Thread by @jwuthnow

How has #China’s military strategy changed under #Xi Jinping? In a new @jststs article, @fravel and I take a look at the latest (ca. 2019) military strategic guidelines. Short thread. 1/8
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…

The MSGs provide answers to key strategy questions and were updated nine times between 1949 and 2014. For a comprehensive analysis, see Taylor’s 2019 @PrincetonUPress book 2/8
press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove…

We look at the 10th strategy, announced in early 2019. This is the 2nd issued under Xi. Based on PLA sources, we found consistency with the previous (2014) iteration. PLA still focused on ’informatized local wars’, ‘integrated joint ops’, and Taiwan/US as main opponents. 3/8

A change in the latest update was rebranding the philosophical ‘core’ of the strategy – the ‘strategic guiding thought’ – to put Xi Jinping and his ‘thought’ firmly at the center. This was a more prominent political-optics motive than in previous strategies. 4/8

The 2019 MSG also updated the strategic assessment to focus more on strategic competition w/ the U.S. and deteriorating cross-strait situation. It also kicked off a renewed round of reform, under the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-5), focused on deepening joint operations. 5/8

While the new MSG did not make major changes in military judgments, there are several currents in non-authoritative PLA sources that are setting the stage for a larger substantive change in the guidelines down the road. 6/8

These include new joint ops concepts and a prominent role for ‘intelligentization’ and adv capabilities. Shifts in the security environment (incl. rivalry w/ US) could lead the PLA away from a ‘local wars’ rubric, but status of TW will constrain global mil ambitions. 7/ 8

The MSGs are a set of principles that push the PLA on a certain road, but the military has much flexibility in interpreting that guidance. Much will continue to evolve in terms of mil capabilities, operations, and acquisition before the PLA is handed its 11th strategy. 8/8