maximizing decisions by firms.
The low inflation in the years up to the pandemic was also corporate greed (companies would have lost money if they charged more).
One part I love about @ezraklein's podcast is his guests recommend three books at the end. I had a chance to recommend three on the Podcast I just did with him, will link to my Goodreads reviews of them in the next three tweets. nytimes.com/2022/02/08/pod…
Who We Are and How We Got Here by uses ancient genetic data to paint a complex picture of the history of humanity. He manages to charts the ups and downs of inequality hundreds of thousands of years ago. Amazing science. goodreads.com/review/show/23…
.@JoHenrich's The WEIRDest People in the World uses genetics, history, evolutionary biology, economics, and more to understand the causes and consequences of the culture he calls Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic. goodreads.com/review/show/34…
A thread on the perils of interpreting moving averages that will be of interest to almost no one. Also has implications for annual averages which is a slightly more important topic. This fleshes out one aspect of my error with the Atlanta Fed wage data.
I'll use a made up hypothetical of the following wage data. What would you say happened to wages in the pandemic period (which for expositional simplicity I'm drawing as starting in 2020)?
I think you would say wages fell in the pandemic.
The right calculation for what happened in wages in the pandemic would be:
Wage growth in pandemic = (wage level Dec 2021 / wage level Dec 2019).
In the picture above this is -1% if you annualize (take the square root to get growth per year).
My charts on the distribution of real wage growth were flat out wrong, as @IrvingSwisher correctly pointed out. I'm deleting all of the tweets (here's a screenshot of one so you know what I'm talking about). Feel terrible to have put this out.
This 🧵 explains more fully.
The question I was trying to ask was what has happened to wage growth adjusted for inflation by different income groups & how does it compare to pre-COVID.
The broad inference is likely still true but possibly less bad than I showed (it is unclear). The data was wrong.
I still believe the following are true for the period from the pandemic to today:
1. On average nominal wages have increased more slowly than inflation.
2. Faster wage gains for lower-wage workers
3. For most groups any inflation-adjusted gains are smaller than pre-pandemic.