This thread is quotes from Volume 5 of the (bipartisan) Senate Intelligence Committee Report.
#Manafort #Ukraine #TrumpRussia
#Manafort #Ukraine #TrumpRussia
Paul Manafort is a former lobbyist and political consultant with ties to numerous foreign politicians and businessmen, most notably in Russia and Ukraine. In March 2016, Manafort joined the Trump Campaign as convention manager.
By May 2016, then-Candidate Trump officially elevated Manafort to be the Campaign's chairman & chief strategist.
On August 19, 2016, following press articles related to his past work in Ukraine for a pro-Russia political party headed by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign.
Manafort had direct access to Trump and his Campaign's senior officials, strategies, and information. During the campaign, Manafort worked closely with his long-time deputy, Rick Gates, who had similar access to Campaign personnel and information.
While serving on the Trump Campaign, Manafort, often with the assistance of Gates, engaged with individuals inside Russia and Ukraine on matters pertaining to both his personal business prospects and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. . . .
Manafort’s connections to Russia and Ukraine began in approximately 2004. At that time, Manafort and his political consulting firm began work for Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch.
Deripaska conducts influence operations, frequently in countries where he has a significant economic interest. The Russian government coordinates with and directs Deripaska on many of his influence operations.
From approximately 2004 to 2009, Manafort implemented these influence operations on behalf of Deripaska, including on a broad, multi-million dollar political influence campaign directed at numerous countries of interest to Deripaska and the Russian government.
. . . At about the same time that he hired Manafort, Deripaska introduced Manafort to pro-RU oligarchs in Ukraine, including Rinat Akhmetov. These Ukrainian oligarchs had deep economic ties to RU & were aligned with a pro-Russia political party which was backed by the RU govt.
Over the next decade, these oligarchs paid Manafort tens of millions of dollars and formed strong ties with Manafort, independent of Deripaska.
Manafort's work in Ukraine culminated with the 2010 election of Viktor Yanukovych to the presidency, bringing Manafort into the inner circle of Ukrainian politics until Yanukovych's flight to Russia in 2014.
At the outset of his work for the Ukrainian oligarchs and for Deripaska, Manafort hired and worked increasingly closely with a Russian national, Konstantin Kilimnik. Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer.
Kilimnik quickly became an integral part of Manafort’s operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv.
Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that would endure to the 2016 U.S. elections and beyond.
By the time he joined the Trump Campaign, Manafort’s work in Ukraine had diminished and his relationship with Deripaska had long soured. In late 2015 and early 2016, however, Manafort remained engaged in business disputes related to both.
Manafort believed he was owed millions of dollars by oligarchs in Ukraine for past political consulting work and sought to collect on this debt. Separately, Deripaska initiated legal proceedings to recover a multi-million dollar investment in a failed Manafort business venture.
These financial disputes came at a time when Manafort had no meaningful income.
In the midst of these disputes, Manafort used personal contacts to offer his services—unpaid—to the Trump Campaign as early as January 2016.
In the midst of these disputes, Manafort used personal contacts to offer his services—unpaid—to the Trump Campaign as early as January 2016.
The Campaign hired Manafort in mid-March 2016 after conducting no known vetting of him, including of his financial situation or vulnerability to foreign influence.
Prior to the public announcement of Manafort’s new position on the Campaign, Manafort reached out to Kilimnik, with whom Manafort had remained in contact, to notify him of the development.
Once on the Campaign, Manafort quickly sought to leverage his position to resolve his multi-million dollar foreign disputes and obtain new work in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Once Manafort’s hiring was publicly announced, Manafort used Kilimnik to send private messages to three Ukrainian oligarchs—at least one of whom Manafort believed owed him money—and to Deripaska. . . .
On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump Campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik. Gates, who served as Manafort’s deputy on the Campaign, aided Manafort in this effort.
Manafort communicated electronically with Kilimnik and met Kilimnik in person twice while serving on the Trump Campaign. Manafort briefed Kilimnik on sensitive Campaign polling data and the Campaign's strategy for beating Hillary Clinton. . . .
The Committee was unable to reliably determine why Manafort shared sensitive internal polling data or Campaign strategy with Kilimnik.
Manafort and Gates both claimed that it was part of an effort to resolve past business disputes and obtain new work with their past Russian and Ukrainian clients by showcasing Manafort’s success.
Manafort, who was interviewed by the SCO approximately a dozen times, lied consistently to the SCO during these interviews about one issue in particular: his interactions with Kilimnik, the Russian intelligence officer at the center of the Committee's investigation.
These lies violated Manafort’s plea agreement, which obligated him to be truthful in his cooperation with the government, and exposed him to a more severe prison sentence than the agreement contemplated….
Manafort’s true motive in deciding to face more severe criminal penalties rather than provide complete answers about his interactions with Kilimnik is unknown.
The Committee found that Manafort’s presence on the Campaign and proximity to Trump created opportunities for the Russian intelligence services to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign.
The Committee assesses that Kilimnik likely served as a channel to Manafort for Russian intelligence services, and that those services likely sought to exploit Manafort’s access to gain insight into the Campaign.
Taken as a whole, Manafort’s high-level access and willingness to share information with individuals closely affiliated with the Russian intelligence services, particularly Kilimnik, represented a grave counterintelligence threat. /END
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