1/ Bill.com allows SMB customers to pay their bills and get paid in a streamlined fashion.
2/ In June, they bought Divvy for $2.3 billion which has really accelerated Bill.com's growth.
A month later, the company also bought Invoice2Go for $625 million.
3/ There are two main aspects to Bill.com's business. The first is: accounts payable (AP) automation
This includes a supplier-specific email address to receive invoices, intelligent bill capture, accounting synchronization and Divvy's spend management platform.
4/ The second part is: accounts receivable (AR) automation.
This includes a simple invoicing platform where customers can easily pay any way they want (ACH, real-time payments, credit card, etc.)
Orders are also automatically synced with leading accounting systems.
5/ Within these 2 aspects, Bill.com makes money in 3 ways.
1. Subscription fees
- Customers pay $39/month for either AP or AR automation. For both, it's $69/month.
6/ The combination of subscription & transaction revenue is called "core revenue."
Over the TTM, core revenue made up 99% of overall revenue because interest rates on the float have been so low.
If rates did go up 100 bps, that would be worth $30-35 mil in annual revs (~5%).
7/ Transaction revenue is the real growth engine, especially with the Divvy acquisition.
Pre-Divvy, the transaction take-rate was roughly 5 bps. In 2020, there were 24 million transactions that made up $96 billion in total payment volume...
8/ So, on average, a bill paid/received was $4k and Bill.com made ~$2.2 in revenue.
The averages are sort of weird because the take-rate differs for each payment method.
ACH transfers can be as low as 10 cents and credit cards can be as high as 2.9%.
9/ Over the TTM, Bill.com now has 135,000 customers and $180 billion in payment volume.
With the Divvy + Invoice2Go acquisitions, Divvy has added roughly $100 million in inorganic revenue (24% of the total).
Divvy's 2.9% fee has tripled the blended take-rate.
9b/ Just a quick note on Divvy. It's a software platform that enables SMBs to control employee spending through physical or virtual credit cards. They make money by keeping a part of the 2.9% interchange fee.
This rake is MUCH higher than the 10 cents that $BILL gets for an ACH.
10/ Transaction revenue now makes up ~64% of overall revenue (and growing much faster) vs. the 35% that subscription fees account for.
One more interesting thing is that Bill.com has a great distribution strategy through banking partners and accounting firms.
End/ Divvy is a KEY part of Bill.com's growth story.
It is still growing well over 100% and now Bill.com can bundle a powerful spend management platform with their well-distributed AR/AP solutions.
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I can understand why bears think Elon is delusional. But the execution is unbelievably impressive. That's his MO -- set impossible expectations and when they fail, they will be much farther along than if he hadn't set those goals.
⬇️
1/
"Lastly, thanks to $5.5 billion of GAAP net income in 2021, our accumulated profitability since the inception of the Company became positive, which I think makes us a real company at this point. This is a critical milestone for the Company."
"Real company" at $1 trillion 😅
2/
"So, it's -- the cars in the fleet essentially becoming self-driving by a software update, I think, might end up being the biggest increase in asset value of any asset class in history."
Opendoor is intriguing to me now that Zillow is out of the picture.
Here are some bear theses I see and some potential rebuttals...
#1: Housing will crash
#2: Unsustainable business model
#3: Capital intensive
#4: iBuying is unsustainable
#5: Low gross margins
2/
#1: Housing market will crash
Even in 2008, the biggest single-month decline was 2.5%. Opendoor holds houses for about 90 days and about half of that is in contract with a buyer.
The actual exposure/duration is quite short and Opendoor has a strong pulse on the market.
3/
Further, the core purpose of Opendoor is to increase the liquidity of housing. It's almost like a market maker.
In crisis, the bid-ask spreads are typically wider, leading to higher margins for the market maker. Opendoor could actually have better margins in a panic.
"To others, being wrong is a source of shame; to me, recognizing my mistakes is a source of pride. Once we realize that imperfect understanding is the human condition, there is no shame in being wrong, only in failing to correct our mistakes.”
- George Soros
On defaults ⬇️
1/ It's important to think about our "defaults"
Do we approach every decision with the default setting that we're always right?
Or that we could be wrong?
2/ A lot of investors put their identity in the fact that they are great decision-makers.
After all, that's what this game is all about!
But what happens when you're completely sure you're right and the evidence begins to go against you?
Within these, you have different sizes of customers though. In SaaS, oftentimes enterprise customers are growing faster and have lower churn because of the high dollar amounts.
2/ Retail/Restaurant
1. # of stores 2. average unit volume
It's important to understand the number of total stores management thinks is possible. Pair this with the efficiency of the store and you can get an end-game revenue estimate.