In my speech @Ambrosetti_ on “Managing policy trade-offs”, I discuss the response of monetary policy to the contractionary supply shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and what role fiscal policy can play in macroeconomic stabilisation. #Finance2022 1/16
Thanks to the response of fiscal and monetary policy during the pandemic, the euro area was on track for one of the fastest recoveries in history before the invasion: from trough to peak, euro area real GDP expanded by 17.5% until year-end 2021. 2/16
In terms of the level of GDP, the euro area is still lagging behind the US due to the much stronger hit to activity in the pandemic. The war will measurably slow the pace of the recovery and lift inflation further away from our target, and for a longer period. 3/16
The appropriate policy response depends on the persistence of the shock. While part of current inflation will vanish over time, a considerable part is likely to prove more persistent, for three reasons: pipeline pressures, structural shocks and wage catch-up. 4/16
First, producer prices in the euro area are increasing at an unprecedented pace, much stronger than elsewhere, affecting consumer prices over a long time. An IMF analysis finds that pipeline pressures are driven by both aggregate demand and supply. 5/16
Second, structural shocks are turning inflationary. The war and the pandemic are accelerating reshoring, thereby loosening the previous brake that globalisation had put on wages and inflation. The energy transition will add to upward price pressures over the medium term. 6/16
Third, job retention schemes are delaying wage adjustments by reducing labour market churn. High inflation and an increasingly tight labour market will likely lead to a staggered and possibly longer-lasting increase in wages, even if the recovery slows. 7/16
The question is whether the impact of the war on demand is sufficiently strong and long-lasting to offset these forces. Expected output remains robust, while surveys paint a mixed picture: large uncertainty over the medium run and a more modest impact in the near term. 8/16
Financial markets remain sanguine about the economy’s capacity to generate inflation in line with our target. Inflation risk premia are even rising, and actual inflation is increasingly influencing forecasters’ beliefs about future inflation. 9/16
By showing resolve, monetary policy can break this dynamic and reduce the trade-off between stabilising output and inflation. Credibility is vital for monetary policy. Therefore, we will continue the path of policy normalisation, subject to optionality and data dependency. 10/16
As monetary policy is focused on preserving price stability and anchoring inflation expectations, the headwinds to growth can be buffered by fiscal policy. Unless the economic situation deteriorates markedly, current circumstances call for targeted support, for two reasons. 11/16
First, monetary policy remains highly accommodative. The real interest rate in three years’ time, which matters for consumption and investment, remains in deep negative territory, with monetary policy far from becoming restrictive for growth and employment. 12/16
Second, euro area governments face a trade-off themselves: between business cycle stabilisation and debt sustainability. Debt has increased materially as a result of the pandemic and fiscal deficits remain sizeable. 13/16
Fiscal policy should prioritise spending on investments that will raise productivity and potential output, especially in the area of the energy transition. Moreover, governments should provide targeted support to the most vulnerable groups. 14/16
Fiscal measures will compensate for a part of the estimated impact of the war on aggregate demand. Coordinated action at European level could complement national initiatives, jointly shouldering the costs from protecting our fundamental values. 15/16
An appropriate policy mix, with monetary policy countering the rise in inflation and fiscal policy countering the drop in aggregate demand in a targeted manner, will be decisive for fostering social cohesion, protecting people’s purchasing power and sustaining the recovery. 16/16
Speeches are an important element of central bank communication. After two years at the @ecb’s Executive Board, I would like to present a selection of the most relevant of my (more than 30) speeches in a long thread🧵. 1/18
#MonetaryPolicy: There are too many speeches to list them all, so let me select a few: on the ECB’s response to the pandemic (6 Apr 2020), mentioning (AFAIK) the concept of the euro area GDP-weighted yield curve for the first time: 3/18 ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date…
Today we @ecb issued our new digital publication and interactive tool on inflation. It is one of our attempts to better explain the concept & measurement of inflation, its heterogeneity across goods and countries as well as the difference between perceived & actual inflation. 1/8
Chapter 1 explains the concept of inflation and why it matters. You can look at the inflation rate in a particular country for a particular category of goods and services, which gives an impression of the heterogeneity across countries and goods. 2/8
It also show the evolution over time for different countries, distinguishing the overall price index and certain subcategories, which show very different degrees of volatility: food, energy, non-energy industrial goods and services. 3/8
In an interview with @derspiegel, conducted by @Bartz70Tim & @KaiserSte, I talk about recent inflation developments, monetary and fiscal policy in the pandemic, the @ecb’s role in combating climate change and financial stability. Below you find some key messages. 1/14
As we are still far from reaching our inflation aim of below, but close to, 2%, a sustainable rise of inflation in the direction of 2% would be good news. That would mean that the economy is gaining momentum and aggregate demand is increasing. 2/14
However, inflation is currently rising on the back of many one-off effects, like base effects in oil prices and the VAT rise in Germany. Our projections show that the rate of inflation will ease again in 2022, because aggregate demand will presumably remain weak. 3/14
On Mondays at 15:45 CET, we publish the Eurosystem’s PEPP holdings (at amortised cost), as of the previous Friday, on our website: 2/11
By taking the difference to the previous week, one obtains the *net* purchases for the previous trading week. This is the difference between gross purchases *settled* in that week (i.e. traded two trading days earlier, so from THU to WED) and redemptions (from MON to FRI). 3/11
Large-scale government & central bank interventions in the COVID-19 crisis have revived the debate on the alleged "zombification" of the economy if unviable firms are kept alive. In our recent VoxEU column with @laeven_luc & @gschepen, we survey the existing literature. 1/14
Why would banks lend to "zombie firms"? On the dark side, low-capitalised banks may engage in the "evergreening" of loans to avoid loss recognition. On the bright side, banks may lend to preserve valuable relationships, which can also avoid disruptions of supply chains. 2/14
A "zombification" of the economy can lead to a drop in productivity through credit misallocation: either mechanically by reducing aggregate productivity, or through a crowding-out effect when "zombie lending" tightens the credit constraints of high-productivity firms. 3/14
On Friday, I gave a speech at Deutscher @juristentag about the distributional effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the danger of “unequal scars”. My goal was to add a European dimension to the debate. Here is my usual Twitter summary, including some of the charts. 1/11
The pandemic is a global shock that hit all euro area countries almost simultaneously. But it has become increasingly clear that the pandemic has very different impacts on different countries, as can be seen from the @EU_Commission’s forecast of economic growth. 2/11
There is a negative correlation between the projected fall in GDP for 2020 and (a) the extent of government-imposed restrictions, measured by the Oxford Stringency Index, and (b) the dependency on tourism. 3/11