Does China have a clear economic incentive to get the Russians out of Ukraine and get some sort of settlement? Building on this earlier thread and then examining a must-read @ForeignPolicy piece on the #geoeconomic dynamic. 1/
China's land transport corridor across Eurasia is imperiled, both by the war and by sanctions. @Andreebrin of the @RISAPOfficial notes, "Poland is home to train routes connecting China to Europe along the New Eurasian Land Bridge. 2/
This railway corridor that crosses all of Eurasia—running through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus—has become an important branch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), dubbed the iron silk road." 3/ foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/bel…
She spells out in detail how China increasingly is relying on the iron silk road for exports, problems with the maritime domain, and how sanctions on Russia and effectively cutting off Russia from the global economy has major impacts for China and will impact its own growth, 4/
in a year when Xi Jinping was hoping to highlight China's return to economic vibrancy. Her conclusion: "This butterfly effect connecting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China could soon prove disastrous for China’s BRI railways and economy. 5/
Putin may not only kill, for the moment, Poland’s dream of becoming a commercial hub between China and Europe, but he may also destabilize what was once one of China’s most successful BRI projects: the New Eurasian Land Bridge, which is now passing near a war zone." So does 6/
incentivize China to take steps to end the war and find a way to reverse sanctions on Russia? END
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Receiving requests for a follow-on NATO explainer to discuss the Kosovo precedent (1999) and what might happen if Ukraine (all or in part) were to join with an existing NATO state. As always, I base these on existing precedents, but clever lawyers/politicians can reinterpret. 1/
In 1999, Serbia/Yugoslavia had not attacked a NATO state and Kosovars were not part of NATO. So if NATO intervened, how did they do it? We need to go to Article 4 (Washington Treaty) and 52 (UN Charter). 2/
Article 4 allows for NATO members to convene the alliance to discuss threats to the security of any individual member, and for the alliance to decide whether to take any steps. Spillover of Milosevic's campaigns was deemed to be a threat. Since the UN Security Council 3/
A quick @FPRI_Orbis explainer on NATO. Seeing a lot of comments like "NATO should institute a NFZ" or "NATO should bring in Ukraine right now." Reminder: NATO can do nothing on its own. NATO can only do what its 30 member states agree to do--and on the basis of consensus. 1/
NATO, like the historic Polish Sejm, operates on the principle of consensus. Any one NATO member can cast its "liberum veto." For 20 years, one NATO member, Greece, held up the admission of North Macedonia, over the country's name. 2/
The 2011 NATO mission in Libya highlights alliance politics. The U.S. wanted NATO to take the official lead. A number of NATO members didn't want the Libya mission. The compromise: NATO would intervene in Libya (as the alliance), but each NATO member could decide whether 3/
This is a fascinating read. It really touches on points @seanmcfate has been raising about the changing nature of war, the "privatization" of conflict (and deniability for governments), transfer of assets. Combine this with reports about thousands of volunteers for Ukraine's 1/
equivalent of the Foreign Legion. But we also come back to what I call the "IM Force" problem: do these volunteers understand that if they "are caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow all knowledge of your actions." On the other hand, will Moscow, which itself uses 2/
private military contractors, accept that these volunteers and equipment are not state-sponsored, and assume there is in fact a hidden Western hand? 3/
A lot of discussions about whether Russia would escalate in the event of U.S./NATO intervention in Ukraine, and about the whole topic of nuclear escalation in general. Some essays from @FPRI Orbis which may help provide more background. 1/
In the current issue, Lukas Milevski, in discussing the Baltic region, gives readers an overview of the Russian Federation’s deterrence and escalation management theories. 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
Rob Singh (@bbkpolitics) might cause you to lose some sleep as he discusses nuclear launch authority in the United States; many of these issues mirrored in the Russian approach (for those who argue that "the generals" somehow would prevent escalation). 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…!
Both at the @carnegiecouncil & @FletcherRussia events this week, I referenced the "Dayton" model as one way conflicts end. A variant of that is having two major outside powers with ties to the parties at war to induce and nudge talks. We've seen hints of Chinese disquiet 1/
as the Russian invasion drags on (and didn't produce the rapid "changing facts on the ground" results) and Chinese equities in both Ukraine and Russia risk damage. The U.S. also doesn't want this conflict to become a destructive war of attrition. 2/
.@POTUS was part of the Obama national security team which explored with then VP Xi Jinping a proposed new "model for great power relations" between Beijing & Washington. Why not both flatter but also pressure China to step up and work with the U.S. for reversing the invasion 3/