A thread on the perils of interpreting moving averages that will be of interest to almost no one. Also has implications for annual averages which is a slightly more important topic. This fleshes out one aspect of my error with the Atlanta Fed wage data.
I'll use a made up hypothetical of the following wage data. What would you say happened to wages in the pandemic period (which for expositional simplicity I'm drawing as starting in 2020)?
I think you would say wages fell in the pandemic.
The right calculation for what happened in wages in the pandemic would be:
Wage growth in pandemic = (wage level Dec 2021 / wage level Dec 2019).
In the picture above this is -1% if you annualize (take the square root to get growth per year).
You could also add up all the monthly growth rates during the pandemic (ignoring a small compounding term) & get the same answer:
Wage growth in pandemic = wage growth in Jan2020 + wage growth in Feb2020 + ... + wage growth in Dec2021
This is a moving average of the monthlies.
IF you used the same type of moving average in the Atlanta Fed data for 2020 and 2021 then you would actually say that the wages grew 0.1% over the pandemic period of 2020 and 2021.
That is because it is taking a moving average, basically averaging 12 month growth rates going back 24 months so it reflects not just growth rates after January 2020 but before.
You can express the 2 yr moving average that I took from the Atlanta Fed as a showing the growth rate as a function of the individual monthly growth rates (ignoring compounding):
If this formula looks weird and unintuitive to you it is because it is weird and unintuitive. It says that what one calls "2020 and 2021" is actually more affected by 6X more affected by what happened in July 2019 (which shouldn't matter) than December 2021.
In fact, 22% of the data used to compute the 2020 and 2021 growth comes from 2019 (should be 0%) and only 7% comes from the last six months (should be 25%).
When applied to actual data this matters a lot because real wages up a lot in 2019 and down a lot in the last six months.
This is why I said that this corrected figure was internally consistent (the wage timing matches the inflation timing) but didn't answer a question anyone should care about (was more about real wages in 2019 than in the last six months).
Note that all of the above is about the way I combined two years of Atlanta Fed data. But if you're using their data (or any other moving average) the same applies: the Jan 2022 "12 month" growth rate is heavily affected by what happened during 2020.
Using moving averages is a common & reasonable way to deal with data noise. It is a good way to understand the general direction of travel over a longer period for a slowly evolving series. But is not suitable for answering questions about what happened in a particular period.
When there is no data noise, I try to avoid moving avgs & the closely related annual average because of all of the weirdness. For GDP, for example, I always prefer to look at growth from Q4/Q4, just like inflation for 2021 is generally reported as Dec/Dec.
(Small caveat: Even w/o data noise you sometimes might care about annual averages if you're interested in a cumulative, like GDP down 2020-Q2, even if it rebounded by 2020-Q4 you might want to show the losses for the year.)
I've seen better threads/pictures explaining the annual average vs. Q4/Q4 growth rate issues but I can't remember where, on the off chance you got this far and wrote one LMK and I'll add it here.
Otherwise, this is now FIN.
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But even conditional on my inflation views, I'm even more uncertain about what exactly monetary policy should do. Nervous about overreacting but also nervous about being so far from a reasonable place now.
So just, well, nervous.
There are good reasons to think inflation will go down (shift to services, massive stimulus behind us, workers returning, global supply chains unsnarl, normalized endemic COVID). A number of these arguments are overstated, often in the same way, but collectively plausible.
There are also good reasons to think inflation will go up (tighter labor markets, higher inflation expectations, wage-price spiral, continued excess demand with accelerations Phillips curve, normalized endemic COVID). (Yes, normalized endemic COVID is on both lists.)
Over the next yr the labor force participation rate could rise by an astounding ~0.9 percentage point if all of the people who have left the labor force return.
The last time we've seen anything like this was 1976, 1977 & 1978.
Maybe not so comforting for inflation.
A short 🧵
The labor force participation fell sharply when COVID hit & is still far from recovered. Now 1pp below where it would have been if all the age-sex participation rates had stayed the same. This is due to a combo of ages and genders. (Discontinuity is the population controls.)
It's plausible that many of these people will come back over something like the next year if COVID becomes more manageably endemic or more ignored.
If these workers come back that will be great for incomes, employment, GDP, and much more.
If you think profit maximization (aka corporate greed) was responsible for the 7.5% inflation over the last twelve months, what would you say was responsible for the 6.3 million private sector jobs added over the last twelve months?
In some sense both of these are trivially the result of corporate greed in that most of what we see in our economy is an equilibrium that reflects profit maximizing decisions by firms.
The low inflation in the years up to the pandemic was also corporate greed (companies would have lost money if they charged more).
One part I love about @ezraklein's podcast is his guests recommend three books at the end. I had a chance to recommend three on the Podcast I just did with him, will link to my Goodreads reviews of them in the next three tweets. nytimes.com/2022/02/08/pod…
Who We Are and How We Got Here by uses ancient genetic data to paint a complex picture of the history of humanity. He manages to charts the ups and downs of inequality hundreds of thousands of years ago. Amazing science. goodreads.com/review/show/23…
.@JoHenrich's The WEIRDest People in the World uses genetics, history, evolutionary biology, economics, and more to understand the causes and consequences of the culture he calls Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic. goodreads.com/review/show/34…
My charts on the distribution of real wage growth were flat out wrong, as @IrvingSwisher correctly pointed out. I'm deleting all of the tweets (here's a screenshot of one so you know what I'm talking about). Feel terrible to have put this out.
This 🧵 explains more fully.
The question I was trying to ask was what has happened to wage growth adjusted for inflation by different income groups & how does it compare to pre-COVID.
The broad inference is likely still true but possibly less bad than I showed (it is unclear). The data was wrong.
I still believe the following are true for the period from the pandemic to today:
1. On average nominal wages have increased more slowly than inflation.
2. Faster wage gains for lower-wage workers
3. For most groups any inflation-adjusted gains are smaller than pre-pandemic.
Even if all firms are perfectly competitive an increase in demand will result in an increase in profits in the "short run"--the short run being a potentially long period until new entrants can compete the profits away.
A 🧵 with an refresher/explainer on the Ec10 of this.
The left-hand curves are the normal supply & demand, they show the market as a whole. The supply curve is the sum of the products supplied by many, many firms. Demand increases for some reason (a taste shift, strong economy, stimulus checks, whatever). The result is P and Q up.
The right-hand curves are from the perspective of a single firm. It is just a small firm in a big competitive market with no pricing power so it "sees" a horizontal demand curve. It can sell it wants at that price but nothing if it raises the price a penny above it.