Mini-🧵
Just stating the obvious in @ForeignPolicy on Russia's handling of EU energy crunch: it's a blend of both economic/market factors and politics. 1/ foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/19/eur…
2/ Russia has justified low flows of gas to Europe by @Gazprom's need to refill domestic storage facilities after winter. And this is a true statement. For example, look at @d_khrennikova's and @MaznevaElena's calculations for @business: bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ Analysts have long predicted that Russia cannot single-handedly balance sudden spikes in European gas demand. Read this September piece by Vitaly Ermakov for @OxfordEnergy: oxfordenergy.org/publications/b…
4/ But is it about something that is both economic and political? Is it about Nord Stream 2? Of course. And 🇷🇺 officials are pretty public about it. Good background here by @olyatanas & @MaznevaElena: bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
5/ And finally, is it about something even more political? Is it about not providing @ZelenskyyUa government with extra gas transit revenue beyond money for 40bcm that @Gazprom has to pump this year through Ukraine as part of 2019 contract?
6/ Well, Vladimir Putin was recently on the record on this, although he has provided economic (pumping via NS2 will result in $3.5b savings for @Gazprom) and environmental (less CO2 emissions if NS2 is used instead of 🇺🇦 gas pipelines): en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
7/ And Russia is just semi-subtle in pushing NS2 speedy approval, as @IrinaReznik4, @meyerhenry4, and @world_reporter report: bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
8/ Some good background on NS2 regulatory approval hurdles by @katyafimava in @OxfordEnergy (pp. 10-14): oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-conte…
9/ In the short run, the Kremlin has yet again an opportunity to make its case: Russia will remain an indispensable player in EU energy market for at least a decade. Long-term focus for @Gazprom though is diversification of markets for Yamal fields...
10/... and the answer here might be China via Power of Siberia-2 (via Mongolia), that will also fill pockets of companies building it (we all know who they are). Let's for Putin's next trip to Beijing, with a potential slot in Jan 2022 for Olympics opening (COVID permitting)

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More from @AlexGabuev

18 Oct
🧵 THREAD 🧵
@jensstoltenberg interview in @FT marks a shift in @NATO's approach to China-Russia axis. Waking up to the issue is welcome compared to years of ignorance. Yet conclusions based on flawed analysis that overstates 🇨🇳🇷🇺 rapport may lead to some grave mistakes 1/
2/ In his interview to @khalafroula & @HenryJFoy @jensstoltenberg outlines the profound challenge that 🇨🇳 presents to @NATO, and then suggests that the alliance should in fact treat China and Russia as parts of one problem. ft.com/content/0202ed…
3/ @jensstoltenberg to @FT exhibit 1: "This whole idea of in a way distinguishing so much between China, Russia, either Asia-Pacific or Europe, it’s one big security environment and we have to address it all together" ft.com/content/cf8c6d…
Read 22 tweets
13 Aug
THREAD
Joint exercise is a milestone in deepening 🇨🇳🇷🇺 military cooperation. But is it a step towards a Sino-Russian alliance? Hardly. Is it a sign of deepening across-the-board security partnership aimed at the U.S.? Well, it’s complicated. Let me add some nuance below 👇
2/ “Xibu/Interaction-2021” (西部|联合) is the latest in a string of joint military exercises that are growing in size and complexity since 2005 – the year when full delimitation of 🇷🇺🇨🇳 border was finally in sight. mod.gov.cn/action/2021-08…
3/ 🇷🇺🇨🇳 military activity now includes annual ground forces drills (frequently with SCO ☔️), annual naval drills (since 2015), table-top missile defense exercise, annual air patrols by strategic bombers. A good summary in @FT by @HenryJFoy & @KathrinHille: ft.com/content/8ba51d…
Read 27 tweets
4 Jun
THREAD
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
2/ For this paper @LeonidKovachich and I have interviewed officials, journalists, editors and experts in both Russia and China. Here is what we've found. carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…
3/ Chinese online behavior is increasingly marked by tactics that were first utilized by Russian actors, as smart colleagues @niubi, @MariaRepnikova and many others have noticed before. Yet this is not the product of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 cooperation in the global information space.
Read 14 tweets
2 Jun
THREAD
As @Huawei releases Harmony OS today, this @washingtonpost story provides important insights on how embattled 🇨🇳 tech giant uses 🇷🇺 talent to diminish impact of 🇺🇸 sanctions. It also highlights some overlooked aspects of Beijing-Moscow ties. 1/ washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
2/ In this well-researched piece, @evadou, @ikhurshudyan & Pei Lin Wu describe how after 🇺🇸 sanctions @Huawei has beefed up its partnership with 🇷🇺 research institution and went on hiring spree for Russian IT talents, mostly mathematicians and specialists in algorithms.
3/ Huawei has a history of significant reliance on 🇷🇺 IT talents going back many years, as company's founder Ren Zhengfei confessed back in 2019: guancha.cn/politics/2019_…
Read 14 tweets
1 Jun
THREAD
Thanks to @ischinger and MSC team's efforts, the @MunSecConf discussion on Russia-West relations last week was clear-eyed and sobering. Couple of quick observations and thoughts. 1/
2/ By now Western diplomats & experts know 🇷🇺 official talking points so well that they are able to draft perfect statements for @mfa_russia or the Kremlin. Of course, the opposite is true as well: people in Moscow are sick and tired of predictable Western arguments too.
3/ The root of🇷🇺 desire to use conversations for lecturing Western counterparts is clear: it's a deplorable state of foreign policy debate, and the goal is to please the listener in the Kremlin. Unfortunately, this desire is most of the times reciprocated. carnegie.ru/commentary/590…
Read 8 tweets
19 May
Putin and Xi have launched construction of 4 new blocs on 2 Chinese nuclear power plants built by @rosatom. A reminder that 🇨🇳🇷🇺 energy cooperation is not just about hydrocarbons, and that there are areas beyond arms where Russia still is a source of high-tech for China. 1/
2/ This @business piece provides a good background of the $3.1b deal (signed during Putin's 2018 state visit to 🇨🇳) that involves construction of 2 blocks of Tianwan (田湾) in Jiangsu & 2 blocs of Xudapu (徐大堡) in Liaoning bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ For @rosatom, the 2018 deal was important in competition against @EDFofficiel & @WECNuclear in 🇨🇳 market. No less important was the 2019 contract to supply nuclear fuel (took a painful year to negotiate it after the main contract was signed) rosatom.ru/en/press-centr…
Read 7 tweets

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