It may be that both of these narratives are meant to work in sync. One to make the case for Western intervention in the conflict, and the other to suggest it won’t be that risky for the United States and other countries to confront Russia if Moscow is already on its last legs.
Update: president Zelensky saying he needs planes. Is this because they’ve lost capability, or that they expect to lose capability within the near future?
"we are reaching the end of a thirty-year cycle in world events, where geopolitical, economic, and technological shifts are rewriting the source code of international affairs. Whereas the start of the cycle was marked by a series of dramatic events that heralded the triumph ...2/
of the U.S.-led liberal democratic system--... the terminus of this post-Cold War era and the birth pangs of a new and yet-unnamed epoch could not be more different. It has been marked by the slow-motion trainwreck of a global pandemic and the termination of the 20-year effort,3/
If this is true, this could be quite important. It could allow for creative solutions that bring security to Ukraine, but address some of the core security dilemma issues that any Russian government, not just Putin, would have. 1/
One could see an arrangement between Ukraine and NATO that would allow for the development of a comprehensive air defense system based on the borders with Poland and Romania that would protect Ukrainian airspace, but would not be able to have any range to strike into Russia. 2/
This would be similar to the 1997 arrangement between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus over the basing of air defense systems to protect Cyprus but be based in Greece. 3/
This is a case where we need to apply @LTGHRMcMaster’s concept of strategic empathy as he discussed in @FPRI Orbis last year. How does the situation look from New Delhi? 1/
I’ve seen some Indian commentators grumble that when there are problems in Asia or Africa, Washington talks about “Asian/African” solutions, but a European problem demands a global response. I think some of that may be a factor. 2/
New Delhi also doesn’t think Americans pay enough attention to the costs they expect India to shoulder. India both partially voluntarily (as a favor to the U.S.)&partially under pressure complied with U.S. sanctions on Iran and Venezuela. Suggest India may be watching to see 3/
On February 19, speculated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine might lead to changes in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship. Now, via @JavierBlas, @nytimes reporting a very high-level U.S. delegation in Caracas. Important because technically U.S. recognizes Juan Guaido ... 1/
as the legitimate president. But apparently now willing to directly deal with Maduro. Next speculation: given Belarusian forces seem very unwilling to enter Ukraine to help the Russian effort, would we consider reaching out 2/
Wanted to add a third item to the list of "Vladimir's Delusions"--not only underestimating Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve, but apparently Chinese willingness to help. A 🧵. 1/
During the 4 February summit, Putin seems to believe he got a pretty large blank check from Xi. Perhaps this was predicated on a rapid Russian fait accompli in Ukraine. But as this drags on and as sanctions tighten, China is holding back. 2/
In the weeks prior to the invasion, Russian commentators kept stressing that Russia would just pivot away from the West to China and survive quite nicely. Not so apparent now. 3/
I’ve been around the Russia game for long enough to see how narratives change. For a number of years, it was how we were much more threatened by a weak Russia than a strong Russia. Right now, we have the narrative of how not only Ukraine but the West in general is threatened by
by Russia, that Putin will just keep going into the heart of Europe. Eight days into the conflict, and we are back to considering Russia much weaker.
Does this mean we will see a resurrection of the narrative that our security is going to be threatened once again by a weak Russia?