Given that the question of Ukraine's territorial integrity came up today in the 3rd round of Ukrainian-Russian talks, I wanted to return to see whether creative diplomacy might reconcile the two positions which as we saw today remain light years apart. 1/
Finding a way out of the Crimea dilemma is beyond my power at this moment, so let's concentrate on Donetsk and Lugansk. NOTE: recognition by Moscow is a major hurdle, but NOT insurmountable. 2/
As part of any settlement, the "republics" could by treaty "rejoin" or recognize Ukrainian sovereignty. Yes, Ukraine's position right now is that they never left, but perhaps think of it as a version of Reconstruction. Union argued states never seceded, but then had to 3/
readmitted. My favorite template is that of the Aland Islands. They belong to Finland, but had been claimed by Sweden because of past association. Swedish ethnic majority. Islands enjoy extensive self-governance but also also neutral and de-militarized. Useful precedents 4/
for the future: separate relationship with the EU for Aland; an autonomous economic status that allows for differences in policy and regulation from other parts of Finland; special relations with Sweden. 5/
Aland arrangement for the Donbass would keep Ukrainian sovereignty but create a buffer zone and more importantly a zone which could have a separate status with the EU (or even NATO) and be able to have a special relationship with Russia. 6/
Problem is that Aland arrangements, which were also proposed for Serbia/Kosovo and Azerbaijan/Karabakh, don't usually work after blood has been spilled and after such compromises were proposed in peacetime but rejected. Maybe Aland is sui generis to Alanders. END

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More from @FPRI_Orbis

Mar 9
This comment speaks directly to very different understandings of what the phrase "Russia will lose in Ukraine" means. This matters because the anti-invasion coalition remains quite fragile. A thread. 1/
If I understand @RadioFreeTom's understanding, it is that Russia will lose because it will not achieve its stated objectives of "denazification" (regime change) & demilitarization (subjugation). Moreover, the costs of the invasion will most likely bring down Putin. 2/
For others loss is identified with actual major Ukrainian battlefield victories that drive Russian forces out of Ukraine and bring the battle to the soil of the Russian Federation, with further military defeats. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Mar 8
So the MiGs for Ukraine deal has fallen through, once again. 1) Why are these things announced as done deals/fait accomplis if critical details have been unresolved? Who is jumping the gun? 1/
This contributes to an undercurrent within the Zelensky administration that Western/NATO help is limited, that rhetoric about Ukraine does not match reality & that perhaps Ukraine should a la Finland in 1940 reluctantly cut a deal with Moscow that will end further destruction. 2/
Ben Franklin's advice in the John Adams miniseries--perhaps we need a refresher: "A good diplomat, Mr. Adams, observes much, acts little, and speaks softly!" 3/
Read 4 tweets
Mar 8
Now that we are seeing sanctions on and countersanctions from Russia, what do past experiences tell us about what to expect? Some of the coverage in the pages of @FPRI Orbis. 1/
Viljar Veebel & Raul Markus looked at the first wave of EU sanctions on Russia after the first Ukraine invasion in 2014 to determine if we were entering into a new period where these measures might or might not be effective. 2/
sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
Back in 2007, Paul Bracken examined "financial warfare" and argued its larger policy framework should draw on escalation and de-escalation theory because it is likely to be most effective when combined with other forms of pressure. 3/
Read 4 tweets
Mar 8
We teach our students at @NavalWarCollege that major changes in world affairs can happen not only because of long-term evolutionary processes but sudden, discontinuous shocks. Over the past two weeks, we've seen that principle validated. Dramatic shifts in Germany & Japan on 1/
Russia. Up to February 2022, prevailing view in both Tokyo and Berlin was that despite Russian bad behavior, integration was the way forward. For Germany, policy was predicated on belief that long-term economic viability of Europe rested on interdependent integration 2/
with Russia's natural resource base and that European security rested on a cooperative relationship with Moscow to help manage the larger arc of instability surrounding Europe. Tokyo's view was that Japan needed to engage Russia to offset China and prevent closer 3/
Read 7 tweets
Mar 6
A short essay in @FPRI Orbis on the 30 year crisis we find ourselves in led to a much longer set of ruminations in @TheNatlInterest ... (written prior to 2/22/22) 1/ nationalinterest.org/feature/can-am…
"we are reaching the end of a thirty-year cycle in world events, where geopolitical, economic, and technological shifts are rewriting the source code of international affairs. Whereas the start of the cycle was marked by a series of dramatic events that heralded the triumph ...2/
of the U.S.-led liberal democratic system--... the terminus of this post-Cold War era and the birth pangs of a new and yet-unnamed epoch could not be more different. It has been marked by the slow-motion trainwreck of a global pandemic and the termination of the 20-year effort,3/
Read 10 tweets
Mar 6
If this is true, this could be quite important. It could allow for creative solutions that bring security to Ukraine, but address some of the core security dilemma issues that any Russian government, not just Putin, would have. 1/
One could see an arrangement between Ukraine and NATO that would allow for the development of a comprehensive air defense system based on the borders with Poland and Romania that would protect Ukrainian airspace, but would not be able to have any range to strike into Russia. 2/
This would be similar to the 1997 arrangement between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus over the basing of air defense systems to protect Cyprus but be based in Greece. 3/
Read 7 tweets

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