Thread by @AndrewPRLevi

Does anyone still think “NATO enlargement” has been “the problem”?

Does anyone still labour under the illusion our governments haven’t known for many years precisely what Putin is, & what needs to be done about him? /1.

Let me tell you a story from 2008. My son was 10 days old. Having co-led a UK diplomatic crisis response to Putin’s invasion of Georgia, I’d been asked urgently to review our policy toward Russia. “Urgent”, for such a fundamental piece of work still meant a month or so. /2.

Now here I was sitting opposite the Foreign Secretary explaining the outcome to him. This is part of what I said:

“Russia is run by the people who own it, principally an elite of a few dozen, largely dominated by ex-KGB officials with a world view formed during Soviet days./3.

“Putin calls the shots. The leadership elite are driven by personal vested interests in money, survival, & security-dominated notions of Russian greatness. They are neither aligned with our values nor - for the most part - our interests. /4.

“There is only a long term prospect of a Russian regime which is.

“The Russian leadership feels able to be more assertive internationally, often in ways which threaten our interests, even if capability does not always match ambition. /5.

“Russia seeks to use energy dependency to exert influence over the foreign policy of EU member states.

“Russia has invaded Georgia. Further Russian military interventions are unlikely in the near term but cannot be ruled out. In the longer term they are a real danger. /6.

“The hope of a strategic or broad-based partnership with Russia has receded into the distant future. Current policy should be realistic about this, & should be based on the most likely scenario for the medium term (a decade or more). /7.

“That is: a Russian leadership similar, or possibly harsher, in foreign policy outlook & behaviour to the current one. Not hoped-for, more benign scenarios”. /8.

I went on to explain how closely concerted effort with the US & our EU/NATO allies, across a range of specific areas, was vital. /9.

And I drew his attention to a series of hair-raising facts about the nature of the threat Putin posed, & precisely how that could - & should - be neutralised. Permanently. /10.

At this point, it’s important to say that, while I carried ultimate responsibility for what I was presenting, & it was my view, I didn’t just sit down & make it up! /11.

The best experts & most senior officials, including from key international partners, had been throughly involved.

Some influential folk were clearly uncomfortable & tried to shout me down.

They were wrong then. They’re wrong now. You’ll hear some of them on the airwaves. /12.

Fortunately the politicians & the most important officials did listen.

Others, later, failed to. And here we are.

I was right.

Perhaps I shouldn’t like being right.

If I do, please nonetheless believe me when I say, today, being right makes me sick to the stomach. /13.

Nothing I told the Foreign Secretary at the time, or repeated when called on again as later Putin crises wreaked more havoc & murderous destruction, was news to his counterparts in central and eastern European countries. /14.

If you want to know why pretty much every central & eastern European country was determined to join NATO, you only need look at what’s been happening since the early hours of the morning of 24 February 2022, Kyiv time, across Ukraine. /15.

A sovereign, independent, eastern European country & UN member state. But not a member of NATO.

They all knew many years back this day could come.

And, like the US intelligence we’ve been hearing so much of over the last days & weeks, they were dead right. /16.

It didn’t take much imagination, to be fair.

They all knew about 1948 (Berlin Blockade). 1953 (military repression of East German uprising). 1956 (invasion of Hungary). /17.

1958 - 1961 (Berlin Crisis culminating in the puppet East German government building the “Anti-Fascist Protection Wall”). 1968 (invasion of Czechoslovakia).

Part of the Putin propaganda line is to claim vulnerability to invasion from the West. /18.

Germany’s despicable war of aggression - WW2 - is a prime reason cited for fearfulness of the USSR/ Russia, or indeed other former Soviet republics, including Ukraine.

The terrible reality of the German atrocity of WW2 is indisputable. /19.

The difference in 2022 is that the Federal Republic of Germany has been run for decades as an exemplary democracy - not without its flaws, of course.

Russia, to put it at its mildest, hasn’t. /20.

In any case Putin’s stated “justification” for invading Ukraine has nothing to do with NATO (he mentions it briefly in paragraph 978, or whatever, of his ghastly speech in the early hours of 24 February).

It’s all based on the idea of Ukraine having no right to exist. /21.

And that’s what he’s been saying about Ukraine … forever.

The real reason is different again.

Putin is being driven, & has been for over two decades now, by an escalatory dynamic which almost inevitably pushes klepto-oligarchic psychopaths to ever greater extremes. /22.

Of repressive violence. Political distraction. And theft – of resources & often territories.

There’s typically no limit.

Unless they’re stopped by force. Or death.

And this one has nuclear weapons. /23.

All our governments have known exactly that, & a lot more besides, for well over a decade.

Yet they have failed.

We all need to ask why. And, yes, we need to ask now.

Because some of those governments need to be disposed of. Now. /24.

Otherwise, don’t be surprised if Putin disposes of us.

You’ve heard it said often. But I’ll say it again.

This isn’t a drill. /25. End