Thread by @AlexGabuev

THREAD
Joint exercise is a milestone in deepening 🇨🇳🇷🇺 military cooperation. But is it a step towards a Sino-Russian alliance? Hardly. Is it a sign of deepening across-the-board security partnership aimed at the U.S.? Well, it’s complicated. Let me add some nuance below 👇

2/ “Xibu/Interaction-2021” (西部｜联合) is the latest in a string of joint military exercises that are growing in size and complexity since 2005 – the year when full delimitation of 🇷🇺🇨🇳 border was finally in sight. mod.gov.cn/action/2021-08…

3/ 🇷🇺🇨🇳 military activity now includes annual ground forces drills (frequently with SCO ☔️), annual naval drills (since 2015), table-top missile defense exercise, annual air patrols by strategic bombers. A good summary in @FT by @HenryJFoy & @KathrinHille: ft.com/content/8ba51d…

4/ Xibu-2021 is new because it’s the 1st time 🇨🇳&🇷🇺 forces have a joint command, and are training interoperability against a 3d party. It has started with Vostok-2018, which was the most important joint drill to date for a number of reasons: foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…

5/ After Vostok-2018, a large-scale joint drill in China was in the cards, but it was COVID that has affected those plans. The virus is also the main reason why the current drill is not as big as 2018 (note that Chinese soldiers will need to quarantine for 2-3 weeks after Xibu).

6/ Xibu-2021 and previous drills are not a tactical response to worsening relations with 🇺🇸, but a reflection of broader dynamics: deepening of 🇷🇺🇨🇳 trust over the last 2 decades, and increasingly overlapping security&economic interests. There are couple of factors at play here.

7/ First, long gone are Russian concerns over Chinese demographic “inroads” into 🇷🇺 Far East. @MariaRepnikova & I explain in @SCMPNews why this is a fact: carnegie.ru/2017/07/14/why…

8/ Freshest testament – recent commissioning of cross-border infrastructure projects. They have been under discussion since late 1980s, but got green light from the Kremlin only in 2014. See @laurachou piece: scmp.com/news/china/dip…

9/ Then both sides have been successful (so far) in finding a formula for co-existence in Central Asia. Shared concerns over the regional stability in the wake of looming Afghan security crisis explain Xibu-2021 too. Good backgrounder by @TemurUmarov: carnegie.ru/commentary/814…

10/ Finally, in 2014 Moscow has reconsidered its informal ban for sales of arms to Beijing, and is busy getting into the window of opportunity for Russia-manufactured arms in the Chinese market. Vasily Kashin and I explain this U-turn in detail: carnegie.ru/2017/11/02/ru-…

11/ The cooperation in arms trade is expanding. At 2019 Valdai meeting Vladimir Putin unveiled 🇷🇺 help to 🇨🇳in building early-warning 🚀 system. In 2020 Putin mentioned new deals so secretive at this point that he refused to go into details. en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…

12/ As a result, 🇷🇺 military + defense-industry behemoth @RostecRussia are the two powerful stakeholders that are pushing for deeper security ties with Beijing on the Russian side. On Chinese side, PLA is also interested in deeper engagement with Russia.

13/ PLA still needs some 🇷🇺 advanced weapons, is interested in learning new Russian combat experience through joint drills. Both sides have vital interest in a non-aggression pact facing pressure from the U.S. and 🇺🇸 allies.

14/ Does it all mean steps towards a security alliance? No. The goals are deeper interoperability of forces for a limited conflict, expanded trade in arms (and possible co-development as a distant goal), and maybe some intelligence sharing (a very distant goal too).

15/ This deeper and expanding 🇷🇺🇨🇳military cooperation doesn’t imply a need for a defense pact with mutual obligation to go to war if the other party is under attack/wants you to participate in a conflict. There are couple of reasons for this.

16/ Both Russia and China are religious about their strategic autonomy, and an alliance is likely to limit this very autonomy. A question of seniority in the alliance is likely to pop up soon - particularly given growing asymmetry between 🇷🇺and 🇨🇳.

17/ Both Moscow and Beijing are clear-eyed about significant differences of respective global security interests. Why should China be willing to join any Russian military adventures in Ukraine? Why should Russia be interested in joining potential conflicts in Asia (Taiwan, SCS)?

18/ Finally, deepening ties between militaries doesn’t mean that other parts of national security establishment don't have own doubts and reservations. This is visible on the Russian side, as 🇷🇺 counterintelligence community is increasingly alerted about some of Chinese actions.

19/ For example, in February FSB broke with the long-standing practice of not discussing China-related spy cases in Russia publicly, and pointed to a sentenced agent of Chinese MSS through an anonymous quote for state-run @tass_agency: tass.ru/proisshestviya…

20/ Concern of 🇷🇺 counterintel over 🇨🇳 cyber espionage is also reflected in an increasingly public discussion about activity of hacking groups with likely ties to Chinese intelligence. See this @kommersant story by @ElenaChernenko for more context: kommersant.ru/doc/4855445

21/ Lack of trust between 🇷🇺&🇨🇳 security establishments is one of the major obstacles for joint infoops in the digital domain, as @LeonidKovachich and I have found out in our latest piece on the subject: carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…

22/ Bottom line: Russia and China are likely to continue deepening their military cooperation. This serves both countries security interests, and the military establishments direct beneficiaries. However, this doesn’t mean road to a full-fledged military alliance.

23/ There is, however, a possibility, that over a long run China will be in a position to influence some of 🇷🇺 security-related decisions. But it will be not through an alliance, but through use of economic and technological leverage that Beijing is quietly building in Russia.

24/ A bad scenario for Moscow may look like this: 10-15 years down the road China will be in a position to make Russia abandon its defense partnerships with India/Vietnam using tools of economic coercion. Not a great news for the U.S. and 🇺🇸 allies in Europe and Asia either.

25/ It’s in Russia’s national interest to have robust ties to its giant and increasingly powerful neighbor China. However, the country would be better served by doing structural reforms to unlock growth potential and address increasing asymmetry with China...

26/ ...as well as normalizing relations with the West in order to get more space for balancing and hedging. Alas, so far Moscow choses otherwise.

27/ Relations with Russia will be a critical component of China’s rise. My @CarnegieEndow colleagues and I follow these developments closely through a #PaxSinica project. You can track our work here: carnegie.ru/specialproject…