๐งต.@holger_r and I spoke to "Karl," an Estonian expert on Russia's military, for an update on the situation in Ukraine. Karl's observations follow. His previous assessment is here: newlinesmag.com/argument/putinโฆ
No significant developments over the weekend. The frontline around Kyiv remains similar. Ukraine has regained 70% of Irpin or the little that has remained of it. In some areas there is a tiny advance of Russian units.
Regarding the south: Ukrainians have control over some parts of Volnovokha but not all. Russia still controls the eastern parts of it. Russia remains roughly in the same positions around Mykolaiv, and actively attacks Severodonetsk.
As the weather has improved, there are fears of a Russian landing in Odessa. Allegedly Russian ships are back near Odessa but this time a bit farther away.
If Russia doesn't have access to Odessa from the land (it hasn't been able to destroy air and naval defence) it would be risky to try a landing with ships. Ukraine would destroy the ships.
Russia hasn't been using all-out attacks for days. It shows they are taking into account the lives of their own troops.
Finding a compromise between Ukraine and Russia is still hopeless. Russia's minimum would be full control of the two "people's republics" and land access to Crimea.
Ukraine won't go for that unless Kyiv is in real danger of falling. Every day that the war continues brings Russia's minimum demands lower.
Talks of Russia bringing additional troops from the Far East and Armenia: They have only around 6,000 troops in Armenia and they can't take them all away. This wouldn't change the overall picture in Ukraine.
No imminent signs that Belarus is going to send their military into Ukraine. Lukashenko is doing what he can for it not to happen. Question is, how much maneuvering space does he have?
The Russian officers put in charge of Belarusian units are mostly logistics and support units that are used to repair damaged equipment, etc.
Russia has managed to recruit up to 3,000 Syrians who should arrive in Ukraine shortly. This is not considered a serious deployment.
Reports are that Russian troops have started digging trenches. This indicates positional warfare. Russians are "very far" from encircling Kyiv. This encirclement would need to be 300km long and very tightly sealed.
Possibility of a more intensive attack from the Russian side in the next 2-3 days but still nothing to suggest it would break the balance. Russian goals would be to get Kyiv, Kharkiv or cut off Ukraine from the sea (Odessa). I can't see them getting success with any of this.
Morale, which we have heard so much about, is continuing to fall. Reports of Russian troops surrendering for food and self-inflicted injuries to get out of the war.
Reports about Xi having been aware of a "special operation" but not about a total war. Xi feels that Putin wasn't honest. Generally there isn't much optimism about the idea of China coming to assist Russia.
Even if China promises equipment, it would be a question of months not weeks to happen. That said, the U.S. is very concerned about China's decisions. Revealing the info about Russia's request goes in line with U.S. tactics in the case: reveal to hinder or stop from happening.
FSB lacks resources to control occupied areas (Kherson). FSB needs their manpower to repress back home.
It's noteworthy that it was the counter-intel FSB (5th Service) that was tasked with foreign intelligence regarding Ukraine (and not the SVR, GRU). The heads of service under home arrest are close to 70 years old.
In a Western agencies you wouldn't find people older than 55 in respective positions. The same gang has been there for 25 years. It doesn't make the system work any better. /END
(N.B. All of the foregoing tweets are Karl's observations, in his own words, not mine. I just found it tedious to put everything in inverted commas.)
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