Thread by @ajwsmall

The fact that China clearly supports Russia would not preclude them taking a mediation role. Beijing typically does this precisely when it’s sympathetic to one side but thinks they’ve gone too far. But there are other reasons I doubt this will happen 1/

https://twitter.com/bueti/status/1500577910108958722

There is plenty of precedent for this if “mediation” is defined expansively - from the DPRK six-party talks (where China hosted and actively mediated) to cases such as Kargil in ’99 (China didn’t mediate but conveyed disapproval to Pakistan and coordinated closely w/the US) 2/

The cases where China has played a helpful role to any degree are precisely the ones where it can lean on its friends - Sudan, DPRK, Pakistan, to a lesser extent the Taliban - but where its friends trust that Beijing has their security interests at heart 3/

The cases where China is not useful and only plays a simulated role - such as the pretend Middle East peace processes it sometimes undertakes - are cases where it is actually fairly neutral but has neither leverage nor real expertise 4/

The distinctions of what it means to “mediate” matter though. China can do that in places where it has depth/ familiarity e.g. DPRK, Myanmar. In Afghanistan, where it has little, China could “host” and convey broad messages but not do the detailed work involved in real mediation

With Ukraine/Russia/European security, China's expertise is minimal. They have no real capacity to shuttle between parties with proposals, nudge here and there, frame alternatives etc. They could host (which isn’t needed) or convey messages between parties (which isn’t needed) 6/

More important than that - the thing China can usefully do, they won’t. The cases where Beijing has been helpful, it’s played an overt “Big Brother” role, conveying tough messages to its partners, conditioning its support to them, and coordinating behind their backs 7/

They could theoretically do that here without “mediating”. But nothing in China-Russia/Xi-Putin dynamics suggests that Beijing thinks it would be a remotely good idea to try to push Russia around like that, let alone in these circumstances. I doubt they think it would work anyway

In fact what China has done with Russia is precisely the opposite of this- refusing to coordinate even modestly with US / Europeans, conveying US attempts to do so directly to Moscow, holding the pro-Russian line in private, and very publicly agreeing a “no limits” partnership 9/

Xi has made his bet - that given China’s strategic landscape, there is a price worth paying for the Sino-Russian partnership. No amount of articles on what various sections of the Chinese ”foreign policy community” think or what we think China’s “real” interests are obviate that

The price now looks higher than Xi had expected; it looks like a miscalculation to have leaned in so far. But it would also be damaging to walk that back now. And it is not being walked back (despite the periodic “China has shifted its position!” spurts of misplaced excitement)

So if China is not likely to do any of the things that were useful in comparable situations and has no expertise to mediate, that would only leave the simulated / pretend version. At a push Beijing might agree if it thought it might get some credulous politicians off its back 12/

At present though, I think China will still be wary of even doing that - there’s a real risk that it could either be misperceived by Russia, or that Beijing would end up with even more exposure and blame if it’s seen as simply aligning with Moscow’s positions in the process 13/

Pushing China on discrete areas still has value: UN votes; warning that sanctions-busting will hit Chinese entities too. Continuing to ask Beijing to help during one of Europe’s gravest security crises and having them continually refuse has demonstration value too 14/

But any hope of Chinese mediation should be tempered by the fact that they will be reluctant to provide it, and that it is very unlikely to take a helpful form if they do 15/

Worst of all would indeed be if China taking on a mediation role was predicated on “improvements in the relationship”, the sort of gambit that Beijing attempted with Afghanistan and climate change cooperation (to no avail), concessions with nothing of actual value in return 16/16