Five weeks have passed since the beginning of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine what a Russian operational reorientation might look like for Ukraine. 1/25 (Image - @CNN) 
2/25 Major General Igor Konashenkov from the Russian Ministry of Defense has said that a planned regrouping of troops was underway around #Kyiv & #Chernihiv. This comes after Russian negotiators said Russian forces would de-escalate operations around the two cities.
3/25 This complements last weeks briefing by Russian General Rudskoy, who notes that “the combat potential of the armed forces of Ukraine has been significantly reduced, allowing us, to focus the main efforts on achieving the main goal - the liberation of Donbas."
4/25 A simple interpretation of this would tell us that because of a Russian culmination, they will hold fast in the north and the south, while reinforcing operations in the east. But with everything in war, nothing is simple. And the Russian’s will try to deceive us.
5/25 As @PentagonPresSec has said, “we ought not be fooled by the Kremlin's claim that it will suddenly just reduce military attacks near Kyiv.” Wise words – and the performance of US intelligence agencies in this conflict so far has been very strong.
6/25 Additionally, Putin is by no means finished with Ukraine. He is merely seeking an alternate theory of victory to justify this war to his people. And to satisfy some of the more hard line nationalists in Moscow that he should remain president. smh.com.au/national/putin…
7/25 As @LawDavF writes today, “Ukraine must seen to be defeated, no matter what the costs. Perhaps because he is aware of this, Putin shows no sign of relenting on any of his core demands. He dare not confirm the weakness in his position.” samf.substack.com/p/the-problem-…
8/25 So the Russians are nowhere near giving up on their Ukraine special military operation, despite the setbacks. Therefore, what might a Russian reorientation in Ukraine look like?
9/25 First, the limited withdrawals of troops from the north would be normal in any other war. When front line combat units reach the end of their endurance and capability, they are rotated out. The problem here is the Russians have few units to replace them.
10/25 Therefore, the Russians are using firepower in the north as a substitute for boots on the ground. And, as with all military forces in a defensive posture, artillery and rockets are useful to dissuade an adversary from conducting counter attacks.
11/25 And the Ukrainians are clearly quite capable of undertaking further counter offensives in some parts of the country. Indeed, in the past few days, Ukrainian forces have gained more ground than they have lost.
12/25 The Russians must first defend the ground they have taken. If they can’t, they either lose the info-war (surrendering ground narrative) or they lose military units that are cut off and destroyed by the Ukrainians (also bad).
13/25 Second, the Russians must be able to physically move forces from the north (and the south) to their eastern front. Because the Russians are operating on exterior lines, this means that journeys of hundreds of kilometres on road or rail are required, which takes time.
14/25 Third, the Russians need more soldiers. Their invasion plan with over 55% of Russian ground forces has placed them in a very difficult spot. Their strategic force generation will take a long time to regenerate their army. It is not going to happen in weeks or even months.
15/25 They will obviously use mercenaries, and second- or third-rate forces from elsewhere (such as Georgia). We should not expect their military effectiveness to be any better than the 'theoretically elite' formations which crossed into Ukraine on 24 February.
16/25 The latest conscription proclamation by President Putin will be of little assistance. It takes time to train soldiers. It takes longer to train good ones who can fight as a team. newsweek.com/what-are-consc…
17/25 The fourth challenge is logistics. While the eastern front will be able to utilise Russian depots further to the east (unlike the temporary logistics hubs in Belarus used by the norther front), they will be operating on extended lines of communications within Ukraine.
18/25 For example, the most logical operational objective of any Russian ‘eastern front’ advance would be Dnipro. It is 430km to the west of the Russian border. It would take a significant improvement in Russian logistics (and rear area security) to advance over that distance.
19/25 Finally, the Russian air force will probably have to redeploy to air bases closer to the eastern theatre to support operations in, and west of, the Donbas region. Although, given their effectiveness so far, they might not get invited to any new eastern campaign.
20/25 Even if this is not some grand ruse from the Russians, we should not expect that they will easily give up ground gained in the north & south. They will also probably continue to conduct long range bombardment of Ukrainian cities, and sporadically attack western Ukraine.
21/25 What is the likely outcome of the Russian reorientation of its campaign in Ukraine?
22/25 Given the poor leadership at all levels of the Russian military, it is hard to see them achieving the drastic improvements in tactical competence that would be needed for a successful eastern offensive. To make it harder, some of the best Ukrainian brigades are in the east.
23/25 Therefore, any Russian operational reorientation to the east is likely to prolong the war. Because it will have the means to fight for longer on one front than it would on three, Russia will continue to fight to achieve some kind of success in Ukraine.
24/25 We should also be wary of Russian offers of ceasefires. They are unlikely to be genuine & likely a play for time to reconstitute Russian forces. This detailed exploration of the ceasefire scenario from @nataliabugayova is excellent. understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…
25/25 @lawdavf writes, “it is hard to avoid the conclusion that there are no good outcomes for Russia from this war.” Given Russia’s poor performance, & Ukrainian tenacity, it's unlikely an eastern offensive will provide the strategic victory that Putin seeks. Image - @UAWeapons
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