Thread by @WarintheFuture

Eight days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. In the past 24 hours, we have seen limited Russian progress in the north & east, a continuing traffic jam, & progress in the south. My 8th thread, focussed on initial lessons from this war. 1/25 (Image via @IAPonomarenko)

2/25 As always, a shout out to those reporting on the Russian invasion. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @IanPannell @defenceHQ @thestudyofwar @OrlaGuerin @siobahn_ogrady @lawdavf among others. Please follow them.

3/25 As the Russians apply greater mass and firepower to surround, and attempt to seize, several Ukrainian cities, and apply greater use of air power, it is worth reflecting on what we have learned from their invasion of Ukraine so far.

4/25 First, strategy matters. The ‘deluded strategy’ of Putin, described by @lawdavf in his recent post, has proved to be terrible guidance for military and information operations in Ukraine. samf.substack.com/p/the-fight-fo…

5/25 Bad assumptions – Ukraine as non-state, a need for deNazification & prevent nuclear weapons in Ukraine - are little more than fantasies. The theory of a rapid Ukrainian capitulation was disproven on day 1. Assumptions matter in strategy - the Russians got all theirs wrong.

6/25 As we know from history, good strategy with realistic objectives that are matched to the ends and means available, is essential to the conduct of successful military operations.

7/25 As Wick Murray and Alan Millet have written, “it is more important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than it is at the operational or tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but strategic mistakes live forever.”

8/25 A 2nd lesson is the relative incompetence of Russian tactical operations. The lack of resilience of BTGs, logistics challenges, and controlling (and sustaining) advances on multiple axes have proven to be beyond the Russian senior leadership.

9/25 There has been much discussion and analysis on this topic in the past week. They have committed ground forces piecemeal, used minimal firepower or EW, and sloppily employed light and airborne forces. We have also seen the large-scale use of unsecure communications.

10/25 A 3rd lesson is about air-ground integration. The Russians should have been able to seize control of the air on day one. The Russian Air Force is a large and technologically advanced organization. This should not have been a major challenge for them.

11/25 They have compounded this with what appears to be poor integration with ground operations. This is testament to their assumptions about Ukrainian resilience, and just poor military planning. Competent military organisations plan for worst case, not best case.

12/25 A 4th lesson pertains to information operations. The Russians have not lived up to their billing as experts in this area. The Russians, in their targeting of civilians in cities and civilian infrastructure, have helped the Ukrainians in this regard.thehill.com/opinion/intern…

13/25 The Ukrainians have seized the national and international initiative in this area. And importantly, they have against all odds kept their national communications and internet infrastructure operational to underpin their information activities.

https://twitter.com/IP_Observatory/status/1499185649928204290

14/25 Led by their President, and supported by government, military & civilian sources, Ukrainian public affairs & info ops have shaped world opinion and support. In fact, the Russians could now be seen as the ‘the gang that couldn’t influence straight’.

15/25 A 5th lesson on speed & use of time. Just because politicians & military leaders want rapid conquests, it does not mean this occurs. As we've seen from German Blitzkriegs & 2003 ‘shock and awe’ in Iraq, a desire for rapid military victory can lead to long, drawn out wars.

16/25 Once again, the Russian assumptions about a rapid Ukrainian collapse that underpinned their strategy is at fault here. As such, they have been playing catch up from day 1 of their invasion. Putin’s gamble relied on a decisive and quick military victory.

17/25 That the Russians did not secure a rapid victory means the Ukrainians now ‘own the clocks’ in the war. The longer the war (& any insurgency lasts), the more time sanctions have to bite & the more Russian casualties will mount. Both place pressure on Putin domestically.

18/25 A 6th lesson is about technology and future war. Where are the drones? While I am sure there are some we are not seeing for a range of reasons, they have not played the significant role many predicted before the role.

19/25 It appears that many kills on Russian armoured and soft-skinned vehicles have come from good old anti-tank weapons and other crew served weapons operated by Ukrainians in close combat with their enemy.

20/25 This is an important lesson – despite new technologies, the ability to engage in close combat, win and survive is vital for a modern army. Combined arms, tanks, artillery, EW etc are all vital components if they are used in clever combinations.

21/25 Finally, good leadership matters. President Zelensky is the exemplar of a wartime leader. Calm, empathetic, and oozing integrity and courage, he has guided his people and the Ukrainian military in an outstanding fashion over the past week.

22/25 The Russian leadership, by comparison, appears to have misled its own soldiers about the invasion. This is morally reprehensible conduct from Russian military officers. In this alone, Russian military culture is revealed as professionally corrupt. forbes.com/sites/craighoo…

23/25 Russian targeting of civilians is another example of debauched Russian leadership. It reveals a political leadership indifferent to the deaths of a people with whom they have fought alongside in the past, and a callous, criminal military leadership.

24/25 I will return to these lessons in the coming days and weeks. Good military institutions in the west will already be studying this war. So will the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing.

25/25 My observations, part 8, ends. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, have been reading and sharing these posts. I hope they have provided useful insights. (Image via @IAPonomarenko)