THREAD
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
2/ For this paper @LeonidKovachich and I have interviewed officials, journalists, editors and experts in both Russia and China. Here is what we've found. carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…
3/ Chinese online behavior is increasingly marked by tactics that were first utilized by Russian actors, as smart colleagues @niubi, @MariaRepnikova and many others have noticed before. Yet this is not the product of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 cooperation in the global information space.
4/ Rather it is the result of 🇨🇳 propaganda machine adopting and creatively modifying “Russian” tools. The similarity in approach benefits from the shared worldview of 2 authoritarian regimes intent on thwarting Western human rights narratives and boosting their own legitimacy.
5/ It's true that China has closely studied Russia’s recent experience of digital propaganda and disinformation. Publicly available 🇨🇳 studies on @RT_com spotted by @chenchenzh are complimented by internal reports produced by government research arms.
https://twitter.com/chenchenzh/status/1366373581995835393?s=20
6/ But the main sources of inspiration for🇨🇳remain its own practices for quashing domestic online dissent and cheering pro-government content, as well as 🇺🇸 approach to “Twitter diplomacy” developed by @AlecJRoss when @HillaryClinton was leading @StateDept. Same is true for 🇷🇺.
7/ There is little evidence to suggest extensive ongoing 🇷🇺🇨🇳 cooperation on information operations against the West. Yes, the social media accounts of state propaganda outlets frequently highlight similar themes, repost each other’s materials, and provide verbal support...
8/ ... But this can be explained by many other factors than a joint 🇷🇺🇨🇳 information front. Despite mushrooming official agreements on information cooperation between state media, these agreements remain largely symbolic and aimed at domestic audiences.
9/ Russia, meanwhile, is not happy about the lack of reciprocity from the Chinese side. Moscow tends to publicly support Beijing’s position more often than vice versa. 🇨🇳 maintains a more cautious public stance on Russia-related issues, and rarely rushes to the Kremlin’s defense.
10/ Although more full-fledged 🇨🇳🇷🇺 cooperation in can’t be ruled out in the future, it faces limitations. These include well-entrenched great power mentality and belief in self-reliance inside both governments; lack of trust between the two countries’ security services...
11/ ...and the different working cultures of state propagandists. For examples of later look no further than this well-researched article for @meduzaproject by @Alexey__Kovalev: meduza.io/en/episodes/20…
12/ Bottom line: Russia and China are indeed mounting influence and information operations against the West. But they are doing it in parallel, without building a united front. carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…
13/ We are extremely grateful to @GermanyDiplo for supporting this work. Kudos to @planungsstab&team!
14/ This paper is part of @CarnegieEndow's #PaxSinica project that looks into China's inroads in Eurasia and evolution of 🇷🇺🇨🇳 ties. You can find other research materials here 👇 carnegie.ru/specialproject…
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