How has #China’s military strategy changed under #Xi Jinping? In a new @jststs article, @fravel and I take a look at the latest (ca. 2019) military strategic guidelines. Short thread. 1/8 tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
The MSGs provide answers to key strategy questions and were updated nine times between 1949 and 2014. For a comprehensive analysis, see Taylor’s 2019 @PrincetonUPress book 2/8 press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove…
We look at the 10th strategy, announced in early 2019. This is the 2nd issued under Xi. Based on PLA sources, we found consistency with the previous (2014) iteration. PLA still focused on ’informatized local wars’, ‘integrated joint ops’, and Taiwan/US as main opponents. 3/8
A change in the latest update was rebranding the philosophical ‘core’ of the strategy – the ‘strategic guiding thought’ – to put Xi Jinping and his ‘thought’ firmly at the center. This was a more prominent political-optics motive than in previous strategies. 4/8
The 2019 MSG also updated the strategic assessment to focus more on strategic competition w/ the U.S. and deteriorating cross-strait situation. It also kicked off a renewed round of reform, under the 14th Five Year Plan (2021-5), focused on deepening joint operations. 5/8
While the new MSG did not make major changes in military judgments, there are several currents in non-authoritative PLA sources that are setting the stage for a larger substantive change in the guidelines down the road. 6/8
These include new joint ops concepts and a prominent role for ‘intelligentization’ and adv capabilities. Shifts in the security environment (incl. rivalry w/ US) could lead the PLA away from a ‘local wars’ rubric, but status of TW will constrain global mil ambitions. 7/ 8
The MSGs are a set of principles that push the PLA on a certain road, but the military has much flexibility in interpreting that guidance. Much will continue to evolve in terms of mil capabilities, operations, and acquisition before the PLA is handed its 11th strategy. 8/8
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Drawing inspiration from British SOF in the Falklands, other campaigns, PLA theorists see 3 roles for SOF in Taiwan: recon/targeting, strikes/raids (incl. political targets), and info ops. SOF is integral to the basic command structure for the island landing, not distinct. (2/6)
Most PLA (and PAP) SOF resembles US Army Rangers but there are a few units more like Delta Force or the SEALs, which delegate more authority to the team commander. PLA SOF is investing in advanced equipment useful for clandestine maritime missions. (3/6)
In August 2020, the PLA released an updated version of its core strategy textbook for senior officers – the Science of Military Strategy. What’s new in this book? I took a look and offer some findings in @CHinaBriefJT
Compared to the last (2017) version, the book has some new content. It has an interesting new section on “wartime political work” that underscores the importance of defensive psychological operations – PLA troops need to be loyal. (2/7)
There is also a greater focus on “intelligentization” – a concept of fighting with cutting edge equipment such as AI, quantum, and hypersonics. (3/7)
THREAD: How much of a threat does China’s #PLA pose to Taiwan? We mostly focus on the military balance and challenges for U.S. intervention, but another angle needs more exploring—competing demands on PLA attention and resources. 1/9 inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Art…
The PLA has to prepare for a war with #Taiwan while also handling a growing array of other missions, with finite resources. The #Ladakh crisis is an example. Worries about conflicts in the west tie up a quarter of China’s ground forces. 2/9
Chinese strategists understand the dilemma and discourage over-concentrating on a single contingency. In their parlance, the PLA has to be prepared for war in ALL “strategic directions,” not just the “main strategic direction” (the southeast). 3/9