Thread by @PhillipsPOBrien

Some thoughts on the arguments for a no-fly zone, effective aid for the Ukrainians and air power. Been quoted a little in this article in the @WSJ (paywall) wsj.com/articles/the-w…

The question of a no-fly zone seems more one of NATO being a full scale participant in this war or not. As many of said, it leads inevitably to direct exchanges between Russia and NATO.

While I still think it very unlikely that Russia would go to full scale nuclear exchange at that point (ie end human existence), not sure we want to find out. Only thing that might change my mind on a no fly zone is a chemical/biological attack by Russia.

Other thing to consider is the great effectiveness of Ukrainian anti air defences so far. Maybe the most important, least talked about story of the conflict. Russian air power has only been sporadically effective.

https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/status/1501604813863276548

To actually help Ukraine as opposed to get NATO in the war: continue to get them as much effective anti-air equipment as possible. We know that they are good at it. And it will at least help contain some of the most inhumane bombings of Ukrainian cities.

This could be a combination of hand held (stingers) but also upgraded systems based on Russian technology (which the Ukrainians seem better at operating than the Russians).

I know people talk about transferring more and more fixed wing MiGs to Ukraine, but actually that will pose significant integration problems and it’s not clear that it’s actually the best way to help (Ukraine still has fixed wing aircraft).

In the scheme of things Ukrainian fixed wing aircraft SEEM to be less influential in shaping this conflict than Ukrainian UAVs (drones). businessinsider.com/ukraines-punis…

Certainly from video evidence these UAVs have shown effectiveness in taking advantage of stretched Russian supply lines. Logistics as always.

Ukraine is showing a possible new paradigm emerging for a small-medium military power (also showed by Azerbaijan). Interdict enemy air power through effective anti air, and use UAVs to be offensive.

So in discussing a no fly zone and transferring fixed wing aircraft to Ukraine, we might be in danger of failing to understand both the reality of AirPower and what Ukraine is showing it can do well.

Will try to update this thread during the course of the day with some analysis of how the air war has developed to this point, and why it has been so different than expected.

Btw, why the Ukrainian experience is more telling than Azerbaijan’s is that Armenian AirPower in NK was very limited but Russia had what was though to be one of the most powerful full spectrum air forces in the world

Anecdotal evidence that anti air is really what Ukraine needs now.

https://twitter.com/nolanwpeterson/status/1501885449706561538

Returning to this thread for a little while, starting with the question of why the air war has been so remarkably different than expected (or why Russia has not been able to dominate the air war and is suffering much heavier losses than expected.) nytimes.com/2022/01/27/wor…

btw, I am going to link to mainstream news stories more than anything else, because my purpose is not to point out individual analyses I think were wrong. Its to make a general observation,

Going into the invasion there was a great deal of talk about how Russia hap upgraded its aircraft as much as anything else. Indeed the Russians were boasting about it. businessinsider.com/how-russia-pla…

There was also talk about Russian Air Force experience in Syria giving it the ability to refine its skills. nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/lo…

Both of these things were true. And now the however, both were not indications of whether Russia could operate a complex air operation in the face of well used anti-air forces. For instance in Syria, the Russian Air Force was able to operate in a basically anti-air free space.

Also, having some capable new manned, fixed-wing aircraft in and of itself is actually only a small part of airpower dominance--which requires the ability to integrate a range of advanced, complex systems which include detection, processing, resource allocation and precision

The Russians actually had little experience in this, but it was assumed by many that they should be able to do it because we have seen other advanced air forces, most obvioulsy the US, do it effectively since 1990.

Yet, this assumption was wrong. From the start of the air war, the Russian Air Force not only was unable to consistently knock out Ukrainian anti-air, it SEEMS it could not effectively operate large numbers of aircraft at the same time. economist.com/interactive/20…

It also seemed to have a terrible weapons mix, running out of targeted munitions, having to rely on untargeted bombs. Otoh, the Russians also seemed incapable of shutting down Ukraine's UAV airpower.

What this points out is that the Russians might have individual pieces of excellent equipment, but have real problems operating the complex systems needed to make them effective. prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/is-the-r…

So Russian Air Power, so far, has been considerably less than the sum of its parts, and Ukrainian Air Power, because they have some simpler pieces of equipment and less complex systems, has been more than sum of its parts.

will return to this later if I can. But also want to point out that logistics is also a complex system, increasingly so as it reached out from depots into long supply lines as part of an advance. And the Russians seem to have had issues with this too. @BoringWar

Last few tweets on this. I have been told by some that I am being too optimistic about Ukrainian performance or too critical of Russian performance (that I am living on hopium). I make no great claim to knowledge of how the Russian army is performing (beyond some on logistics)

But when it comes to its Air Force what is interesting is that the performance has not seemed to improve the longer the war has gone on. There was talk in some quarters that at first the Russians were unprepared and took it easy, however they would get their act together.

They certainly seemed to up their tempo of operations after a few days, though this ramping up of operations did not seem to follow with a ramp up of performance. If anything, the performance has remained 'mixed'.

One US Air Force general has gone on record that from what can be seen, the Russians have shown themselves to struggle to reconcile their doctrine with what they are experiencing, and cant seen to adjust. airforcemag.com/kelly-russian-…

Russian losses, even of some of their best aircraft, are occurring. Ukrainian UAVs and Anti-Air are still operating. defence-blog.com/russian-air-fo… forbes.com/sites/davidham…

Indeed, the Russians seem to be struggling (see that tweet thread earlier about

So I hope my opinions, at least on air power, are based on knowledge and not on hopium. It is not to argue that this wont be a horrible war, or that Russia wont kill tens of thousands and level cities, its just that in the one area I know a little abt, their performance is weak

Apologies for this super long thread. But it does seem the US is making what could be the smarter choice and sending Ukraine better anti-air systems. Also means, and I think this matters, that they see Ukraine resistance being very effective.

https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/1502023580900593676?s=20&t=LGXtQixJJbCt0uDe9A8Jig