Shelling of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv in North/Northeast continues; 🇷🇺 forces reportedly failed in their attempt to encircle Kharkiv from the east. No offensive operations around Sumy or Chernihiv. 🇷🇺 forces are reportedly regrouping and getting resupplied in these areas.
Once again, Russian forces did make limited territorial gains in the East (Donetsk Oblast) and in the Southeast around Mariupol. An attack against Velyka Novosilka was reportedly repulsed.
🇷🇺 made progress in the South north of Dnpr:
-slow 🇷🇺 advances in direction of Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol / Zaporizhzhia.
- 🇺🇦 reportedly counter-attacked in the area and at least temporally halted Russian advances.
Conflicting reports about 🇷🇺 advances around Mykolaiv (city needs to fall/be fully encircled before push on Odessa). The Russian navy shelled areas of Odesa Oblast on March 16. However, an unsupported amphibious operation is unlikely to happen.
According to US intelligence estimates, around 7,000 Russian troops have been killed in action in Ukraine thus far. 4,000 to 21,000 have been wounded. Russia will need to move in reinforcements for the next phase of this war.
Note: intelligence estimates are estimates.
Russians rep. continue to make slow progress in parts of the country. Status of 🇺🇦 armed forces (including casualty rate) remains unclear.
Note: there are more reports of Russian troop movements inside Russia (all presumably heading to Ukraine).
"Russia may seek to create new forces by pressing conscripts to sign contracts with the army when they formally leave military service on 1 April 2022, " says @GresselGustav in this analysis.
The likelihood of new larger-scale offensive operations by Russian forces in Ukraine appears higher after April 1 (~mid-April) than before that date. Either way, given current attrition levels (if true), an operational pause/slowing down of 🇷🇺mil. ops will need to happen...
...between now and then.
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One note on calling the KUB loitering munition an autonomous weapons system:
Describing the KUB as a lethal autonomous weapons system (LAWS) shows the definitional difficulty, if not confusion, over what is meant by full autonomy in a weapon.
KUB loitering munitions can likely be operated with a human-in-the loop in the decision-making process or without depending on the configuration of the system.
Even if the KUB loitering munition is programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition--in effect, a “fire, forget and find” capability’—then it is debatable whether the KUB would meet the criteria for a fully LAWS.
Shelling of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv in North/Northeast ongoing; 🇷🇺 forces reportedly failed in their attempt to encircle Kharkiv from the east. No offensive operations around Sumy or Chernihiv.
(video: 🇷🇺 2S7 Pion 203mm heavy artillery firing in the direction of Kharkiv)
“[T]he 2-day battle of Voznesensk, details of which are only now emerging, turned decisively against the Russians.” Great reporting by @yarotrof 👇wsj.com/articles/ukrai…
“Judging from the destroyed and abandoned armor, Ukrainian forces, which comprised local volunteers and the professional military, eliminated most of a Russian battalion tactical group on March 2 and 3.”
“We didn’t have a single tank against them, just rocket-propelled grenades, Javelin missiles and the help of artillery,” said Vadym Dombrovsky, commander of the Ukrainian special-forces reconnaissance group in the area and a Voznesensk resident. “
Rufe nach Spezialisierung des Bundesheeres auf einige wenige Waffengattungen, sowie die komplette Abschaffung des Kampfes der verbundenen Waffen, entbehren jeder militärischen & geopolitischen Logik egal ob Mitglied der NATO oder EU-Beistandspflicht.
Spezialisierung in einem Militärbündnis macht nur Sinn wenn grundlegende militärische Fähigkeiten erhalten bleiben, die in 🇦🇹aber auch in 🇩🇪 in den letzten 30 Jahren grob vernachlässigt wurden. Das lernte auch die NATO im letzten Jahrzehnt.
Die Zukunft der Kriegsführung liegt im Kampf der verbundenen Waffen oberhalb und unterhalb des offenen Konfliktspektrums. Dies wird durch emergente Technologien (z.b. KI, Cyber etc.) nur verstärkt. Streitkräfte müssen zu multi-dimensionalen Operationen fähig sein.
Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 16) 👇🧵
Limited🇷🇺 progress:
-slow 🇷🇺 advances in North to encircle Kyiv.
-Cont. 🇷🇺 slow but steady advances in South/East (especially in Donetsk Oblast
- 🇺🇦 defenses remain intact; some counterattacks
succeeded.
Situation around Kyiv: "We estimate Russian forces are still about 15-20km to the northwest and about 20-30km to the east. Ukrainians hold Brovary and are still defending Kyiv." (per U.S. DoD briefer)
🇷🇺 made progress in the South north of Dnpr:
-cont. 🇷🇺 advances in direction of Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol / Zaporizhzhia.
- 🇷🇺cont. offensives towards Kryvyi Rih
-conflicting reports about 🇷🇺 advances around Mykolaiv (city needs to fall/be fully encircled before push on Odessa).
Short summary of the military situation in Ukraine (March 15) 👇🧵
Frontlines remain largely steady:
-stalled 🇷🇺 advance in North.
-Cont. 🇷🇺 slow advance in South/East.
- Again,🇷🇺 made most progress in Donetsk/Luhansk Oblasts
- 🇺🇦 defenses remain intact.
Steady progress in the South north of Dnpr:
-further 🇷🇺 advances in direction of Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol / Zaporizhzhia.
- 🇷🇺continued offensives towards Kryvyi Rih
-further 🇷🇺 advances around Mykolaiv (city needs to fall/be fully encircled before push on Odessa).
Continued shelling of shelling of Mykolaiv/Mariupol in South and Chenihi/Kharkiv in North/Northeast; 🇷🇺 forces are still attempting to encircle Chernihiv. (video: shelling of Kharkiv over night.)