Article by @akarlin0 making the case that Russia will almost certainly invade Ukraine. I agree 1-4 are good reasons to believe that, but I think he underestimates the cost and I'm still inclined to think it won't happen, but very interesting nonetheless. akarlin.substack.com/p/regathering-…
When discussing reason #4, he draws a lot on this article published by Putin last July, which I had missed. I think it's more ambiguous than @akarlin0 makes it out to be, but it's still a very interesting window into the official Russian ideology. en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Again, I think all of 1-4 are good reasons to believe that Russia will invade, but for me it's 2 that moved the needle the most. The fact that Russia published a list of demands that it must have known the US would never accept is hard to explain if it's not planning to invade.
Still, I think his prediction of how easy it would be for Russia not only to militarily defeat Ukraine (this part I completely agree with), but also to occupy and absorb most of it into a unitary pan-Russian state is extremely optimistic and I doubt Putin shares it.
This doesn't rule out anything, but I also think this kind of statement 1) makes it unlikely Russia will invade and 2) can be interpreted as a way for Russia not to invade without losing face by spinning the whole thing as a creation of Western propaganda.
Yes, when I say @akarlin0 underestimates the cost, this is part of what I mean. I don't see how it makes sense for Russia to invade Ukraine now if the goal is just to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.
However, he thinks the goal is actually to absorb most of Ukraine, so I guess this argument has less force on him. I just disagree that Putin really is the kind of pan-Russian ideologue he assumes and think his article from last July admits of a much weaker reading.
The reason why I think it makes it unlikely to invade is that, to launch an invasion after such a statement, Russia would need the Ukrainians to do something really crazy in the Donbass and who can believe they would be stupid enough to do that now?
I get that Russia could use a false flag operation to justify the invasion, but it would have to be minimally plausible, and after making such a strong statement (it has made other similar ones since then), they can't go to war over some business as usual skirmish in the Donbass.
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Excellent fil sur le fact-checking auquel je souscris globalement et qui rejoint une observation que j'ai souvent faite au sujet du fact-checking, mais toutefois je ne suis pas entièrement d'accord avec l'analyse de @lorisguemart ou du moins je voudrais aller plus loin ⬇️
D'abord, même si je ne dis pas que ça n'a pas joué un rôle, je ne pense pas que le rôle de Facebook dans le financement du fact-checking soit la principale explication de la focalisation sur les réseaux sociaux, ce que @lorisguemart ne dit pas exactement d'ailleurs.
Je pense que fondamentalement cette focalisation sur les conneries qui circulent sur les réseaux sociaux est un phénomène de classe : le journalisme est un milieu socialement et idéologiquement très homogène, ce qui détermine largement le choix des sujets qui sont traités.
One of my hot takes, which comes from reading @RCAFDM's work on the determinants of health care spending, is that socialized medicine is good actually because it's the best way to ration health care and stop people from spending fortunes on it for small marginal returns.
This is another good sign after Lavrov's statement yesterday about how he believed there was still a chance to find a diplomatic way forward. I continue to think Russia will not invade, but I guess we'll see.
I'm sure that some people will argue that the Russians are just trying to make us think they are backing down before attacking, but to me this kind of dance really sounds like their trying to sell de-escalation to the Russian public. reuters.com/world/europe/r…
In the interest of full disclosure though, I should tell you that I have $600 on the line that Russia will not invade (a bet I made with @rfitz77 before Russia made public its list of demands on December 17, which really surprised me), so this may just be wishful thinking.
This is why prison is good actually and why you should favor long sentences for violent crimes: not because it reforms offenders, but because it incapacitates them.
By the way, the stupidity of Italian lawmakers has been a great provider of natural experiments on the effects of incarceration. Another collective pardon has also been used to support the hypothesis that incarceration had a deterrent effect on crime. journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.108…
Ça ne fait même aucun doute. D'après les papiers que j'ai vu passer, le fait d'être immunodéprimé augmente le risque d'un facteur de 2 ou 3, donc concrètement beaucoup de ces gens ne risquent pas grand-chose et ils s'empêchent de vivre à cause de l'hystérie zéro-covidiste.
Par exemple, ce papier dont a parlé @BallouxFrancois il y a quelques jours a trouvé que le fait d'être immunodéficient n'était pas associé à un risque de forme grave plus important chez les enfants. sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
En réalité, c'est sans doute un facteur de risque, mais le taux de base est si faible chez les enfants que cette étude n'avait probablement pas une puissance statistique suffisante pour détecter l'effet même s'il existe.
I think people who find that weird just don’t appreciate how much sway authority has over midwits. They really don’t care how nonsensical the argument is: as long as they consider the person or institution making it authoritative on the topic, they will accept the conclusion.
I already knew that before, but the pandemic really impressed that on me. Many people simply cannot comprehend that someone with no relevant credentials might be right against someone who they think has them, regardless of how clear it is that they are in fact right.
What’s funny is that, in many cases, the people they consider authoritative on a topic don’t actually have relevant expertise in virtue of their credentials (think about how people trust physicians to opine on epidemic modeling), but it doesn’t matter. What matters is perception.