Impact of long term depopulation of Ukraine and whether Ukrainian refugees provide European parties with acceptable solutions to labor shortages. 2/
Do sanctions on Russia prove no country is too big for Iran style sanctions, but also is China using this to learn and prepare? 3/
How long will Asia-Pacific countries stay aligned with U.S.-EU sanctions on Russia before seeking compensation or consideration of other interests where they will expect Euro-Atlantic support or concessions? 4/
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Wanted to add a third item to the list of "Vladimir's Delusions"--not only underestimating Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve, but apparently Chinese willingness to help. A 🧵. 1/
During the 4 February summit, Putin seems to believe he got a pretty large blank check from Xi. Perhaps this was predicated on a rapid Russian fait accompli in Ukraine. But as this drags on and as sanctions tighten, China is holding back. 2/
In the weeks prior to the invasion, Russian commentators kept stressing that Russia would just pivot away from the West to China and survive quite nicely. Not so apparent now. 3/
I’ve been around the Russia game for long enough to see how narratives change. For a number of years, it was how we were much more threatened by a weak Russia than a strong Russia. Right now, we have the narrative of how not only Ukraine but the West in general is threatened by
by Russia, that Putin will just keep going into the heart of Europe. Eight days into the conflict, and we are back to considering Russia much weaker.
Does this mean we will see a resurrection of the narrative that our security is going to be threatened once again by a weak Russia?
Receiving requests for a follow-on NATO explainer to discuss the Kosovo precedent (1999) and what might happen if Ukraine (all or in part) were to join with an existing NATO state. As always, I base these on existing precedents, but clever lawyers/politicians can reinterpret. 1/
In 1999, Serbia/Yugoslavia had not attacked a NATO state and Kosovars were not part of NATO. So if NATO intervened, how did they do it? We need to go to Article 4 (Washington Treaty) and 52 (UN Charter). 2/
Article 4 allows for NATO members to convene the alliance to discuss threats to the security of any individual member, and for the alliance to decide whether to take any steps. Spillover of Milosevic's campaigns was deemed to be a threat. Since the UN Security Council 3/
A quick @FPRI_Orbis explainer on NATO. Seeing a lot of comments like "NATO should institute a NFZ" or "NATO should bring in Ukraine right now." Reminder: NATO can do nothing on its own. NATO can only do what its 30 member states agree to do--and on the basis of consensus. 1/
NATO, like the historic Polish Sejm, operates on the principle of consensus. Any one NATO member can cast its "liberum veto." For 20 years, one NATO member, Greece, held up the admission of North Macedonia, over the country's name. 2/
The 2011 NATO mission in Libya highlights alliance politics. The U.S. wanted NATO to take the official lead. A number of NATO members didn't want the Libya mission. The compromise: NATO would intervene in Libya (as the alliance), but each NATO member could decide whether 3/
This is a fascinating read. It really touches on points @seanmcfate has been raising about the changing nature of war, the "privatization" of conflict (and deniability for governments), transfer of assets. Combine this with reports about thousands of volunteers for Ukraine's 1/
equivalent of the Foreign Legion. But we also come back to what I call the "IM Force" problem: do these volunteers understand that if they "are caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow all knowledge of your actions." On the other hand, will Moscow, which itself uses 2/
private military contractors, accept that these volunteers and equipment are not state-sponsored, and assume there is in fact a hidden Western hand? 3/
A lot of discussions about whether Russia would escalate in the event of U.S./NATO intervention in Ukraine, and about the whole topic of nuclear escalation in general. Some essays from @FPRI Orbis which may help provide more background. 1/
In the current issue, Lukas Milevski, in discussing the Baltic region, gives readers an overview of the Russian Federation’s deterrence and escalation management theories. 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
Rob Singh (@bbkpolitics) might cause you to lose some sleep as he discusses nuclear launch authority in the United States; many of these issues mirrored in the Russian approach (for those who argue that "the generals" somehow would prevent escalation). 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…!