A lot of US commentary on Russo-Ukrainian war assumes it is US responsibility to define terms for a settlement. This is reflected in discussions about the concessions Ukraine meeds to make and now whether the overthrow of Putin should be a war aim. 1/
The negotiations are between Ukraine and Russia, not US and Russia. The Russian objective was regime change in Ukraine. In these circumstances, and Russia’s brutal conduct of war, a Ukrainian demand for regime change in Moscow would not be unreasonable.2/
But it is also unrealistic. Any peace settlement will deal with other matters. But it is also the case that Putin’s personal position is at stake here because he has made a massive blunder. 3/
Biden’s comments that Putin should not stay in power reflects a widespread view but it is not something he can influence except in two respects. The first is the question of war crimes. Biden has already described Putin as a war criminal, which implies removal from power.4/
This all comes together when we get to easing sanctions as part of a peace settlement. Here Western aims and concerns will become relevant. Do sanctions stay as long as Putin remains in power? Or is the priority just to get Russian withdrawal 5/
This is for the future. Putin’s fate will depend on developments in Moscow that we can neither anticipate nor control. But the idea that after this war we can try and find some new way of working with Putin in power seems far-fetched. End/
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What are we to make of this Russian statement that a first phase of the operation is complete so that the intention now is to concentrate on its main objective and take the Donbas? 1/
1/ First, we are reluctant to accept Russian statements at face value, but this makes some strategic sense. However they seek to dress it up, past month represents a major failure. Away from the Donbas all its offensives are stalled, and Ukrainian counter-attacks underway. 2/
The article does not preclude returning to the task of 'storming' the main Ukrainian cities once it has completed its primary task. This begs the question of what it has been trying to do the last few weeks (it suggests defeating the Ukrainian air force and navy). 3/
As the Russia war scare rumbles on I remain struck by the number of claims being made about the high quality of Putin's military options, demonstrating how any Ukrainian (or other potential victim) resistance will be crushed and how little NATO can do to help.2/
These claims tend to suffer from the fallacy of the first move, by which confidence in the ability of a military operation to achieve its initial objectives leads to a neglect of all the possible - and often more difficult - consequential moves to follow. 3/
With the current attention being given to Russia's menacing military buildup there is a lot of discussion about how seriously the threat should be taken and how to respond.1/
Inevitably at times like this we get the two favourite historical analogies - rapid mobilisation in the summer of 1914 or Munich in 1938. One warns about ambitious military moves; the other too many diplomatic concessions. 2/
Trouble with both analogies is we know they each led to war, and so 'lessons' can get overdrawn and by now are cliched. And also they come from pre-nuclear age. Risks of war are different now. 3/
Thread on UK nuclear weapons policy. Be patient. Quite long.
The statement in the review on UK nuclear policy is the most comprehensive for some time, although it requires careful reading. It largely reaffirms existing policy. 1/
Most important announcement is the increase in the nuclear stockpile from 180 to no more than 260 warheads. The number derives from the maximum that can be deployed if two subs are on patrol. 16 missiles per boat; 8 warheads per missile; two boats on patrol. 16 x 8 x 2 = 256. 2/
The paper I tweeted yesterday was not the one to which Channel 4 referred (apologies) but one actually discussed at SAGE (which is why i assumed one mentioned). I have done a bit more research to work out how Prof Riley’s paper fitted into pattern of decision-making. 1/
This is what Channel 4 said. channel4.com/news/uk-govern…
Professor Riley’s paper warned that is measures were not taken then the UK faced a Covid-19 catastrophe. Channel 4 say they don’t know how it was evaluated and they don’t say why it was written. 2/
Professor Riley, one of the Imperial College team, was not the only modeller urging action. John Edmunds’ group at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine had been warning of the scale of the coming epidemic since February.3/
Lots of papers put on SAGE website - up to meeting on 12 May. haven't had a chance to review yet. gov.uk/government/gro…
These are largely statistical analyses of cases rather than scientific advice. It is mainly updated versions of this paper - Dynamic CO-CIN report to SAGE and
NERVTAG - from later March to last week. This is the most up to date version. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…
There is a lot of detail in these reports but headlines are unsurprising:
‘Hot spots’ of disease incidence largely reflect areas of high population density (most notably London) with a few exceptions.