Russia's armed forces will now be entrenched in Belarus and Ukraine for a while. One of the major questions that the US and Europe will have to ask is how far they revise their baseline assumptions about Putin's aims and risk-appetite beyond Ukraine, including towards NATO.
The costs, consequences and risks of attacking Ukraine, though epically high, are less than those of attacking NATO territory—an alliance with a mutual-defence clause and three nuclear-armed members. But there is going to be some serious stock-taking now.
Remember that NATO is currently working on its next strategic concept, which sets out its strategy. EU "strategic compass" due soon. US working on national security strategy and nuclear posture review. All these documents will be profoundly affected by Russia's invasion.
You can see seasoned foreign policy and defence wonks (sensibly) re-think assumptions in real time.
https://twitter.com/BrunoTertrais/status/1496773042999070720?s=20&t=UKKGNnMfdQ_33oWOj-V1gQ
Stephen Hadley, Bush's former NSA, told us about his concerns around Kaliningrad: “If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he might decide that he needs a land bridge to link Kaliningrad to Belarus and then Russia...through Lithuania or Poland”. economist.com/europe/2022/02…
I don't think that's a serious possibility myself. But the fact that people like Hadley are worrying about it tells you something about the mood, I think.
https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1496776943483580419?s=20&t=UKKGNnMfdQ_33oWOj-V1gQ
Another concerned view about Putin's potential appetite.
https://twitter.com/FHeisbourg/status/1497208706550874127?s=20&t=Njm8FlrLECkgXL-ab99rNQ
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