Quick thread response to this note by Matt. He's right that age divide is very large currently. And 2017 and 2019 had largest age gradient since 1960s. But... these elections don't look so different, when you adjust for income, home ownership and education 1/n
@jrgingrich and I have a chapter in the forthcoming IFS Deaton Review where we look at this. Here we show the relationship between age and voting Conservative between 1964 & 2019. Left is bivariate (just age), right is adjusting for income, education, homeownership and gender 2/n
The likely culprit is, you guessed it, education, which once drove people to the right but in the last couple of elections in particular has pushed people to the left. note though, this is a long run story. 3/n
What I think is surprising though, is that WITHIN age groups, education has similar pattern. In 2019, over 50s with degrees / postgrad behaved rather like under 50s. It's just there aren't so many over 50s who went to university. But as we move into Gen Xers that changes 4/n
So will the age gradient survive or is it an artefact of educational differences of the generations who came of age before and after the great expansions of the early 1990s? I guess we'll see n/n
Should quickly add, this is using the British Election Study and working to reconcile the education, income etc indicators across surveys since the 1960s. These are pretty sparse models that don't include region, marital status, etc. But descriptively useful I think. n+1/n
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
🚨💉🏡 NEW ARTICLE 🏡💉🚨
"Social Distancing, Politics and Wealth" out in Open Access in West European Politics, joint with @aslicansunar and @madselk through our @ERC_Research grant WEALTHPOL. Yes, we wrote a COVID article ;) What do we find? 1/n tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
The paper uses Google Community Mobility data at the local level in the 1st wave of COVID19 and looks at the correlates of workplace and residential activity. Who went to work more? Who stayed at home? We focus on the UK, Sweden and Denmark and then expand to European regions 2/n
Let's begin with a dragon. Our dragon here is workplace activity relative to the baseline of Jan3-Feb6 2020 in the UK. Each dot is 1 of 366 local authorities. We see the head in Feb/Mar, the neck as lockdown hits and the body low though rising in summer with weekend spikes! 3/n
💉Who wants to take the vaccine? Together with @jrgingrich, @Jackstilgoe and Martin W Bauer, I've conducted a 2 wave panel study of how people in the UK feel about taking the vaccine. And it's pretty good news, though with some challenges left. 🧵1/n ox.ac.uk/news/2021-02-2…
Here's the good news. Whereas only 50% of people were "very likely" to take the vaccine in early October, over 3/4 are now. Adding people who are "likely" that's moved to almost 90%. And many demographic gaps (gender, ethnicity) have closed. See rpubs.com/benwansell/729… 🎺🎉. 2/n
What are the challenges? There are still a group of people who are cautious. About 7% of our sample are "very unlikely" in both waves - that's the core anti-vac group. But we also find that young people, non-voters, poorer households, and Reform UK supporters (!) are unlikely 3/n
I had a statistical conniption about the Aberdeen study published in BMJOpen earlier today. Let's see if I can explain my concerns in a less techie fashion. The gist of the article is that countries with more flights arriving had more deaths. That so? 1/n
The article, which you can read at bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjope… relies on the following scatterplot to make its point. Indeed, there does appear to be a relationship between arrivals and (logged) daily death rates. 2/n
That graphical presentation is supported by a multivariate statistical model, which shows that the result is robust to including lots of other confounds - (log) population, income, age profile, health status, density, etc. So far so good. 3/n
Since the authors of this study kindly make their data available, we can see that their multivariate finding largely depends on using absolute deaths and flights not per capita. To wit, on the left their results replicated, on the right the per capita version 1/n
Now if we then log flights per capita we can recreate their 'finding' - see below. But I'm somewhat nervous about what that means about the role of outliers. Basically we have too few observations and too much instability of results for me to be comfortable with this. 2/n
The moral of this tale is single-shot cross-country regressions as policy guidance ain't the way to go. This is where we really need something with a stronger claim to causality. You can play with data yourself and see how I created these at github.com/benwansell/COV… 3/n
🇬🇧🇪🇺 Who caused Hard Brexit? Some thoughts from the perspective of a social scientist. In the last few days we have seen an interminable debate on whether Remainers, Soft Brexiters, or Hard Brexiters are responsible for Hard Brexit. And it’s a false debate. Why? 1/n
People are confusing 'causes of effects' with 'effects of causes'. What this means is that we are all interested in - the former - why Hard Brexit happened - but using arguments about how one actor did something - the latter - as our explanation. These are different! 2/n
It is completely possible that Remainers not accepting a customs union increased the probability of Hard Brexit - that's an effect of a cause. But that does not imply responsibility. Because there are lots of other causes producing the same effect. 3/n
🧑🎓MERITOCRACY IN THE NEWS👩🎓 @David_Goodhart and Michael Sandel have both written provocative new books about the trouble with 'meritocracy'. Both argue that non-graduates have been undervalued and that graduates in non-graduate jobs are disillusioned. What do the data show? 🧵1/n
The former question is a tough one since there are two issues at stake. 1. Are non-grads elected as politicians? And 2. Are their policy preferences represented? But consensus in polisci is the answers are (a) Not as much as they used to be and (b) Not as much as for the rich.2/n