Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵
The high and wide positioning of Dembélé and Torres, created gaps in Madrid’s back line, especially when their full-backs decided to mark the opponents tightly. Passes over and around then exploited these gaps, with Torres particularly effective when running beyond Nacho... 🧐🧵
To access the wingers’ movements beyond the Madrid defence, Aubameyang dropped in to connect with the midfield. As Busquets, De Jong and Pedri were still man-marked, they could only receive to play forward as part of a third-man combination... 🧐🧵
With no recognised centre-forward, Ancelotti set Real up with a box midfield during build-up, with Modric and Federico Valverde as two number 10s between the lines (below). Wingers Rodrygo and Vinícius held the team’s width, attacking around and beyond Barca’s full-backs... 🧐🧵
Madrid converted into a temporary back three to build, with Nacho taking up a reserved position from left-back, allowing Vinícius to isolate his opponent for as long as possible. Rodrygo moved into a narrow position and Carvajal pushed forward to provide the width... 🧐🧵
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4-4-2 is made up of three distinct lines. The back four including two centre-backs and two full-backs. Ahead of them, a midfield four features two players in the middle and one on each side. Then the front two in attack who provide both height and goalscoring threat... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
In the 1950s, Viktor Maslov developed another variation of the 4-2-4, in which the two wingers dropped back alongside the two central midfielders. So originated the 4-4-2, which worked to overload opposition midfields with traditionally fewer numbers... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
How Diego @Simeone’s #AtleticoMadrid knocked Manchester United out of the Champions League through attacking in a 3-5-2 and left-sided counter-attacks... 🧐🧵
United were set up in a 4-2-3-1, up against Atlético’s 5-3-2 defensive block. The hosts built around Atlético’s front two and progressed down the flanks. A strong spell in the first half came as a result of Ronaldo dropping out to combine between a full-back and winger... 🧐🧵
When Ronaldo drifted out to the left, left-back Alex Telles was more aggressive with his positioning. He overlapped to support Jadon Sancho, who made direct runs in behind, especially after moving into the inside channel... 🧐🧵
Guardiola set his team up in their familiar 4-3-3, against United’s 4-4-2 block. City focused on building through the inside channels. De Bruyne and Silva received in between the United winger and central midfielder, before connecting with the wide attacker and full-back... 🧐🧵
Walker held his position at right-back, acting as cover against any United counter-attacks, while Cancelo combined with Silva and Grealish on the left. Foden’s supporting movements to that side led to multiple quick combinations that broke through United’s deeper block... 🧐🧵
Counter-pressing is a strategy used to disrupt the opposition as soon as possession is lost – the point of defensive transition. It involves aggressively pressing the ball and the opponents near to the ball with several players... ⏱️🧵
Pressing is one of the five defensive principles, and has been an aspect of the game since football was invented. It grew in prominence from the '60s, when Ernst Happel, Rinus Michels, Valeriy Lobanovskyi and Arrigo Sacchi all had their teams adopt an aggressive press... ⏱️🧵
City's 4-3-3 was designed to create central overloads, with false 9 Silva dropping deep and Sterling and Mahrez maintaining their width. Walker and Cancelo could then go forward to create 2v1s out wide in the knowledge that PSG’s wide forwards, were unlikely to track back... 🧐🧵
City implemented a high and aggressive press. The idea to show PSG inside was most likely to reduce the chances of them getting Mbappé or Neymar into one-on-one races in the channels in behind the City defence... 🧐🧵
Chelsea used a 3-5-2 structure with two high number eights in N’Golo Kanté and Hudson-Odoi. Hakim Ziyech acted as a number 10, often moving away from Christian Pulisic, who stayed high as the main centre-forward... 🧐🧵
In the first half, Hudson-Odoi and Chilwell rotated well, with Ziyech moving over to provide support on the left. Here, he proved more difficult for Juventus to pick up because their midfield line often narrowed to prevent direct access into Ziyech between the lines... 🧐🧵