MYTH 2: Russia can sell oil & gas to China and others, so we’d only be hurting ourselves.
FALSE: a complete substitution towards China is infeasible given the scale of EU imports. If China becomes nearly the sole buyer, it will bargain hard.
MYTH 3: Russia would circumvent the sanctions by selling via third parties.
FALSE: secondary sanctions may be employed (Iran provides a recent example). We are already seeing private businesses staying away from Russia in fear of breaching sanctions.
MYTH 4: A ban would cause “mass poverty” in Europe.
FALSE: Available estimates suggest the impact could be between 0.5-3.5% of GDP, or 200 to 1200 euros per head in Germany, the country most dependent on Russian energy.
MYTH 5: The less well-off would be hurt the most, b/c of unemployment and higher inflation.
INCOMPLETE: the consequences are indeed likely to be somewhat regressive (but not hugely so). Critically, our governments have the appropriate policy tools to deal with these impacts.
MYTH 6: Business leaders and industry experts say it’s impossible to adjust. Don’t they know best?
NOT NECESSARILY: the marvel of market economy is its adaptability. Incumbents' reactions may be overblown.
MYTH 8: Such a ban would be unsustainable in the long-term.
FALSE: The pain is short-term. The adjustment means that the embargo’s cost will decline over time. Ultimately, this policy will speed up our transition towards a greener, cleaner, and more sustainable economy.
MYTH 9:People of Europe would never support a costly action.
FALSE: In fact, they do. Despite the campaign of fear, about 60% of Germans support the ban. See links in the PDF.
MYTH 13: Advocates of the ban are too “excited” and “hot-headed”.
FALSE: The advocates are the only ones who have produced clear analysis of the issue, using state-of-the-art methods. But yes, of course, the matter is extremely urgent. Every day lives are destroyed. Act now.
MYTH 14: We’ve made a historic U-turn on military spending, and that is already a costly policy. Perhaps that is sufficient?
NO: Much more military spending will be needed in the new cold (or hot) war scenario if Putin wins in Ukraine.
Another input into the energy imports embargo 🇩🇪 debate, now from @MonikaSchnitzer.
Unfortunately rather than the advertised "balanced and unexcited assessment of the tradeoffs" we get a bunch of gut feelings, unsubstantiated claims, and outright errors and misunderstandings.
What are the distributional consequences of shifts in technology? Who wins and who loses, and why?
Much has been said about the uneven impact of technology on wages of different workers (@davidautor, @lkatz42).
But what about its effects on wealth ownership and the unequal distribution of capital income?
In this paper we build a tractable framework of wealth and total (i.e. labor + capital) income distributions, and we use it to study the consequences of automation technologies.
UNEVEN GROWTH: NEW PAPER [Thread] Over the past 4 decades, gains from growth have been very unevenly distributed. Why is that? In a new paper, Ben Moll @pascualrpo & I consider the role of automation in driving the rise in inequality, inc at the v top: princeton.edu/%7Emoll/UG.pdf 1/7
The key feature of our theory is that technology permanently affects rates of return. By raising return to capital automation results in rapid individual wealth accumulation and thus higher wealth inequality. This is related to @PikettyLeMonde 'r-g’ argument. 2/7
More concentrated holdings of wealth translate into more concentrated capital income, which drives up income inequality. We show how this is distinct from - and more powerful than - the usual compositional argument that emphasises K-income is more concentrated than L-income. 3/7