🧵 Russia's requests for some types of 🇨🇳 military hardware look plausible. However, most likely the recent communication is part of an ongoing negotiation process that precedes Putin's invasion in Ukraine, not 🇷🇺 ask for an emergency military resupply for this war 1/ 
2/ Just hours before @jakejsullivan's meeting with Yang Jiechi in Rome, the Biden administration has disclosed that Moscow has turned to Beijing asking for some military equipment. According to USG framing, the request was made in order to support Russia's invasion in Ukraine.
3/ According to @Dimi, 🇺🇸 told its allies that 🇨🇳 signaled willingness to provide 🇷🇺 with hardware, and the requested hardware could include drones, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and some intelligence-related equipment. ft.com/content/52ea7a…
4/ We lack many important facts at this point, but, given remarkable accuracy of USG intelligence throughout this crisis, it's likely that reports of talks on Chinese military sales to Russia are true. The devil, however, is in the details.
5/ This @JohnFollain, @jendeben & @JenniferJJacobs story in @business provides important nuance. 🇨🇳🇷🇺 exchange took place shortly after the invasion. It wasn't a desperate cry for military help after the war started to look long and costly for Putin. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
6/ Key question is: was the disclosed exchange Moscow's first approach to Beijing related to immediate war needs in Ukraine? Or is it rather an episode in an ongoing 🇷🇺🇨🇳 arms trade negotiation? Later seems much more plausible to me at this point.
7/ For many years since breakup of the Soviet Union, China was the major buyer of Russian weapons. The arms trade paused in 2000s, but then Moscow resumed its weapon exports to PLA in 2014. This was an integral part of Putin's pivot to China following annexation of Crimea.
8/ Resumption of arms trade was based on 🇷🇺 analysis of 🇨🇳 advances in defense industry. Moscow now wants to monetize its window of opportunity in the Chinese weapons market, that might close in 10-15 years due to Beijing's indigenous progress. foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…
9/ At the same time, as the Kremlin's awareness about progress in 🇨🇳 military R&D grew, 🇷🇺 interest to purchase some equipment where China was ahead of Russia was also increasing. Attack drones, particularly Pterodactyl (翼龙) produced by AVIC, have been of particular interest.
10/ It's totally plausible that Russia and China are now in talks about purchasing some 🇨🇳 equipment, including types mentioned in USG disclosures to media. It's much harder to imagine that Moscow has rushed to Beijing asking for some hardware for immediate war needs in Ukraine.
11/ As Vasily Kashin, Russia's best analyst on 🇨🇳 military, notes to @ru_rbc, even if the deal is sealed today, hardware would take months to deliver. It would require lengthy training, technical adaptation to 🇷🇺 platforms, integration into combat etc. rbc.ru/politics/14/03…
12/ At this point, 🇺🇸 disclosures seem plausible, but they are incomplete and need to be put in proper context. Media framing of the story suggests an USG attempt to rally allies and put additional pressure on China in order to distance itself from Russia.
13/ I expect that 🇨🇳 will not pledge to stop military cooperation with 🇷🇺, as this cooperation is valuable for Beijing (and may become even more so with a weakened Moscow as a result of this war). But for now China is unlikely to rush into new export deals with Russia.
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