Thread by @DrRadchenko

Here are some thoughts / documents on the "broken promise" of NATO enlargement, which (I hope) will constructively contribute to our debate. First of all, I will not go into great detail about the Feb. 9, 1990 Gorby/Baker conversation and Baker's "not one inch" remark.

This is because the facts of the story are well-known. I would suggest reading @e_sarotte and @shifrinson in particular, who are detailed and brilliant, and of course the relevant documents are downloadable here: nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/…. Be sure also to read Mary's new book.

In a nutshell, it's clear that Baker's "promise" had to do with NATO's jurisdiction in East Germany as the GDR was absorbed by the West Germans. I am interested in what happened next.

Why is this important? Because if Gorbachev struck a deal with Baker, you would expect him to act accordingly, i.e. to drop his opposition to united Germany joining NATO. This is not what actually happened. He continued to insist that united Germany should stay neutral.

Check out his comments at a meeting at CC CPSU on February 13, 1990. If he had just reached a deal with the US, you'd expect him to tell this to his party comrades. You'd expect him to say: oh yeah, they promised not to enlarge NATO beyond its current borders. He doesn't do it.

Instead, he talks about the importance of maintaining the "international equilibrium." This is a euphemism that refers to his opposition to united Germany's membership in NATO.

He continued to express opposition to united Germany's membership in NATO, e.g. in this conversation with George H.W. Bush, on February 28. Again, if a deal had been reached, you'd expected Gorby to say: we have a deal, and I drop my opposition. But thise was not even mentioned.

On March 7, 1990, Pravda published an interview with Gorbachev, which included the following question: "What is the Soviet Union's attitude towards any form of united Germany's participation in NATO?" To which Gorbachev said: "We cannot agree to it. This is completed ruled out."

Just to repeat: if Gorbachev *accepted* Baker's "not one inch" promise, he would *not* be insisting that united Germany must stay out of NATO - and yet he continued to insist.

Here's, for example, what he said in his speech to the Congress of People's Deputies on March 15, 1990. (United) Germany's membership is NATO, he said, is "unacceptable." Would he have said that if he had struck a deal re Germany's NATO membership with a non-enlargement pledge?

And on and on it goes. Historical facts show that while it is possible to argue that assurances were being offered re NATO's non-enlargement (into GDR or further East), it is *not* possible to argue that these assurances were a part of a deal with Moscow.

It is true that in the end Moscow agreed to allow united Germany's membership in NATO. The reason Gorbachev did it was not because he had been promised anything but because he had no choice. The GDR had collapsed, and Kohl was offering money for good behaviour.

Moreover, as Gorbachev's aide A. Chernyaev argued, Moscow's security situation was "defined by the nuclear balance between the USSR and the USA.” “Real security of the USSR,” he concluded, “did not depend on the amount of forces in the West and in the East, and their armaments.”

What are we to conclude from the above? When Putin says that assurances were made and the Soviets were duped, he is peddling a one-sided narrative. Have you noticed that Russian officials do not cite internal documentation on the question of NATO enlargement?

Even when they argue that promises were made, they do so by citing (mainly US) documents published by Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya at the National Security Archive: missiontonato.mid.ru/web/nato-en/na….

Looking at the Soviet side of the story reveals that Gorbachev was not a fool, nor was he naive. He attempted to prevent united Germany's membership in NATO, and he failed because he had a bad hand to play, and he played it badly. And, most importantly, there never was a deal.