Some very early impressions of the last two days. It's an operation with maximalist war aims, and Moscow's thinking on this war seems to have been colored by war optimism. It looked as though Russian forces were expecting a quicker UKR military collapse and easier gains. 1/
Early campaign to knock out Ukrainian air defenses and air force had mixed results, Russian aerospace forces aren't particularly practiced at SEAD or DEAD. Most of the strikes in the opening phase were via cruise missiles. UKR air force still has some aircraft up. 2/
A brazen heliborne assault to take Hostomel airport with a small airborne element was a puzzling move. I doubt the goal was to land more airborne at a contested airport easily covered by artillery and MLRS. Likely they expected to hold out for ground reinforcements. 3/
So far we've seen only a fraction of the Russian force arrayed for the operation. Unclear if Russian forces reached initial objectives, but best estimate is they expected more rapid gains & less resistance. 4/
Russian forces seem to be avoiding use of massed fires, except maybe around Kharkiv, focusing on trying to make a speedy advance. Expect they will revert to much larger use of fires when frustrated. Not seeing much in the way of cyber and less EW effects than many anticipated. 5/
Russian forces are mainly sticking to the road network (as in 2014-2015). Early advances made by recon troops, but driving along roads left support units open to ambushes. Already signs of urban warfare and firefights in cities. 6/
There has been heavy fighting around Kharkiv and in Symi. Russian forces tried to advance past Okhtyrka, and it looks like they're attempting to go around Kharkiv. There is also an advance west of Symi to Konotop. This is a very incomplete picture. 7/
Russian forces entered from Belarus and went through Chernobyl exclusion zone to Dymer. Early signs of fighting on outskirts of Kyiv in Obolonskyi distict today. They're clearly going for the capital. 8/
Main breakout appears to be in the south from Crimea. Russian forces pushed to Kherson, and Melitopol. There's sustained fighting for Kherson still and around Antonovsky bridge. Some early signs they may have entered Mykolaiv, but probably just a recon element. 9/
Russian forces retain significant quantitative and qualitative superiority. UKR forces have demonstrated resolve & resilience. Russian conventional overmatch, such as it is, may not translate into attaining their maximalist political aims. This is just the opening of the war. End
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I made a basic map, with red arrows, which I have held off from posting because I believed it would not be responsible to put something out like that unless it was clear the war had begun. This is just one very incomplete estimate of what the Russian op plan might look like.
Maps like this can be terrifying so please use with caution and don't treat it as any kind of established fact.
Just to emphasize, the Russian campaign does have maximalist war aims. It is about regime change, and multi-axes ground offensive. There's no evidence it will necessarily stop at the river.
The large number of forces Russia shifted from its Eastern Military District (12 BTGs+) to Belarus is illustrative of the degree of vulnerability Moscow is comfortable with China. The Russian Far East has probably not been stripped of combat power like this in decades. /1
This large deployment from EMD, unprecedented in contemporary history, offers one additional piece of evidence that the alignment liberates both states to pursue their respective contests, without having to invest as much in hedging against each other. 2/
If Moscow does go through with a large-scale military operation, this deployment will not be short lived. It suggests Eastern MD will be understrength for quite some time and it shows a degree of Russian confidence in the relationship. 3/
I'm going to differ a bit, this is looking for the wrong item in the text. Russia never framed this confrontation as being about Ukraine, it framed it as being about security guarantees and 'indivisibility of security' in Europe, using that as a vehicle to discuss its demands. 1/
The text very clearly indicates Chinese support for Russia's demands on security guarantees in Europe. We know what those are, and which countries they concern. So its a puzzle why folks are expecting to find Ukraine listed in all caps somewhere.
And it shows support for the Russian formulation regarding indivisibility of security.
Folks are right to be skeptical about regime change, but if you consider the logic, a compellance operation or a punitive raid doesn't make good sense in this case. Moscow has no way to enforce implementation of any agreement it imposes without regime change and/or occupation. 1/
The problem with the various lower-end scenarios is they don't offer much in the way of gains. Prior offensives yielded Minsk I, and again Minsk II. This strategy is seen as having failed. Why would Moscow repeat the same failed strategy of compelling with a limited operation? 2/
Moscow loses bargaining power as soon as an offensive ends, which means it has no way to secure preferences in UKR no matter what deal is signed at gunpoint. UKR only gains in Western support, Russian influence declines in the country, sanctions increase. 3/