"we are reaching the end of a thirty-year cycle in world events, where geopolitical, economic, and technological shifts are rewriting the source code of international affairs. Whereas the start of the cycle was marked by a series of dramatic events that heralded the triumph ...2/
of the U.S.-led liberal democratic system--... the terminus of this post-Cold War era and the birth pangs of a new and yet-unnamed epoch could not be more different. It has been marked by the slow-motion trainwreck of a global pandemic and the termination of the 20-year effort,3/
following the September 11 attacks, to prove that American power ... could remake Afghanistan (and by extension, other societies) in a liberal-democratic image. We are now entering the 2020s, where the familiar landmarks and lodestones are eroding, 4/
with growing uncertainty as to what will replace them—and the extent to which a new era will be shaped by Washington." 5/ As I noted, this essay finalized before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but not clear whether this represents the close of the post-Cold War era, or the 5/
start of something new. And so I stand by this: "Even before the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, a serious process was already underway within the U.S. national security community, especially work done by the late Colin Powell, to consider the impact ... 6/
of possible major changes in the international system and the implications for how U.S. national security ought to be configured to meet these new conditions. The agility of the U.S. defense, diplomatic, and developmental communities allowed the United States to quickly 7/
take advantage of the window of opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe to move ahead with a vision of a Europe “whole and free.” Conditions are changing once again, but we need to recapture that sense of agility and innovation—rather than attempt to recreate a past age." 8/
I understand that the process of completing the U.S. national security strategy has been interrupted by the Russian invasion, and reconsidering core assumptions, but it is critical that the strategy not be reactive to short-term events only and grapple with the implications of 9/
the new era we've entered. [And here is the initial short essay that spawned the larger piece.] END sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
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Given that the question of Ukraine's territorial integrity came up today in the 3rd round of Ukrainian-Russian talks, I wanted to return to see whether creative diplomacy might reconcile the two positions which as we saw today remain light years apart. 1/
Finding a way out of the Crimea dilemma is beyond my power at this moment, so let's concentrate on Donetsk and Lugansk. NOTE: recognition by Moscow is a major hurdle, but NOT insurmountable. 2/
As part of any settlement, the "republics" could by treaty "rejoin" or recognize Ukrainian sovereignty. Yes, Ukraine's position right now is that they never left, but perhaps think of it as a version of Reconstruction. Union argued states never seceded, but then had to 3/
If this is true, this could be quite important. It could allow for creative solutions that bring security to Ukraine, but address some of the core security dilemma issues that any Russian government, not just Putin, would have. 1/
One could see an arrangement between Ukraine and NATO that would allow for the development of a comprehensive air defense system based on the borders with Poland and Romania that would protect Ukrainian airspace, but would not be able to have any range to strike into Russia. 2/
This would be similar to the 1997 arrangement between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus over the basing of air defense systems to protect Cyprus but be based in Greece. 3/
This is a case where we need to apply @LTGHRMcMaster’s concept of strategic empathy as he discussed in @FPRI Orbis last year. How does the situation look from New Delhi? 1/
I’ve seen some Indian commentators grumble that when there are problems in Asia or Africa, Washington talks about “Asian/African” solutions, but a European problem demands a global response. I think some of that may be a factor. 2/
New Delhi also doesn’t think Americans pay enough attention to the costs they expect India to shoulder. India both partially voluntarily (as a favor to the U.S.)&partially under pressure complied with U.S. sanctions on Iran and Venezuela. Suggest India may be watching to see 3/
On February 19, speculated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine might lead to changes in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship. Now, via @javierblas, @nytimes reporting a very high-level U.S. delegation in Caracas. Important because technically U.S. recognizes Juan Guaido ... 1/
as the legitimate president. But apparently now willing to directly deal with Maduro. Next speculation: given Belarusian forces seem very unwilling to enter Ukraine to help the Russian effort, would we consider reaching out 2/
Wanted to add a third item to the list of "Vladimir's Delusions"--not only underestimating Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve, but apparently Chinese willingness to help. A 🧵. 1/
During the 4 February summit, Putin seems to believe he got a pretty large blank check from Xi. Perhaps this was predicated on a rapid Russian fait accompli in Ukraine. But as this drags on and as sanctions tighten, China is holding back. 2/
In the weeks prior to the invasion, Russian commentators kept stressing that Russia would just pivot away from the West to China and survive quite nicely. Not so apparent now. 3/
This is one reason that Saudi Arabia & Israel have been reluctant to completely isolate Russia is their expectation that Moscow would help facilitate this coexistence. They are on talks in Vienna are the only area where there has not been a freeze in U.S.-Russia interactions.